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Summary 
 
The practice of design reviews – the regulation and control of design aspects of private 
developments by a public authority – is well established in Singapore. The powers to regulate 
design are incorporated in the various institutions inherited from the colonial era – the legal 
framework enshrined in the Planning Act, the professionalisation of town planning, and the 
various planning instruments such as development control and the Master Plan.  Since 
independence, three main review mechanisms have been instrumental in the regulation of 
Singapore’s urban aesthetic : 
 
1. Review by administration represents the everyday operation whereby all 
development applications submitted for planning permission are subject to. 
Traditionally known as ‘development control’, this mechanism requires the creation 
of various urban design guidelines and plans, stipulating different design-related 
controls for different parts of the island.  
2.  Review by specialized panels of architectural experts and officials represents an 
extra layer of control reserved for sites or projects which are significant enough to 
warrant greater design attention.  
3. Review through the sale of sites, where land is sold with various design-related 
conditions, started in 1967 to launch the urban renewal of the Central Area. The 
dominant state ownership of land, coupled with a strong centralized planning system 
largely contributes to the immense impact of the GLS programme.  
 
The research argues that the practice of design reviews in Singapore is intimately tied to 
various articulations of power. In this, a centralized planning system facilitates the rapid 
percolation of state agendas into urban design policies and visions, translating to the power to 
ascribe desired meanings into various urban forms and aesthetics. Towards the late 80s, 
anxieties about national identity and competitiveness in a global economy prompted efforts at 
making planning a more consultative and open process, while demanding the government to 
become more pro-business and less managerial. The perceived threats of a global economy 
were also employed to legitimise various urban strategies, notably generating a hunger for 
iconic products and place-branding.  
 
This paradigm shift at the political and civil service level inflects the design review process in 
many ways. In conclusion, it is argued that three basic conditions encapsulate the institution 
and practice of design review in Singapore, with implications for further research into urban 
aesthetics as a medium through which various meanings are encoded and decoded according 
to a given set of larger national/extra-national agendas -  
 
1. Professionalisation of design language and aesthetic judgment, while at the same 
time, the trivialisation of design discourse in the public realm through selective 
disclosure and the art of mass communications; 
 
2. Avoidance of open contestations and potential conflict between lay and professional 
opinions on aesthetics in public domain; and 
 
3. Centralization of all functions of urban planning, development control and urban 
design within a single authority, resulting in a strong state control over the arbitration 
of aesthetic value and meaning, while at the same time, the employment of affective 
rhetoric and limited public/professional consultation to grease this centralization of 
power. 
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Academics have often scrutinized popular media of mass communication – literature, 
advertisements, popular culture and art – in order to uncover hidden structures, naturalized 
meanings and covert operations of power that mediate the relationship between people and 
the urban environment. Such mediums of mass media are already refined and filtered by 
various interest groups to influence the recipients in order to affect certain behaviours, such 
as to promote consumption, induce obedience, or evoke a sense of belonging and community. 
Architecture, by its ubiquity, physical presence and demand on valuable resources, can be 
seen to be complicit in representing and effecting such operations of power. The control of 
aesthetics – influencing and defining how cities and buildings should look – is an exercise 
that is embroiled in some of these power-relationships. For one, conservation of buildings 
requires legitimatization in terms of historical truth/appropriateness, and its operations require 
the support of grassroots who must be persuaded and/or educated to connect with such 
historicities. The aesthetic imaginings of a city represented in built form as a skyline, urban 
pattern, architectural icons or an ‘urban lifestyle’ are often linked to official discourses on 
national identity, pride and groundedness. Here, the dominant force will ultimately seek to 
stabilize the image that serves its political, economic and social goals – giving rise to design 
regulations and control in its various forms.  
 
As a crucial moment in which design is set out for scrutiny by the public or a public body, 
design review can be seen as an integral process in the construction of architectural and urban 
meanings, for it is in this moment that ideas, convictions and prejudices are fought out and 
subsequently legitimatised as ‘appropriate’, ‘excellent’ or ‘worthy’. When placed within such 
a ‘institutional matrix’, the meaning of architecture and urban design can no longer be 
adequately explained by waves of aesthetic or theoretical ideas superseding one another, but 
one that is sustained and contested in many political, social and economic arenas. Postmodern 
stylistics did not just ascend to replace Modernist architecture because a new generation of 
architects superseded the old and perceived the world differently from their predecessors. 
Rather, an entire range of industries and politics stood together to provide legitimacy for its 
rise – patronage from the powerful, intellectual support from respected critics and academics, 
new construction technologies and positive media projections of this new architectural style. 
Thus, if buildings are often valorised by the quality of its design, its innovation in style or 
technique, and its social or historical value, this research questions the valorization process as 






Design reviews are of course a valorization process. This research attempts to foreground it 
as a moment where meanings are being constructed and which then are encoded and 
naturalized in material space and culture. Such meaning-construction implicates intimately 
with articulations of power and how it legitimizes itself through various forms of rhetoric 
which might be nuanced for public consumption or hardened to have legal teeth and powers. 
Thus, the results of a review process could be an accolade to celebrate or valorize a certain 
aesthetic – as with architectural awards or competitions – or legal conditions which detail 
what must be done and what cannot – as with tender documents and governmental policies. 
The objective is thus not a value judgement, but an expository one – to unpack the complex 
politics employed to legitimise or naturalise various urban strategies and architectural 
projections. The ‘cultural turn’ in this inquiry aims at trying to understand the production of 
architectural meaning not just in museums and studios, but in offices of power and sites of 
resistance. 
 
This research thus employs the study of design reviews to ask two questions about the 
relationships between architecture, power and knowledge in Singapore. The first question 
asks how the aesthetic of the city is being regulated by the public authorities. The task of 
answering this question is essentially a descriptive one. The second question asks why and for 
what purposes are such regulations in place. The task of answering this question is both an 
evaluative as well as a critical one. In this, I have proceeded not to disengage the two 
questions, such that the description comes before the evaluation, but to allow the descriptive 
process itself to be inflected by this critical perspective. This endeavour, I feel, is more 
appropriate as it meets the necessary task of presenting empirical knowledge on a hitherto 
less researched subject, while acknowledging that this descriptive process is never objective 






By saying that the period of study stretches from 1819 to 2005, this research clearly sacrifices 
depth for breadth. Many risks are taken to cover such breadth. Yet, an important benefit of 
this long reach across time is to avail ourselves of a sense of historicity, a complexion of 
things that already suggests materiality and momentum. Again, facing a void of precedent 
literature on design reviews or regulations in Singapore, such a general survey performs a 
tentative role as scaffolding for further discussion, while making links with critical discourses 
in other areas of urban studies. In this, I hope that trajectory of this inquiry, as well as its  
obvious lapses and gaps, can signal greater attention to this area of discourse, and the 








On Design Review 
 








Much has been written about design review in the British and American context. It is a 
distinct and specialized field within the larger discourses of urban design, planning and 
governance represented by clusters of experts in various countries. A survey of the literature 
shows that the latest wave of academic interest started in the 1980s, coinciding with the rise 
of the discipline of urban design. The rapid development of urban design theory is often 
attributed to the rash of social critique in the 50s and 60s lamenting a profound sense of 
placelessness and alienation due to accelerated changes to the physical urban landscape (Ellin 
1996). As Southworth (1989) pointed out for the States, ‘urban design as a distinct speciality 
within city planning in the United States developed rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s in 
response to the failure of urban renewal projects which demolished too much, leaving behind 
a barren landscape that has no sense of place or community’. Reacting against the 
functionalist attitude towards the city espoused by the early modernist architects and planners, 
particularly the Modern Movement’s Athen’s Charter in 1933, urban design theory grew out 
of a ‘postmodern reflex’, often described categorically as a turn towards nostalgia, 
romanticism and the search for a lost sense of community. Another common description of 
the discipline of urban design is that it fills in the gap between planning and architecture, one 
that returns attention to the spaces between buildings, and the scale between the object and 
the plan.  
 
Academics have offered different definitions of design reviews to give precision to the 
scope of exploration, though the different definitions also reflect the political, historical and 
operational differences between cities and countries. An early and extremely broad definition 
is offered by Bender and Bressi (1989) : 
 
Any time a distinction can be made between the person who wants and has the means 
to build a structure and the person who has the skill to design it, some form of design 






Subsequent researchers often place design review within the institutional practice of 
development control and the planning system. Thus, Shirvani provides a definition that 
describes the task of design review:  
 
By design review I mean all the criteria and methods used in implementing urban design 
policies and/or plans, including both functional and aesthetic concerns. As an overall 
implementation tool, design review aids in regulating segments of the visual, sensory, 
and functionally built environment of a defined area in accordance with values and goals 
of the particular ‘community of interests’ and relates design features such as pedestrian 
amenities and building massing to the sensory environment.  
Shirvani H., 1981 : 12 
Schuster, in the American context, makes the further distinction that design reviews are 
processes whereby the public is involved in scrutinizing the designs of private developments: 
 
I will use the term ‘design review’ to encompass all of the processes whereby private 
development proposals are presented for, and receive, independent, third-party public 
interest scrutiny. By this definition, design review can range from citizen groups 
commenting on development proposals in an ad hoc manner through project-specific, 
citizen’s advisory committees; to more formalized processes such as review by 
historic preservation commissions, review by specially appointed juries, or review by 
standing civic design review boards. These processes share two common 
characteristics : they are conducted by “third” parties – neither the architect, the 
developer, the client, nor the government – who represent a public interest in the 






Schuster J M D, 1997 : 210 
 The practice of design review is closely tied to the rise of the discipline of urban 
design as its implementation tool. As such, the basic tenets of urban design as enshrined by 
its founders can be found echoing in the debates on the merits and demerits of design 
reviews1. While urban design theory is a reaction to the failure of modern planning and 
architecture in all its social, cultural and economic dimensions, discourse on design review 
started largely as a reaction to its (already prevalent) practice in various cities and 
communities, and the political and legal issues that surround it. Therefore, different political 
and urban models mean that design reviews and their implementation differ across the US 
and the UK, and even amongst different cities of the same country, making its study 
geographically and politically specific. Thus, Schuster’s definition will not be applicable to 
other countries where ‘third-party’ intervention does not exist. In UK, where the central 
government has exercised considerable control over local planning practice through both 
legislation and policy for almost a century, Punter does not make any distinction between 
public scrutiny or government control. In fact, he does not make any distinction between 
‘design review’ and ‘aesthetic control’ - a term which the American planners avoid like the 
plague2 - since, at least in the UK continent, there often seems to be no substantial difference 
between the two.   
 
                                                 
1 See Scheer - 1994 for a list of grievances against design reviews, from the American perspective 
2 See Hinshaw’s lengthy and careful delineation between ‘design review’, which is to be encouraged, and ‘aesthetic 
control’ which is to be rejected. (Hinshaw, M L 1995 : 4) 
Academic discourse and studies on design review has a longer history in the US, starting with 
earlier writers like Preiser and Hall (1980) and Bender and Bressi (1989), largely growing out 
of a concern with the widespread emergence of ‘appearance codes’ and ‘aesthetic covenants’ 
in the 70s, the implementation of the “National Environmental Policy Act’ in 19693 and 
several design related ordinances in cities like San Francisco during that period of time. It 
should be noted, however, that development of design review is uneven in the various states 
of America – some cities like Boston and San Francisco have a long history of design 
regulations and comprehensive planning controls, while Houston and Texas, for example, do 
not practice zoning at all. The emergence of such ordinances and regulations grew out of the 
same anxiety that gave rise to urban design as a distinct discipline – suburban sprawl, 
placelessness and loss of identity/community being the usual suspects in the long list of 
grievances. It should not be surprising therefore, that the earliest ordinances enacted revolved 
around taming some of the unprecedented transformations in the American landscape which 
many of the founding writers of urban design had highlighted – the “National Highway 
Beautification Act” in 1976 to stem the proliferation of billboards along highways, various 
sign ordinances to protect the character of local districts from rampant neon-lit signages, and 
in San Francisco where skyscrapers were beginning to sprout, roofscape and height controls 
to prevent ‘boxy high-rise buildings and a ‘benching effect on the skyline’ (Duerkson: 1986). 
The attention to the issue of design reviews in the US resulted in several surveys amongst 
professionals, and at least two conferences4. A parallel stream of discourse in the US is 
represented by lawyers (such as Rubin, 1975, Costonis 1982, 1989, Pearlman, 1988 and 
Novak and Blaesser, 1990) who are concerned with the challenges posed by admitting 





                                                 
3 The Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies to detail a project’s effects on environmental values in ‘environmental 
impact statements’ to be publicized for critique by other public bodies and environmental watchdog groups. It has 
been noted that some of the values espoused and protected by the Act are aesthetic based, as NEPA’s purposes 
include ensuring ‘aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings” 
4 An early conference, International Symposium on Design Review, was convened by Scheer (formerly Lightner) and 
Preiser in 1989 and produced a publication “Design Review – Challenging Urban Aesthetic Control”. In 2002, 
another conference, “Regulating Place”, was held in MIT, and resulted in the publication of the same name in 2005.  
law, and contravenes the First Amendment of the constitution which guarantees free speech. 
From this angle of inquiry which traces the various case laws and judicial decisions involving 
aesthetic control, it seems that “no trend is more clearly defined in planning than that of 






 On the other hand, academic discourse on design control and regulation in the UK is 
dominated by a few researchers and practitioners (most notably Punter and McCarmona), 
though professional interest in the issue is vibrant and just as controversial. Punter (1986), in 
tracing the history of aesthetic regulations in the UK through government circulars and legal 
acts, shows that it is a highly contested area that has engaged the central government, local 
authorities and individual community groups since 1909. In his account, the introduction of 
town planning in 1947 after the Second World War marked the beginning of the 
contemporary model of design control in England. By this system, developments were 
required to obtain planning permissions which considered aesthetics as one of the ‘material 
considerations’ in the grant of the permission. The impetus for more comprehensive design 
control was initially provided by the conservation movement, as represented by the 1973 
Essex Design Guide for Residential Areas which tried to “codify a new approach to suburban 
design that was more responsive to the character of the locality, and that rejected the 
controlling influence of highway, parking, and layout standards, and the ‘anyplace’ 
architecture of the mass house builders” (Punter 1994 : 54). Punter also delineates carefully 
the central government’s advice on design control which tended to be cautious about 
controlling aesthetics, and the local authorities who more often were much more zealous in 
applying design control on developments in the areas of their jurisdiction. Punter ends his 
narrative at around the early 1990s, culminating in the interference by Prince of Wales 
through TV programmes and coffee table books. His “Ten Commandments” of good urban 
design, according to Punter (1990), “revived interest in the development of clearer principles 
of design control that are more comprehensible to the public, that command their support, and 
can be clearly articulated to prospective developers”. This period of time was also marked by 
intense debates within the professions on the role of design regulations and the impact it had 
on architectural practice in the UK, as the UK planning system was undergoing a 
comprehensive review. As a result, Royal Institute of British Architects and Royal Town 
Planners’ Institute made a joint submission to the Department of Environment, 
recommending seven points which essentially supported the view that appearances are 
material concerns in the issuance of planning permissions, but that its review should be more 
concerned with the larger social function and environmental contexts, rather than on 







 For a field of inquiry that is generally demarcated geographically, comparative 
studies between the US and UK, or between European countries are not uncommon. An early 
survey of design review practices was carried out by Preiser and Rohane (1988) to study the 
range and types of aesthetic controls for the built environment across English-speaking 
communities.5 Later research efforts by Punter (1999) attempted to understand the lessons 
and experiences in other cities to reflect on and make substantive recommendations for 
improvement. A comprehensive set of papers contributed by writers from various European 
countries was collected in an issue of the journal “Built Environment” [1994 v(20)]. Such 
studies reveal the distinct differences that researchers should be sensitive to when comparing 
the histories and models of design reviews as practiced in different countries and cities. 
Punter, in comparing the US and UK models thus remarked –  
 
                                                 
5 The communities of city officials involved in the survey come from Canada, United States, Australia, United 
Kingdom and New Zealand. 
… it is important to appreciate the key differences between the British and American 
planning system in order to understand the context of design control. In Britain, 
central government exercises considerable control over local planning practice and 
maintaining control of both legislative and policy… [and] a second key aspect of 
British planning system is its discretionary nature. In contrast with Western Europe 
and America, where conformity to a development/zoning plan guarantees a planning 
permission, the British approach is to treat each application for planning permission 
on its own merits… so design review or control is in no sense separable from other 
aspects of development control process, and it has political, professional and 





Punter, 1994 : 52  
 
Methodological approaches in existing literature 
Literature on design review is dominated by descriptive and normative approaches, taking the 
form of manuals, guidelines or other forms of pedagogical texts. Such texts describe the 
process of design reviews, point out its flaws and promises by focusing on its impact on the 
physical environment and the profession, and advocate some improvement to the current 
system. Authors in both continents predominantly analyze design reviews within its 
institutional, legislative or judicial framework, focusing on issues regarding the legal 
foundations and justifications for public control of aesthetics, the relationships between the 
judicial, legislative and executive institutions in the implementation of design reviews, or 
compliance with the rules of judicial decisions in design review processes. Research usually 
revolves around controversial questions such as who has the right, or expertise, to judge 
aesthetics, what aspects of aesthetics can be judged, and what might be the best procedure 
and criteria for such assessments. For example, Punter’s (1986) detailed historical account of 
design regulations in England and Wales from 1909 to 1985 is a precursor to the 
compendium in 1997 which provides recommendations for good design policies to be 
adopted by the government and municipalities. In the case of the US, discussion is much 
broader, with contributors from architectural, planning and legal professions. Two early 
reports published by the American Planning Association. [Duerksen (1986), Hinshaw (1995)] 
on landuse and aesthetic control in the States represent historical accounts that end with 
advocacy of certain good practices. Many earlier studies on the institutional processes and 
mechanisms of design reviews in US are similarly descriptive in nature [Shirvani (1981),  






 Another trajectory of research concerns a more evaluative or ‘aesthetic’ analysis, 
with regards to defining and clarifying the types of aesthetics of the built environment that are 
of concern during design review processes. These often rely on surveys of professionals 
involved in the design review process as a primary source of information. An example of 
such a study is Habe’s (1989) survey to “examine the state of the art of design guidelines and 
to help other communities that are considering, creating or revising existing guidelines by 
analyzing the contents of currently used design guidelines and the opinions of public 
planners.” In measuring effectiveness of design reviews, one of her focus was on the (urban 
design) objectives of ‘harmony’ and ‘compatibility’ and the type of criteria and standards 
used to translate that into guidelines and subsequently into implementation. This is followed 
by surveys carried out by Schuster (1990) and Jones (2001) of architects in Boston and 
Portland to gauge the professionals’ attitude towards design review. In such surveys, 
understanding the architects’ experience of design review processes - their critique of the 
process in terms of how it promotes/prevents creative design, the type of representation in the 
panels, the amount of time spent preparing for such reviews and the types of issues they feel 
should be valid or invalid for consideration by the review panels – are the primary objectives.  
 
 Such surveys also reveal the communicative dimension of urban design. Jones 
therefore advocates that “the process of aesthetic control represented by design review should 
not simply be viewed as one of strict and direct application of regulatory policy, but rather as 
a social act based upon communication and agreement between various interested groups and 
individuals” (Jones 2001 : 30) Thiel (1994) also proposes to look beyond the control of 
specific architectural elements or aesthetic treatments to focus instead on issues of 
environmental perception of user-participants, and the notion of community character, thus 
reasserting urban design as a discipline that tries to link architecture and planning to the 






Such a perspective has as its basis a theoretical conviction that architecture and urban 
design should be seen not as singular acts of genius or moments of self-expression, 
but as socially relevant and structured practices in which aesthetics is generated out 
of negotiations and contestations, not imposed or defined apriori.  
Thiel P, 1994:374 
 
 Professional views are often contrasted with lay people's views on aesthetics, or 
communally-oriented aesthetics (e.g., public goods) contrasted with personal aesthetics (e.g., 
individual freedom of artistic expression). Such discussions also resonate with research in 
environmental aesthetics and science, with often cited references from Rapoport, Lynch and 
Appleyard. An important contribution to this trajectory is found in the book - ‘Environmental 
Aesthetics – Theory, Research and Applications’ by Jack Nasar (1988) where empirical 
research in behavorial and perceptual aspects of the urban environment serves as a theoretical 
basis for the study in the effectiveness of citizen participation and satisfaction in design 
review processes.  
 
Another methodological approach is social/historical, where researchers attempt to trace 
the historical emergence and basis of codes and standards, in order to critique their relevance 
in the contemporary context. It is interesting to note that even though the aesthetic control of 
cities has existed for as long as there are cities, most academics start their narratives of design 
reviews with the advent of modern planning, and its legislation into the governance of 
modern cities. Design review is seen as part of the development control process, and thus its 
emergence and implementation is tied to the systemic application of modern town planning to 
cities. Punter is thus able to start his “history of aesthetic control” in England and Wales from 
1909, which marks the implementation of the Housing and Planning Act to ‘secure the home 
healthy, the house beautiful, the town pleasant, the city dignified, and the suburb salubrious’ 
(Punter, 1986:352). Pearlman (1988), Duerksen (1986), Costonis (1989) and almost every 
other researcher on design review in America start their historical accounts by referring to the 
classic legal case between Berman and Parker where the Supreme Court supported the 
District of Columbia’s urban renewal programme against the charge that the programme was 
aesthetically based. The oft-quoted verdict marks the first and decisive turn towards admitting 






The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive … the values it represents are 
spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of 
the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, 
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled… It is within 
the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as 
well as healthy  
Berman v Parker, 1954 
 
Considering also the emphasis on the institutional and judicial parameters of design 
review, current historical research on design review is thus heavily built on official 
documents - by tracing various legal acts, circulars and memorandums which reveal the 
evolving attitude the government and other governing bodies hold towards controlling the 
aesthetics of the urban realm, and the feedback from various professional and community 






There are some exceptions, of course, such as Sancar (1994 : 312) who situates design 
review within the broader context of social discourse and proposes the three paradigms of 
“place, sustainability and participation” as “grounds and the backing for substantive and 
procedural discussion of planning and design review”. Thus, she provides both a bridge back 
to its theoretical foundation in urban design theory, as well as a way forward in its (better) 
implementation. Closer to a being a cultural critique is an article by Pouler (1994) who 
discusses how the objectives of architectural review are often premised on the construction of 
a myth of community, and how the review mechanism legitimizes itself through the 
perpetuation of such fake consciousness. Clearly borrowing the theoretical armature of the 
Frankfurt school, he thus embarks on a “deconstructive enterprise of exposing and 
undermining the ideological web of relations between power and architecture” (Pouler, 1994 : 
175)  A recent symposium, “Regulating Place”, convened by the Department of Urban 
Studies and Planning in MIT, also attracted more varied approaches to the topic, where 
critical voices were hurled against the established practices of wholesale, top-down planning 
and unreflexive review processes. While generally within the broad three-prong approaches 
of directive/normative, evaluative and historical/sociological, the authors present new 
perspectives to reflect critically on the material impact and social basis of this ‘hidden 
language’ in the urban fabric.  It is interesting to note that while the previous symposium 
convened by Scheer and Preiser focused specifically on design review and aesthetic control 
and the problems with its basis and implementations, “Regulating Place” broadened the field 
of inquiry to include all manners of codes, standards and regulations and its impact on ‘place-
making’. This suggests that ‘design review’ as an inquiry is expanding to include the writing 
of codes, standards and all manners of regulations, looking beyond the concerns of the 
professionals (mainly how to not stifle creativity and make design review a less painful 
process) to achieve a “more equitable planning process and a more just urban environment” 






Value, Objective and Scope of Research 
To state the obvious, this research first and foremost serves as a ‘gap-filler’ in the spread of 
similar literature from other countries and cities. Design reviews have not received much 
academic attention in the Asian region, and it is likely that its practice (or lack of) is as 
variegated as the diverse range of planning systems and stages of development that can be 
found across Asian cities. Research on the ‘Asian Megapolis’ and aspects of its governance  
will clearly benefit from an understanding of how aesthetics is ‘regulated’ and the social,  
political and professional implications of such regulation. Furthermore, many Asian cities 
require an additional colonial filter, and research in geographies of difference or transnational 
planning histories already suggest that the various codes and standards, planning systems and 
other supporting institutions exported from colonial parents transform and are transformed by 
the particularities of the communities and politics they serve. Specifically, Singapore adopted 
its planning system from the British, which came with it a structure of operation (a legal basis 
for planning and the necessary institutions), as well as certain historical and social baggage, 
which may or may not be lost or transformed in the process of this importation. The impetus 
and power to regulate design, and thus the need for design reviews, represents one of the 
institutional powers exported from the colonial parent. As Preiser and Rohane discovered in 
their survey of design review practices in English-speaking countries, countries belonging to 
the British Commonwealth are ‘greatly influenced by the long tradition of aesthetic controls 
in the United Kingdom’. ( Preiser, W F E and Rohane, K. 1988 : 425). Furthermore, a scan of 
the diverse literature on the urban development and transformation of independent Singapore 
reveals that studies on governmental urban policies are primarily focused on its economic, 
social and physical impact on the landscape and lives of the citizens, as well as the various 
institutions set up to regulate and implement such policies. For example, Dale (1999) 
describes the process of urban planning in Singapore by locating “the development process, 
of which the planning system is a part, within the context of the economic and political 
changes, and the pressure for spatial change, experienced between 1959 and 1993” (pp x). In 
his analysis, he asserts that the pivotal role of the state encompassed more arenas than was 
commonly practiced in other cities. Although he makes extensive linkages between the 
economic forces, socio-cultural values and land-use policies, aesthetic regulations do not 
feature in the ‘forces which have shaped, and are shaping, planning in Singapore” – the 
primary objective of his book (pp xi). One would not be too hard bent to argue that certain 
planning ideas already embody a set of aesthetic preferences which then influence the way 
the city is governed and sculpted. The hidden image lurking between texts and discourse is, to 
a large extent, what this research is trying to articulate. Ooi (2004 : 207) and Perry, Kong and 
Yeoh (1997) have suggested that one of the primary aesthetic motivations of newly 
independent Singapore – the vision of a Garden City – was never practiced in its full 
reformist spirit and ultimately became nothing more than an aesthetic exercise. Indeed, such 
slippages of ideologies, whether it is imported through legal acts, or through architects, 
planners and politicians educated overseas, make the attempt to trace aesthetic lineage a very 






For the purpose of this study, it is necessary to offer a definition of design review that 
lends focus and is applicable to the local context. In this, I will be adopting a definition by 






 Design review refers to the public review of the design of private development 
proposals. This definition embraces a full range of activities, from review by ad hoc 
advisory groups to politically or legally binding review required for issuance of a 
building permit. Judgments may be rendered by designers, politicians, neighbours, 
activists, boards or panels, hired professional staff, or ordinary citizens. Design 
review may be completely at the discretion of the reviewers or be formalized by 
written guidelines or regulatory control. Formal design review may be, and often is, 
pre-empted by informal negotiation.  
Scheer, B & Preiser, W, 1994b: 308 
 
This research keeps strictly to the study of reviewing private developments, as stated in the 
definition. This effectively narrows the scope of inquiry, as the designing of public buildings 
(notably the massive public housing projects by the HDB) is circumscribed by very different 
institutional practices and political/technical constraints. However, in the Singaporean context, 
the identity of ‘public’ in this case is almost always a government body or planning authority 
acting in the interest of ‘public good’, and the identity of the ‘public’ will become one of the 
persistent questions in this research. Keeping this definition in mind, the objective of this 
research is to employ the study of design reviews to ask two questions about the relationships 
between architecture, power and knowledge in Singapore. The first question asks how the 
aesthetic of the city is being regulated by the public authorities. The task of answering this 
question is essentially a descriptive one. The second question asks why and for what purposes 
are such regulations in place. The task of answering this question is both an evaluative as well 
as a critical one. In this, I have proceeded not to disengage the two questions, such that the 
description comes before the evaluation, but to allow the descriptive process itself to be 
inflected by this critical perspective. This endeavour, I feel, is more appropriate as it meets 
the necessary task of presenting empirical knowledge on a hitherto less researched subject, 
while acknowledging that this descriptive process is never objective or neutral, but always 






Methododology and Structure 
Immediately after this, Chapter Two begins a descriptive historical analysis of the various 
forms of design review, regulations and control that existed in Singapore during colonial 
times. However, it is not the primary task of the research to study in-depth the political, 
economic and cultural dimensions of design reviews during this period of time, as that would 
engender another completely divergent area of inquiry. This discussion on the practice of 
design review during the colonial period is thus presented only as a background to highlight 
the very different circumstances in which it was practiced and suggest the subsequent 
transformation and translation in both practice and ideology when Singapore moved towards 
independence in 1965. In fact, such a background is necessary as much of the legal basis of 
planning and its history must be traced to British colonial history, and it is important to be 
mindful of its subsequent importation through the project of colonialism. 
 
Just as Punter begins his account with the Housing and Planning Act in 1909, I will 
continue the analysis with the reading of the Planning Bill in 1958. Taking cue from existing 
literature on design reviews, the documents that furnish this study will comprise of 
professional and government circulars, design guidelines and policies, legal acts and 
ordinances, tender documents and architectural briefs. The research thus traces, through these 
documents, the evolution of design reviews as practiced in Singapore. Three interrelated 
chapters cover the period of this evolution from 1958 (the first reading of the Planning Act) 
to around 2006, when the project for the Integrated Resort was launched. Chapter Three 
covers firstly the institutional set-up that makes design review possible in Singapore, and how 
they circumscribe its practice. The arguments and concerns voiced during the Parliamentary 
debate signaled the beginning of design regulations carried out by the national planning 
authorities of Singapore – the Urban Renewal Department in the Housing Development 
Board and the Planning Department in the Ministry of National Development till 1974, and 
the Urban Redevelopment Authority of Singapore after that. The organizational structure of 
the URA is studied, in particular the administrative framework that determines how design 
regulation is handled within and through the URA, the various projects undertaken to set up a 
comprehensive urban design plan for Singapore, as well as the mechanisms created to enforce 
and administer design reviews. This chapter thus deals with the basic everyday form of 
design review – review by administration – which all development applications submitted for 
planning permission are subject to. Chapter Four discusses design review in relation to its 
political and professional specificities. In this, one employs specific texts such as official 
press releases to professional institutions, presentation speeches as well as development 
control and urban design guidelines to unpack the larger political and professional ideologies 
that influence the evolution of the practice of design review. Thus, connections are made 
between design reviews and the culture of the civil service and political party, highlighting 
the close relationship between the two, particularly in a state with a centralized planning 
structure like Singapore. This chapter also covers another review mechanism – review by 
specialized panels – which represents an extra layer of review reserved for sites or projects 
that need more design attention. The third mechanism of design review – through the sale of 
land with attached design-related conditions – is covered in Chapter Five. Partly because this 





which furnish its research (the sales tender packages) are readily available, this form of 






Proceeding from this research, some thoughts and trajectories are discussed in the 
concluding chapter, where the questions of power and meaning are foregrounded. The texture 
of such questioning has been suggested in the Introduction. First and foremost, what do these 
regulations and systems tell us about ourselves, as architects, as professionals, as inhabitants 
in an urban realm and as a society? What do the various discourses reveal in terms of the 
legitimacy of urban forms and meanings that we have too often taken for granted? Difficult 
and large questions, they are best left untouched, but at the back of our heads, till the end of 














This chapter is a synoptic view of what has been written about planning and development 
control in colonial Singapore, and as such it does not purport to offer a lot of ‘new’ 
knowledge. However, it does try to foreground ‘aesthetics’ as amongst a list of foundational 
planning considerations, notably sanitation and civic order, all of which are considered 
‘material’ concerns by the colonial administrators. What this chapter does is therefore to 
recover how aesthetics are implicated in the more dominant rhetoric of colonial urban 
planning, and argue that the assumptions of how things should look always already sway 
judgment and weigh in favour of those who hold the key to accepted tastes and have to power 
to impose them on others. Aesthetics thus becomes ‘material’ in planning concerns in very 
different ways when applied on the ruling elite, and on the ruled natives/immigrants.   
 
Singapore’s first design code - Raffles’ vision of beauty and order  
The first instance of a conscious effort to plan and design the city of Singapore, at least in the 
modern sense, starts with Sir Stamford Raffles. A man gripped by a sense of ‘messianic 
mission’, Turnbull (1977 : 7) contends that he ‘saw his country’s role in South-east Asia 
almost as a crusade, to free the peoples of the eastern archipelago from civil war, piracy, 
slavery and oppression, to restore and revive their old cultures and independence under the 
influence of European enlightenment, liberal education, progressive economic prosperity and 
sound law’. In the case of Singapore, his most precious colony which he referred often to as 
‘my settlement’, the exercise of drafting a constitution was, to him, to enshrine the “utmost 
possible freedom of trade and equal rights to all, with protection of property and person’ 
(Raffles’ letters to the Land Allotment Committee. In Buckley C B. 1965 : 78). As it 
happened, ‘equal rights to all, with protection of property and person’, also included the well-
used colonial strategy of “appropriating and marking out the quarters or departments of the 
several classes of the native population”(ibid. 81). The two privileged classes were the 
Europeans who enjoyed the best location in the town, as well as the mercantile community, 
where the objective was to provide them with “all the facilities which the natural advantages 
of the port afford”. The rest of the native and immigrant communities, in particular the 
Chinese, were to be separated, resettled in sectorised communities based on their dialect 
groups, and overseen by local leaders. In laying the rules for shaping the built environment, 
he applied the principle of division and control as a precondition for social stability and 
economic prosperity. However, it is also clear that in dreaming of this “first capital 
established in the nineteenth century”, Raffles envisaged a setting of orderly structures, wide 
streets and public buildings in the colonial architectural style and taste. Turnbull (1977:12) 
summarized Raffles’ plan for Singapore by stating that it was “partly designed for aesthetics 
effect, but primarily for order and control by grouping the different communities in specified 





Edwards (1992 : 27) contended that Raffles must have been aware of the ideal 
Renaissance city plan, used commonly in early Indian colonial enclaves, as well as ‘Georgian 
Regency’ themes then fashionable in London. In his letter to the first Resident of Singapore, 
Sir John Crawford, Raffles (quoted in Buckley C B, 1965 : 117) wrote :   
 
In laying out the town, I particularly recommend to your attention the advantage 
of an early attention (not only) to the provision of ample accommodation for the 
public service hereafter whenever it may be required, but to the beauty, 
regularity and cleanliness of the settlement; the width of the different roads and 
streets should be fixed by authority, and as much attention paid to the general 
styling of building as circumstances admit. 
 
In his letters to the Land Allotment Committee, he stipulated that the Committee should 
‘line out the different streets and highways, which should as far as practicable run at right 
angles and in no instance be less than – feet in breadth’(ibid. 84)6. In organizing the urban 
space with an orthogonal geometry, Raffles applied colonial planning concepts, where streets 
were for ‘circulation’, where the order of urban space reflected the order of the mental space, 
and where ‘efficiency’ and the tools of the land surveying profession necessitated the right 
angle. In addition, by ‘determining the least space along the street which shall be occupied by 
each house and consequently fixing the exact number of houses which each street will 
contain’, it marked the beginnings of a ‘streetblock’ and equates to the type of building mass 
control we are familiar with today. Subsequently, the width of these shophouses was 
determined at 20 feet by “the availability of felled timber from the Island’ (Hancock, T H H. 
1953). In instructing the Land Allocation Committee to resettle the Chinese natives, Raffles 
also set the first prescriptive design guidelines for the creation of covered verandahs, or as is 





It will further be advisable that for the sake of uniformity and gaining as 
much room as possible a particular description of front for all brick or tiled 
houses should be attended to, and it is conceived that while the breath of the 
streets is strictly preserved as above directed, a still further accommodation 
will be afforded to the public by requiring that each house should have a 
verandah of a certain depth, open at all times as a continued and covered 
passage on each side of the street.  (quoted in Buckley C B. 1965 : 84) 
 
                                                 
6 The breadth was left undetermined, though eventually Coleman built the streets ‘one chain in width’. See Hancock, 
T H H, Coleman’s Singapore. In Architectural Review, March 1953.    
In addition to such an aestheticised vision of Singapore by Raffles, Singapore had the 
blessing of a trained architect - George Drumgoole Coleman – who served as her surveyor, 
planner and architect for about 15 years since 1822. This is an exception to other British 
colonies in the tropics, where public buildings were ‘invariably built by military engineers 
with the aid of military manuals…[and] these buildings were usually of the simplest kind, and 
often coarse and crude’ (Hancock, T H H : 1953).  His designs for the Residency House 
received Raffles’ approval and admiration, for subsequently, when Raffles drafted the 
abovementioned letter to the Land Allotment Committee, Coleman’s advice was likely 
sought on many of its clauses. Raffles’ commitment to the ‘beauty’ of his most prized colony 
can be alluded to in his appreciation of Coleman’s architectural talent, who went on to 
dominate the architectural scene in Singapore, at least for colonial public buildings and the 





Aesthetics of segregation and grandeur, discipline and the ‘public’ 
An impetus for a more drastic physical transformation of Singapore by the colonial 
government came in August 1824, when John Crawford, Resident of Singapore, concluded a 
treaty with the Sultan and Temenggong of Singapore which ceded the whole island ‘in full 
sovereignty to the [East India] Company, its heirs and successors for ever’. According to 
Hancock (1853), as soon as the treaty was ratified, ‘European merchants started to erect 
substantial houses, offices and warehouses on grants of land issued by the Government on 
long leases’. A sense of permanent ownership naturally led the white settlers to take a more 
serious view of transforming their second home to their desired image, an image with which 
to reinforce their identity and signify political power over the native communities (Edwards 
1990, 1992). The Europeans were allowed to build their residences wherever they wished. 
Shortly after, however, an Act was passed by Legislative Council of India in the 1850s 
requiring private persons who wished to erect houses or other buildings to give notice of their 
intentions together with a plan showing ‘levels of foundations and lowest floor of the house 
to the Municipal’ (Dale O J. 1999 : 72). There is no mention of elevations as a requirement in 
the submission plans, which would be necessary if some form of design control were to be 
exercised. Lornie’s account of land lease and use during this period of time suggests that the 
Government was more concerned with the proper demarcation of boundaries and the 
appropriate and profitable taxation of land, than any strict regulation of building design 
(Makepeace W, Brooke G and Braddell R.:1921). At least for the Europeans, this seemed 
unnecessary, since they would share the same aesthetic preferences as the administrators. The 
type of the villa, or ‘detached house’, built by the Europeans can be traced to the ‘bungalow-
complex of colonial India which diffused via England to various British colonies (Edwards N, 
1990; King AD, 1984). Coleman’s domination of the architectural scene - he built almost all 
the large mansions during this period from 1820s to 30s – also set the aesthetic standard for 
the European and merchant quarters. The Europeans generally lived in garden-houses in the 
suburbs, most of them along the beach to the eastward of the town, from which they had “a 
full view of the harbour, as well as of both its entrances, and can see every vessel that comes 
or goes” (G F Davidson. In Tarling, N. 1992 : 28). James Cameron provided a general survey 





The greatest number of European residences are about two miles out, but some are 
twice that distance. Those nearer town, where ground is more valuable, are built 
intolerably close together, with perhaps one or two acre to each; those at a greater 
distance are more apt, generally crowning the summits of the innumerable little hills, 
which are such a geological peculiarity of Singapore, and surrounded by ten or 
fifteen acres of ground, either covered with patches of jungle, or planted with nutmeg 
and fruit trees…  




The stretch of waterfront where the villas faced became enclosed as a public esplanade, 
reinforcing the European enclaves’ visual impact, ‘particularly in an age of sea travel and 
romantic associations’ (Edwards, 1992 : 27). The priorities of the administrative government, 
from facilitating commercial activities in Singapore to projecting an image of civility and 
order in their colonial quarters, can be alluded in Buckley’s report that in 1843, “$1,900 was 
spent on roads  and a sum of $18.62 was spent to enclose the Esplanade” (Halifax, 1921: 318). 
As Edward argued, the European villas both withdrew from the congested city and native 
communities, while publicly displaying wealth and power as a symbolic expression of the 
superiority of the Europeans, and thus their mandate to rule. The aesthetic quality of the 
landscape is thus both an ends in itself, as well as a political instrument of subjugation –  
 
This display was symbolically encoded in the very siting, design and layout of the 
colonial house in its own compound. The houses were prominently displayed on high 
grounds for all to see and approached by long winding driveways… this very public 
display contrasted radically with the English suburb from which the colonial suburb 
drew some of its inspirations. Its openness could not be more unlike the English 
suburbs with their high walls or hedges that shielded its inhabitants not only socially 
but also visually from the rest of the world. This contrast suggests that the colonial 
bungalow was more than merely a comfortable home for its residents… Of greater 
significance, at the political symbolic level, it simultaneously served to communicate 
and impress the Asian population of the social and political status of its occupations, 
of the latters’ superiority and right to govern.   
Edwards N. 1992 : 37 
  
For the immigrant/Asiatic communities, things were of course much more different. 
Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions were prevalent. Modern planning sought to 
eradicate these ills that seemed to the colonial rulers to be endemic to certain races. Much has 
been written from the postcolonial perspective on the control of space through administrative, 
legal and punitive instruments, aimed at regulating and subjugating local lifestyles and 
practices (King, 1976, Home 1990 and 1997, Yeoh 1996). The setting up of the Municipality 
in itself, as suggested by Willie Tan (1993 : 39), was an attempt by Europeans and the 
mercantile class to wrest more zoning control over land development and restricting 
undesirable elements from entering their neighbourhood. Between the 1820s and 50s, the 
town grew tremendously, and various ad hoc committees were formed to look into the 
increasingly complex task of its management. Building regulations were mentioned in 
Hallifax’s (1921 : 317) account, but ‘no special municipal law was enacted’. Nevertheless, 
under the hard-headed and efficient administration of Singapore’s Resident, John Crawford 
(Turnbull, 1977), the result of the basic streetblock controls mentioned earlier was a 
consistent building mass and height, and continuous verandahs that ran for the whole length 





The whole of the native part of the town, the chief business division of which 
lies behind Commercial Square, and the river frontage I have described, are 
very much alike in appearance. The buildings are closely packed together 
and uniform height and character…Underneath run, for the entire length of 
the streets, the enclosed verandahs… Being narrow, it is nearly always 
crowded, and the buildings fronting it are occupied entirely by Chinese and 
Klings… 
Cameron J. 1865. Quoted in Tarling N. 1992 : 11  
 
In 1856, pressured by the increasingly complex task of managing a burgeoning town, 
an Act was passed to establish a Municipality for Singapore. Administratively, this separated 
the town centre from the rural districts, and the Municipal was empowered by the Central 
Government with its own funds to govern the town centre. In 1887, the Municipal Ordinance 
was enacted to give greater powers to the Municipal to carry out essential role of improving 
the deteriorating and rapidly growing urban conditions of Singapore. The main provisions in 
the Ordinance reflected the main concerns of the Municipality at that time. They focused on 
eliminating unauthorised developments, orderly layout of public streets and the provision of 
basic utilities, such as drainage, water supply, gas and sewerage. The Act also empowered the 
Municipality to inspect premises for insanitary conditions that might be suspected of 
incubating infectious diseases, and the Municipal Health Department was established as a 
result. These were the powers given to combat what was at that time endemic conditions of 





None of these powers was however sufficient to combat the growing slum problems 
at that time. Without sufficient funding and power, the President of the Municipal 
Commissioners reported that “proceedings were taken against insanitary buildings (huts and 
sheds) in various parts of the town” and no actual improvement works were even 
contemplated (Tan H H. 1959). Faced with such insurmountable tasks, regulating aesthetics 
was understandably not an overt agenda for the Municipal. It would be an area placed 
alongside other ‘extraneous issues’ such as ‘recreation and amusement’ which were already 
turned down by the municipal commissioners when a motion was introduced in 1889 to 
‘extend the powers of the municipal commissioners to encompass the provision of public 
recreation and entertainment’ (Yeoh B. 1996 : 53-54). Nevertheless, there were clauses that 
seemed to mask aesthetic bias between dominant rhetorics of public health and civic order - 
the most crucial one stemming from the definition of a ‘public street’, and the aesthetic value 





In the 1887 Municipal Act, a public street was defined as “any road square court 
alley footway or passage (whether thoroughfare of not) over which the public have a right of 
way together with the roadway over any public bridge”. Taking from postcolonial discourse, 
this notion of ‘public’ is anthropomorphized as a European person, such that the regulatory 
rationale for ‘public circulation’, ‘right of way’ and ‘public good’ are derived from a 
Eurocentric perspective and judged on European tastes. Yeoh (1996) has argued that the 
creation of verandahs, backlanes and a ‘uniform’ streetscape on the basis of ‘public good’ 
were instruments that facilitate municipal’s ‘inspecting gaze’ into the private lives and spaces 
of the native communities. Notions of the ‘public’ as defined by the colonial authorities were 
totally absent in the Asian mentality and spatial practice. The blurred boundaries of 
public/private indigenous to such spaces as the verandah and the back-of-house where living 
and commercial activities spill out and adapt to the needs of the inhabitants were inscrutable 
to the authorities, nor to the discipline of modern planning7. The definition of ‘public street’ 
therefore subjugated such local practices by giving the ‘public’ the legal ‘right of way’ to take 
over its use. In this sense, British interests and public good were inseparable, and both can be 
perceivably threatened when the spatial and visual buffer between the native and the 
European started to erode. As Hallifax himself stated, “drains and refuse had to look after 
themselves till they obtruded too much on public notice” [italics mine] (Hallifax, 1921 : 325).  
The question of who this public is should not be much of a mystery, since the native Chinese, 
by his own account, had already developed a ‘resistance to disease acquired by generations of 
living in insanitary conditions in their own country’ (ibid : 322), and thus it was only when 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Yeoh’s (1996) account of the verandah and the backlane as contact zones where practices of 
domination enmesh with everyday resistance of the natives..   
sanitary conditions started to become visible to the European administrators, in the public 
realm, that action was deemed necessary. Such an aestheticisation of the streets as a form of 
disciplinary and moralizing device is also evident into the rationale for lighting the streets - 
“The lighting of a town … is in some measure an index both of its prosperity and orderly 
government. Absence of good lighting means increased opportunity for evil-doers”. The 
identity of such ‘evil-doers’ and their victims was alluded to subsequently when he 
mentioned the prevalence of ‘gang robberies’ and a group of 200 Chinese who conducted 
regular siege on a house in Mount Elizabeth (ibid: 330). The employment of ‘public good’ to 
legitimize urban transformation thus carried a complex intertwining of aesthetic biases within 





Along such ‘public streets’, some form of ‘urban decorum’ befitting a British Colony 
was also expected of the developments. Notions of prestige and competitiveness resulted in a 
certain standard that was to be desired of, on the one hand, colonial architectural aesthetics in 
the European and Municipal areas, and, on the other hand, the orderliness and perceived 
obedience of the native communities. The public face of the native communities was the 
‘public streets’, which thus came under the Municipal’s aesthetic jurisdiction. Based on 
Home’s research (1997 : 58), the argument in favour of the ‘wideness’ of the street was based 
on grounds of morality – the narrowness of slums and back lanes harbored all sorts of vice 
and crime which can be eradicated by ‘good wide streets’ which ‘greatly promote the virtue, 
morality and health of the people’. Subsequent arguments were based on public health, 
greatly echoing the preoccupation with the culture of sanitation and hygiene amongst the 
colonial rulers. Professor Simpson, who prepared a report on the sanitary conditions of 
Singapore, recommended that streets were to be not less in width than the height of the 
proposed building on either side, and no less than 50 feet, and up to 120 feet for principal 
ones (Home, 1997 : 58). As an imposition of colonial order upon indigenous culture, well 
maintained public streets exhibited a certain obedience in the orderliness of the streetscape, 
uniformity of the building frontage line and the cleanliness of the street. The straightness of 
the street also translated to an obsession with ‘encroachments’, as if its straightness was a 
virtue in and of itself. Such aesthetic representations operate side by side with other 
disciplinary objectives which were tackled by ‘improving the legibility of the landscape 
through naming and signifying places, controlling and canalizing urban traffic … and 
segregating different types of land uses by demarcating space along a multiplicity of lines 
such as private/public, sacred/profane and progressive/offensive’ (Perry, Kong and Yeoh, 





These ideals were given legal status within specific clauses in the Municipal 
Ordinance 1887. For example, it was stipulated that the deposition of dirt and rubbish in the 
streets or erection of fences, rails and other barriers along any public street would attract a 
penalty. For new buildings within 50 feet of a public street, the Municipal would take into 
consideration the ‘line of street frontage’ with neighbouring buildings, as well as the ‘quality 
of materials’ used. Also, any alterations to frontage of buildings within 50 feet of public 
streets needed express approval from the Municipal, who also exercised the right to require 
the building to be set back to conform with the line of street frontage if it were to be 
redeveloped. Several clauses gave power to the Municipal to clear all sorts of encroachments 
and obstructions from public streets, such as ‘wall fence rail post’ that would cause 
inconvenience to the passage of the public, while unauthorized changes to the pavements or 
fences and rails of a public street would be liable to fines. The Ordinance also required 
owners or occupiers of any land to ‘trim or prune the hedges thereof bordering any public 
street so that they may not exceed seven feet in height from the level of the street and to cut 
and trim all trees overhanging any public street so that they may not injure the same or annoy 






Pictorial evidence and such travelogues from European tourists (Savage, 1992 : 11 – 23) 
at that time however suggests that the regulations which were effective were those that could 
be more or less controlled at the initial moment of submission of plans for approval.  
Therefore, while the verandah and setback controls to observe building frontage lines could 
be effectively enforced, since the layout of the development could be controlled at the point 
of submission for planning approval, it did not guarantee that the practice and use of such 
spaces eventually followed the same spirit as intended in the regulations. Similarly, controls 
which required continuous monitoring such as keeping the walkways clear of rubbish and 
other accretions of living and working for the sake of public circulation, were completely 
unsuccessful. The problem with regulation was vexing for the colonial rulers, who often 
blamed it on the ‘Asian ignorance and apathy’: 
The Asiatic of [the poorer] class has an invincible determination to live right on his 
works and right amongst his competitors and customers. He cares nothing for 
sanitation or ventilation. All he requires is a place to sleep in as near to his daily work 
as possible, and a more or less secure place to keep his belongings. He can get all this 
simply by railing off a portion of a passage or room in a house and making a cubicle. 
 
 
Memorandum B: Notes by Mr F.J. Hallifax on the Shortage of Housing in Singapore and its relation to Taxation’, in 
Housing Difficulties Report, 1918, quoted in Brenda Yeoh, 1996 : 142 
 
 
The Beginning of Planning and the formation of the SIT 
Despite the obvious difficulties with planning the town to meet the primary objectives of 
improving sanitation, hygiene and civic order, aesthetic control as one of the material 
concerns of town planning was not entirely out of the minds of the administrators. The 
clearest case came in 1919, when amendments were made to the Municipal Ordinance, one of 
which gave the Commissioners control over the ‘class, design, or appearance of buildings 
intended to be erected in particular areas’ (Dale O J. 1999: 72). This addition gave power to 
the Commissioners to ‘make by-laws with regard to building and regulating certain buildings 
of a particular class design or appearance to be erected in particular districts, localities or 





 (The Commissioners) will say houses of a particular class design shall be erected in 
this particular district. In this particular you must not build godowns; they must be 
dwelling houses. To regulate the class of building was a most desirable power to give 
at the present time. Houses at the present time of different designs are being built in 
close proximity and the effect is most hideous. It also gives them powers to prohibit 
the erection of a building of a particular class or design in particular districts, etc. 
You must not erect a building of the godown class in street A.  
 
Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements, Mar 1919 
 
This clause was passed without any debate. The parliamentary debate during the reading 
of this bill focused on taxation rates of vacant land and undeveloped land held by private 
owners. The need to regulate class design and appearance, and thus indirectly landuse, was 
based largely on aesthetic considerations – the avoidance of the ‘hideous’. Echoing here were 
colonialist tendencies to create beautiful streetscapes and civic spaces that will both improve 
the image of this colonial possession, as well as educate the poor masses on the finer arts of 
living. This was encapsulated by the editor of Straits Times who urged in 1921, shortly after 
the reading of this bill, that public parks be ‘kept strictly clean, made graceful and 
attractive… for they would not only serve as lungs but would help to awaken a sense of 
appreciation of beauty and neatness among the dirt –scarred masses who live in viler holes 





Such moral hyperventilating is set in contrast with the overall powerlessness of the 
Municipality to make any substantial improvement to the problems of hygiene and 
overcrowding. Besides the shortage of funds, Singapore’s Building law and Bye-laws did not 
apply to buildings built before 1869, and the fact that land was given on 999 or 99 years 
tenure meant that large segments of what was built could not be touched. There was also no 
encouragement given to land development in the Municipal Ordinance, and the above 
mentioned discussion of taxation rates on vacant land reflected the situation whereby owners 
of undeveloped land could afford to let their land sit idle till it was worthwhile to sell (Tan H 
H, 1959 : 12 – 14). The existence of these larger issues short-circuited most efforts at 
improving the slum conditions, and meant that verbal projections of beauty and grace could 
only serve to assuage the colonial administrators of their own right to rule by upholding the 
morals of “gentleman capitalism”, and did nothing for the native community at all.  
In 1927, the Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT) was set up to tackle the problem of 
urban degeneration. The date is significant for at least two reasons – as a consolidation of 
planning ideologies imported from London as well as the beginning of various amendments 
and additions to the Municipal building regulations to actualise such planning missions. The 
Housing and Town Planning Act of Britain was drawn up and promulgated in 1909, about 
two decades before the setting up of the SIT. The English legislation was intricately tied to 
the Garden City Movement in twilight of the 19th century. The movement grew to address 
burgeoning urban growth, social upheavals brought about by industrialization, and the 
necessary political reforms to combat these upheavals. It was interwoven with socialist 
utopian ideals, believing that human progress can be achieved through the shaping and 
organization of the built environment. In architectural and urban design terms, this socialist 
and utopian agenda is obvious in the attempts to create a strong urban order with tree-lined 
avenues terminating in monumental civic buildings and squares, as well as its notion of 
communal land ownership, tenure, and the symbiotic relationship between the town and the 




The 1909 Town and Country Planning Act[UK] was thus a direct manifestation of the 
social and political goals of this movement, aimed at improving the ‘drab monotony of by-
law housing development” as well as “securing proper sanitary conditions, amenity and 
convenience” (Dale O J 1999 : 74) for the masses. In the words of John Burns, the President 
of the Local Government Board in UK, the Act was to provide ‘the home healthy, the town 
pleasant, the city dignified and the suburb salubrious’. As Mcloughlin (1973) argued, the 
triple purposes of being ‘sanitary, efficient and beautiful’ in the early period of British 
planning ‘were caught up in an overarching view which believed that health, efficiency and 
beauty together were contributory factors, even essential elements in the life of a civilized 
society and its individual members’.  The control of land use, layout and design became not 
only an aesthetic consideration, but a necessary part of national economic and social planning, 
and in colonial cities, a civilizing force. Widespread State control in the development and use 
of land became necessary to counter the deleterious effects of purely market-driven land 
speculations.  
 
Improvement Trusts were part of a colonial machinery very much influenced by the 
proselytizing fervour of planning rhetoric back in Britain. Yet, the final impetus that led to its 
creation in the colonies was in response to the spread of plague in Bombay (See Foo Ah Fong, 
1993, for a historical study of Improvement Trusts created in British colonies). The cause of 
the plague was, at that time, not known, and the authorities often chose to lay the blame on 
the living conditions and habits of the native population. While the plague did not come to 
Singapore, the zeal and fear in which built environment, living habits and moral fibre of the 
natives were attacked as the cause of the ‘Black Death’ provided the justification required to 
carry out disruptive interventions in the urban fabric of the native communities. It is 
important to note that many of the regulations and codes (for example, for the width of streets, 
depth and frontage of shophouses and the desired density of people in any urban area) were 
written in the shadow of the bubonic plague. Dr William Simpson, a Medical Officer of 
Health for Calcutta who subsequently became an influential professor of public health at the 
University of London, served as a vector for the transmission of the culture of sanitary 
surveillance through his medical reports in various British colonies, which consistently 
ignored the fact that “the insanitary and overcrowded conditions were more due to British 
neglect of local services other than within the white man’s city’ (Home, 1997 : 78). His 
recommendations for Singapore prepared in 1907 were very much in the same vein, and 
justified physical intervention into the Chinese shop-house. Dismissing the value of the 
airwells of the Chinese shophouse and ignoring the fact that the sanitation problem was more 
a result of overcrowding rather than the intrinsic building form itself, he advocated instead 
demolition of part of the back of the shophouse to create backlanes, and did not acknowledge 
the airwell as part of the total amount of ‘open space’ which the regulations stipulated. This 
aversion to the shophouse as a building type that in and of itself promoted crime and disease 





The shop-house type of building will no doubt remain in Singapore for many 
generations to come, but it is hoped that a more enlightened type of development will 
result from modern methods of building and the recent example set by the Singapore 
Improvement Trust. It is hoped that it will not be long before the shop-house type 





Town planning as a professional institution arrived in Singapore in the form of Captain E 
P Richards, a founder member of the Town Planning Institute in Britain. He served as a 
planning adviser in Singapore from 1920 – 24, where he worked with another famous 
colonial planner, C. C. Reade, also a founding member of the Town Planning Institute who 
had worked extensively in five British colonies (Home, 1997 : 84). Richards had worked in 
Calcutta as Chief Engineer of the Calcutta Improvement Trust, and was pessimistic about the 
Calcutta Trust’s power to solve a massive slum problem there. He also advocated a form of 
‘cottage housing’ – low-density suburban-style housing for the workers – against the type of 
tenement housing which he felt was not ‘productive of good citizens” (Lancaster, 1914, pp 
219-220. In Home, 1997 : 113).  Nevertheless, he left in 1924, after the Government found 
the Town Improvement and Development Bill he drafted with Reade to be impracticable. In 
Home’s account (1997: 170 – 191), this early generation of town planners – particularly 
Reade and Geddes - who actively proselytized the social and economic benefits of planning 
and the ideals of the Garden City, mostly failed to get their ambitious schemes realized. 
Nevertheless, the profession of a planner and the importation of its discipline through figures 
like E P Richards, newly borne and increasingly popular amongst the colonies, can be 
paralleled with that of sanitary science in the figure of Dr William Simpson – vectors of a 
colonial network who traveled and worked in many colonies, often feeding experiences from 
one colony into the next, inflected by both personal preferences (Richard’s preference for 
cottage house over tenement block housing) and new disciplinary knowledge (the discipline 
of town planning). The instituting of the Singapore Improvement Trust, as with other similar 
Trusts in the British colonies, meant that planning became a specialized expertise that needed 
professional training – one that cannot be left to the inexperience of the local bodies. The 
emergence of this ‘new science’ can be felt in the architectural community when the Journal 
of Singapore Society of Architects ran a long series of articles from Sept 1929 to May 1931, 
where main principles in planning practiced in both Britain, Singapore and other British 
colonies – its premises, benefits, and mechanisms such as the ‘control of elevations’ – were 





SIT’s immediate task was to prepare a General Improvement Plan to ‘show upon it all 
existing roads, navigable water-courses, railways and other principal means of 
communication – that is to say existing facts – and added to that will be schemes which have 
been already authorised, all regular lines of streets which have already been prescribed, all 
lands set apart for back-lanes and all back-lanes that laying out of which has been ordered, all 
of which are, therefore, binding at the present moment’ (Proceedings of the Legislative 
Council of the Straits Settlements, 1927). Besides this largely documentary role, it was to 
carry out ‘back-lane’ and improvement programmes as well as the approved building plans 
submitted to the Municipality under the building bye-laws. Further, the SIT Ordinance also 
stated that ‘no person shall, without the written permission of the Board, erect any building or 
lay out any land or use any land or building in any manner which is not in conformity with 
the General Improvement Plan’.   
 
In terms of development control, SIT was guided by the provisions of the General 
Improvement Plan which, as stated earlier, set out “projected roads, private or public open 
spaces, building lots, regular lines of streets, back lanes, railings or other means of 
communication, and reserves for public purposes”. Evidently, no explicit design-related 
control was exercised, and it is also clear from the annual reports that the control of buildings 
in relation to the General Improvement Plan was mainly concerned with lay-out, setting out 




Control of Buildings in relating to the G.I.P. (General Improvement Plan) 
Building Plans checked for Lay-out and recorded on Standard Sheets  888 
Requisition for setting out of road and backlanes in respect of Building Plans 92 
Building Plans of completed buildings recorded on the G.I.P.  81 
 
     The Singapore Improvement Trust, 1948, pp 33 
 
Clause 62 (1) of the Singapore Improvement Trust Ordinance states that “every 
person who intends to make or lay out any new street or new back lane or to lay out any land 
in lots for building purposes shall give due notice thereof in writing to the Board, 
accompanied by a plan in duplicate showing the intended block plan with full dimensions of 
such streets, back lanes or building lots…”. No detailed sectional or elevational drawings, 
which will be necessary for any form of design control, were required beyond the block plan, 
suggesting again that the primary task of the SIT was not in the area of regulating building 
designs. Clause 64(4f) also states that “the dimensions of any building lots so as to ensure 
that a proper area is allowed for the provision of buildings of a character suitable to the 
locality”. This clause, which essentially draws parallels between local character and building 
size, should not be too surprising, considering that the preceding Municipal Ordinance 
already gave the Municipal power to control the ‘class, design, or appearance of buildings 
intended to be erected in particular areas”.  
With this in place, the Municipality, and later the City Council, proceeded to 
implement various building bye-laws from 1926. By 1953, a full set of Municipal (Building – 
Amendment ) By-Law included clauses stipulating open spaces, setback boundaries, 
ventilation of cubicles, provision of covered walkways, building height, fire escape and 
building safety. Submission requirements by then had also expanded to include elevations, 
longitudinal and cross sections, elevations of adjoining buildings with their “floor levels, 
main cornices, parapets and string courses when required by Municipal Commissioners” 
(Municipal By-Laws, 1952), as well as dimensions for the architectural details and open 
spaces of the building. These bye-laws mainly grew from the concerns of the parent 
Ordinance, and can be seem to encompass more and more aesthetic and architectural 
elements in the submission requirements. This complete set of submission drawings, and the 
clause on “class, design, or appearance of buildings” added in 1919 meant that aesthetic 




The impact of SIT on aesthetic landscape of Singapore became only apparent during 
the Post-war years, when “the zeal and enthusiasm for Town Planning in Singapore was at its 
height” (Lim C K. 1969 : 6-17). By the 50s, SIT had become the authority responsible for 
urban planning, public housing and development control. By exercising development control 
over all major developments and planning applications, the SIT set the foundations for the 
State control over shaping the physical landscape of Singapore. Through reclamation, land 
acquisition, housing schemes and urban renewal efforts, and subsequently as custodian of the 
Master Plan, the SIT was the solitary authority on all matters impacting on the shaping and 
development of Singapore’s post-war landscape.  
Conclusion
It is clear that a consistent agenda for control of aesthetics of the built environment existed 
during the colonial era. Sir Stamford Raffles had ‘visions’ of his newly founded colony and 
laid the foundations of this vision through evocations of uniformity and order, aesthetic 
qualities of an ideal urban landscape which were formulated by his experience in other 
colonies and his own homeland. The attention to the aesthetic quality of the native 
communities went largely neglected subsequently as the colony grew both in size and 
profitability. The main concern of the colonial government was to increase the importance of 
Singapore as a trading centre, and as such, the social problems of housing and sanitation 
escaped their attention till it threatened the commercial operation of the colony. At the turn of 
1900, with the advent of town planning as a profession and influenced by the Garden City 
movement, greater powers were given to the Municipality and subsequently the SIT, which 
set the basis for planning in Singapore, including the range of regulations from zoning, 
building typology to aesthetic control. The basis for aesthetic control was however often 
entwined with rhetoric of civic order and public health. The complex strands of health, 
imperial and moral discourses articulated by the colonial administrators, coalesced with the 
planning visions of the imported professionals. While aesthetic objectives were often not 
primary or overt, they were effectively embedded in these discourses and more 
problematically, I would suggest, operated in the formulation and legitimation process of the 
discourses. In other words, while it is reasonable to say that all of these discourses arrived at 
some form of aesthetics of the material environment, it might be that these discourses also 
had their aesthetic sources – a precise image, whether it is the straightness and wideness of 
the streets or the uniformity of the shop-house frontages, or a romanticized picture of a 
foreign place, that existed together and worked invisibly with the more legitimate and 
scientific rhetoric of urban hygiene and civic order. Still, there are important moments when 
aesthetics became exposed as a legitimate rationale for various planning control, such as the 
‘avoidance of the hideous’ as reported in the 1919 legislative proceedings, and similar 
language used in public newspapers. This reflects the monopoly of power by the colonial 
administrators who were able to evoke their ‘right to rule’ in moralizing terms, and needed no 
firmer basis for this right than whimsical notions of what was pleasing to their senses of sight, 
sound and touch. Newspapers, such as the Straits Times, were able to similarly carry such 




‘vile pigs’ or the ‘Asiatic race’, but the privileged class of the colonial rulers or those wealthy 




From the imperial perspective, the state of the urban environment was to be 
something the colonial masters should be proud of, feel safe in, and of course perform 
efficiently for the economic benefits of Britain. This meant that aesthetic control took on 
various guises and operated on different levels. The city centre and the European quarters 
served the objective of projecting British power to the natives, rival colonies and other 
imperial powers, through the simultaneous strategy of segregation and visibility. On the other 
hand, the native communities also needed to be cast as obedient and civilized subjects, 
through the cleanliness and orderliness of the public streets. The definition of the public street 
transferred power from the locals to the ‘public’, while various land-uses clauses also 
gradually moved the power of aesthetic arbitration to the colonial administrators. All these 
meant that aesthetic regulation meant very different things for the native poor and the 





Design review by administration – 
institution and practice 
 
 
The definition of design review as employed in this paper and discussed in Chapter One is 
essentially any review of the design of private development proposals by a public body. This 
chapter begins by describing how design review is administered in Singapore within the 
planning authority. The primary planning function which conducts design review on an 
everyday basis is termed ‘development control’. It is the process whereby every development 
proposal in Singapore needs to be subject to in order to obtain planning permission. Firstly, a 
description of the production of design schemes is provided in a largely chronological manner. 
Design schemes in this case encapsulate any plans, policies or guidelines produced for the 
primary purpose of prescribing, guiding, incentivising or otherwise influence the design 
aspects of private developments. Design schemes work hand in hand with the development 
control process as they supply the regulations to be applied on every proposal submitted for 
planning approval. Next, a discussion of the administrative structure of design review as 
practiced in the relevant government authorities, as well as the participation of professional 
groups and the public, serve to illuminate the complexities of its operation. In this respect, the 
focus is on both the function of development control and design schemes – both necessary for 
‘review by administration’ - as the basic review mechanism through which various aspects of 





Contestations on the Eve of Independence 
In 1952, SIT carried out the auctioning of sites along Shenton way for commercial 
development. Only one site was sold (Chartered Bank at the junction of Robinson Road and 
McCallum Street) and the rest of the sites had to be repossessed (Dale O J. 1999 : 75). The 
auction of these sites was shrouded in controversy. In the reading of the Planning bill in 1958, 
MP of Pasir Panjang, Mr Wong Foo Nam spiritedly lambasted what he perceived to be undue 
control over design aspects of the Shenton Way developments: 
 
A number of years ago, the Government decided to sell the land in Shenton Way 
along Robinson Road. They called for bids for auction. I remember very distinctly 
that one of the conditions is that you must follow the designs entirely as shown in the 
drawings. You cannot build higher or lower, and building throughout the whole of 
Shenton Way in Robinson Road must be in one horizontal line. This was submitted to 





Singapore Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates. 10 Sept 1958 
 
He further argued that this sort of control was part of the reason why the auctions for sites 
along Shenton Way largely were unsuccessful. Architects felt aggrieved by the constraint of 
their creative and design freedom, while developers were not able to exercise their discretion 
to meet their investment and commercial goals. There were also allegations of corruption and 
accusations were made by the public and government officials against the Planning 
Department:  
 
We know that some of the officers in the Planning Department are highly corrupt. 
When I say that they are ‘highly corrupt’, I am not saying it without foundation. The 
Police have made extensive enquiries and although no one has come forward to give 
evidence on the matter, I am sure the Police must come to the conclusion that there 
are grounds for suspicion although such allegations of corruption have not been 
proved. 
 
Singapore Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates. 10 Sept 1958 
 
Mr Wong Foo Nam was debating specifically against clause 17(2)(c), which gave the 
Minister the power to make rules pertaining to the ‘regulation of height, design, appearance 
and siting of buildings’(Planning Ordinance, 1959). He argued that design is a subjective and 
controversial subject, and questioned the wisdom of trying to regulate it. He cited that this 
clause was new, and not found in the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act [UK], which this 





May I ask Government which country controls designs? If no countries do so, then 
why should Singapore take upon itself to control much about? Technically, we are 
behind other countries on this question of design. 
 
Singapore Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates. 22 Nov 1958 
 
In fact, in the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act [UK], development works which 
were defined as ‘not materially affecting the external appearance of the building (s.12[1][a]) 
were excluded from requiring planning permission’ (Punter 1986 : 373), which imply that 
works which affect external appearance need planning approval. So it did allow design 
control. In the end, the clause was passed and accepted, on the understanding that the control 
will be practiced in a limited way. In addition, in defending Clause 17(2)(c), Dato Abdul 
Hamid bin Haji Jumat, Minister for Local Government, Lands and Housing cited the Minutes 
of Evidence with the Society of Malayan Architects wherein the architects were quoted to 
have replied that an uniformity in design “could be to the advantage of Singapore’ (Select 
Committee on Planning Bill, 1958 : 144). 
It is important to understand the 1958 Bill in the context of its 1947 British parent. Punter 
(1986) outlined the history of aesthetic control in England and showed how powers to control 
and regulate design had surged and ebbed since the first planning Act in 1909, till the 1947 
Town and Planning Act [UK] which established a near-comprehensive system of control of 
design and external appearance. The 1958 Bill derived from the planning legislation that was 
then current in England, the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 [UK] a “model for all of 
its provisions relating to development control, such as the definition of ‘development’ 
requiring planning permission, the procedures for handling and determining planning 
applications and appeals and the enforcement and purchase notices” (Grant M. 1998 : 6). The 
permissive powers offered in the British system of planning thus set the stage for allowing 
strong State intervention in all aspects of land use and development, including aesthetics, 
whether exercised or not, in Singapore. An important point of difference, however, lies in the 
political and administrative structure of UK and Singapore. While the Town and Planning 
Act [UK] offered powers to control design, local authorities could decide whether or not, and 
to what extent, to exercise these powers. In the case of Singapore, it is a centralized system, 
where the competent authorities report directly to, and carry out the directives of, the relevant 
Ministry. While Wong was wrong to say that no country controls design, he was right in his 
worry that in Singapore’s centralized system, the control of design might become a blanket 





What the parliamentary debate and the passing of this 1958 bill demonstrated was that the 
battle for design control in Singapore, while controversial, was already won in England. By 
taking on the planning law and system of the British, Singapore imported the centuries-long 
arguments in favour of design control, and adopted the same. There was suspicion and worry, 
which often accompanied any legislation that aimed to regulate aesthetics. Still, in that 
political climate of the 50s, and given the state of the society and urban environment, the 
government felt the need to reserve the right, while the professional community lent their 
support for design control by citing ‘uniformity’. This set the stage for the practice of design 





The Central Area and the Boundaries of Design Regulation  
Another important legacy of the British planning system which has remained relatively intact 
is the dual distinction between city centre or ‘Central Area’ (CA) and that which is outside 
the city centre – a continuation of the ‘town’ and ‘country’ distinction in British colonial 
planning. Urban settlement in Singapore started in and defined the boundaries of the CA. The 
boundary of the CA was established by use, rather than by vision. Starting with the creation 
of the Municipality, an area defined as the ‘Municipal Area’ (about 20,069 acres, or about 
8,120 hectares) was placed under its jurisdiction. Within this Municipal Area was defined a 
smaller site largely confined to the north and south of Singapore River – called the 
“Congested Area” (about 1,000 acres, circa 1948 or 405 hectares) in the Report of Singapore 
Housing Committee (1948). It was where, traditionally, the commercial and civic activities 
were carried out and also included the residential areas of the local communities. This 
‘Congested Area’ was the initial basis for the perimeters of what we now know as the CA. 
The first Master Plan Report of Singapore in 1955 described the CA as an area where 
redevelopment is necessary, due to overcrowding and the high value of land: 
 
Together with the problems of an increasing population and the necessity of 
providing sufficient means of livelihood is a problem of equal severity set by the 
existence of a large number of buildings in the centre of the City which, by reason of 
age, condition, size, siting, sanitation and other factors, should be demolished and 
replaced. It is essential that a programme of redevelopment should be instituted in 
Singapore because the areas most in need of it lie adjacent to the principal business, 





Master Plan, Report of Survey, 1955 : 48 
 
Despite the severity of the overcrowding problem, there was recognition that the CA also 
marked the imaginative centre of the colony, and thus, redevelopment also needed to ‘satisfy 
the growing civic pride in the City’ (ibid, 56). By the time of SIT and the URD, major slum 
clearance, resettlement and rebuilding projects were carried out in the CA, and the beginnings 
of a comprehensive urban vision grew from there.  
The rigorous planning of Singapore started in 60s, immediately after two 5-year cycles of 
intensive public housing schemes. The Master Plan, the preparation of which started in 1952 
under Sir Peplar, and which was gazetted in 1955, quickly became obsolete in the face of 
rapid development and industrialisation. Consequently, two teams of planners and architects 
were requested from the United Nations to help Singapore prepare long range concept plans 
and master plans to guide the growth of Singapore. Known as the Lorange Plan (1961) and 
the Koenigsberger Plan (1963), by their team leaders, these plans set the macro-scale 
planning vision and structure for the island of Singapore.  
While the URD was already engaged in various urban design projects for the urban 
renewal sites in the 60s and early 70s, such as for Precinct South 1 and later Orchard Road8, a 
comprehensive set of urban design plans did not emerge until the formation of the Urban 
Redevelopment Authority in 1974. The first steps towards making finer scaled urban design 
plans started with the State and City Planning (SCP) project, which began in 1967 under the 
support of UN and the government. The project was led by Australian firm Crooks, Michell, 
                                                 
8 See HDB’s Annual Reports 1969 and 1973/74 for a brief description of the early works of URD in terms of urban 
renewal and urban design  
Peacock and Stewart of Sydney at a project cost of $5 million, and comprised of staff from 
the Urban Renewal Department of HDB, the Planning Department and Public Works 
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Organisation structure of the State and City Planning Organisation  
 
Besides preparing the Concept Plan, the SCP, with its “Urban Design” section, started the 
finer scaled urban design plans for the Central area of Singapore. ( Reproduced from 
Annual Report, 1968/69, Planning Department, pp 3 ) 
 
 
Besides preparing the Concept Plan which was used to guide land allocation for 
public projects and infrastructure, the SCP also produced a Central area study. It expanded 
the previous boundary of the CA, absorbing into its folds the rapidly growing Orchard Road 
belt, an enlarged civic district, the conservation areas of Chinatown and Little India, and the 
Beach Road extension. In 1970, a sub-project team was formed in the Planning Department 
and attached to URD to undertake ‘detail planning of the Central Area as an extension of the 
work already done by the SCP Project’ (Planning Department, 1970 : 20). The Central Area 
concept plan prepared by this sub-project team proposed ‘arrangement of activities, 
distribution of employment and population, and major parking concentrations’. In addition, 
areas which demanded more intensive ‘design studies’ were noted, such as a ‘tentatively 
suggested coastal expressway along the city water-front, the area between Fort Canning and 
















Maps 1a, 1b and 1c (cont’ to next page)
The United Nations Urban Renewal & Development Project - Central Area Plans, 1971 
 
Three of the plans produced by the sub-project team for the Central Area. The plans had rudimentary concepts of a 
structural division of the Central area into distinct clusters, such as the ‘civic area’ and the ‘conservation area’ , and, 
as Map 1b illustrates, identified areas for further design studies. 
 
Source : Annual Report, 1970, Planning Department, pp 29 – 33, and The United Nations Urban Renewal & 





In 1973, the Planning Department released ‘micro-zoning plans’. These micro-zoning plans 
aimed to ‘conserve the more attractive environments existing today, protect some older but 
pleasant housing estates nearer the Central against indiscriminate encroachment by urban 
development and yield a more varied and interesting forms of residential development’ (PD 
1973 : 12). Despite such wide-ranging aims, the resultant plans only sought to control 
building heights, and primarily worked on the premise of using existing contexts to guide the 
height of new developments so that ‘in areas where there are existing or approved high-rise 
developments, boundaries of areas where a high-rise zone is prescribed are extended to 
embrace them’, and ‘where there are low-rise bungalows in good condition and in attractive 
surroundings, a low-rise zone is proposed to perpetuate this form of development’.  It 
essentially was an exercise in ameliorating built form so as to perpetuate existing typologies. 
Such micro-zoning plans were created for the Bukit Timah, Orchard/Paterson, River Valley, 
Holland Road and Farrer Road areas. Thus, while the state was involved heavily in the 
clearance of slums and resettling the largely poor communities within the CA in high-rise 
public housing, they were also mindful of and sensitive to the needs of the elite communities, 
as this policy – perhaps one of the first planning policies written with an obvious aesthetic 
justification - acted to protect their low-rise, low density residential environment from 
development encroachments. Nevertheless, since this set of plans was released by a 
department solely concerned with planning, it employed only the macro-tools of zoning and 





URA’s formation in 1974 signaled a greater emphasis on and power given to the 
redevelopment of the city centre. URA’s role was to carry out ‘comprehensive redevelopment 
of the city centre with the ultimate objective of creating a new and gracious city with a better 
environment for commercial, residential, and social and recreational activities’ (HDB, 
1973/4 : 1). “New”, “gracious” and “better environment” all carried with them a range of 
social, cultural and aesthetic dimensions, and for the planning authority, these would be 
translated into the formulation of urban design guide plans from 1974 to 1980s, firstly for the 
rapidly redeveloping parts of the Central Area such as Orchard Road and Marina Centre, and 




   
By the late 70s, as the pressures of urban renewal and resettlement subsided, the 
planning emphasis for the CA veered towards ‘urban design studies aimed at attaining 
environmental improvement and better economic development’. The Central Area Planning 
Team (CAPT) was set up in 1979 as a coordinating committee chaired by the URA and 
involved representatives from PD, HDB, PWD and Parks and Recreation Department to deal 
with central area planning. A preliminary Central Area Structure Plan (Map 2) was drawn up 
around then for the whole of the CA, which set the pattern of landuse and urban growth. This 
structure also laid the foundations for finer urban design plans for the CA. By 1985, The 
CAPT planning area covered an area of 2,545 hectares, considerably bigger than the 405 
hectares of ‘Congested Area’ demarcated during the colonial times. Then, the CA boundary 
had also expanded and was bounded by Lavender Street/Serangoon Road/Singapore 
River/Outram Road/Cantonment Road and the Orchard Road corridor (Master Plan, Report 
of Survey. 1985 : 19), reflecting how the perception of the CA as a space of shopping, 
commerce and entertainment encouraged the authorities to consolidate such surrounding 
spaces into its folds (Map 3). The study area of the CAPT, which went beyond the boundaries 
of the CA in 1985 to include residential areas to the north and south of Orchard Road, the 
Kallang Basin, and the reclaimed areas of Marina Centre, East and South, preempted 




























The Central Area Structure Plan, 1978  
 
As a structure plan, it is a development of what was proposed by the SCP in 1971. It shows a continuous stretch 
of commercial activities stretching from Orchard Road all the way south to the waterfront (Beach Road in the 
SCP plan, and the newly reclaimed Marina Centre in URA’s plan), and an east-west belt along Hill Street. 
Around these commercial belts are mixed residential/ commercial developments, called ‘supporting activities’ in 
SCP plan. Both plans also picked up important civic centres, while the URA plan had more comprehensive 
annotations of open spaces and the road system. The structure plan formed the basis for the various urban 
design plans to follow, which started to differentiate each cluster of areas in finer details according to urban form, 
character and activities.    
 



















The Central Area Boundaries, 1955 – 2003 (indicative) 
 
Map showing  
 
1. 1955 Master Plan (pink shaded) 490 Ha 
 
2. 1985 Master Plan (green dashed boundary) 1020 Ha 
 
3. 2003 Masterplan (black dashed boundary)  
 




Within this period of time, landuse plans for the expanded Central Area and the Urban 
Design Guide Plan were completed. The Urban Design Guide Plan reflected the attention 
paid to the aesthetic quality of the Central Area, in addition to the more functional planning 
considerations. The Plan divided the Central Area into various clusters, identified by their 
predominant physical character and landuse pattern. Each such cluster had a set of design 
guidelines controlling land usage as well as the ‘form, size and height of the buildings’ (ibid : 
7). The interventionist approach taken in the shaping of urban form is encapsulated in an 





While economic objectives continue to dominate, with the attainment of significant 
material progress our urban planners can now pay more attention to providing 
amenities that enhance the quality of life in the City. At the same time, development 
has to be guided in such a way that the city’s future form will be deliberately shaped  
URA, Annual Report 1983/4 : 4  
 
Thence, ‘all new development projects, both private and public, are evaluated against the 
planned landuse and future overall urban design concepts … to achieve a coordinated 
development programme as well as landuse and urban design objectives’ (URA, Annual 
Report 1980/1: 8). According to the official website of the URA (read Mar 2007), by 1983, 
this Central Area Structure plan was updated and this ‘resulted in an orderly transformation 
of the city skyline and the creation of an impressive environment interwoven with the 
historical, architectural and cultural heritage of the older parts of the city’.  
 
Review by administration and the aesthetic divide  
With the setting up of the URA, one thus notices the immense energy spent on aestheticising 
the CA, when compared to the ‘rest of Singapore’. In the absence of a urban/rural distinction 
in Singapore, various significations and assumptions can be seen to operate across this divide. 
The growth of the CA to absorb the spillage of activities seen to be more appropriate for a 
‘Central Area’ – shopping, finance and entertainment – reflect the official perception of what 
a CA should be. Clearly, there are significations of the CA as a form of showcase to the 
world, and to itself, as tourist destination, financial and cultural centre, and national space 






In tracing the mechanisms, policies and guidelines which deal with the aesthetic or 
design aspects of private developments, it is realized that there exists two large classes of 
standards and guidelines operating in Singapore, and across the CA/outside CA divide. 
Firstly, as discussed in the previous section, the URA has been producing a series of urban 
design guidelines, specifically for the CA, since its inception in 1974. However, outside the 
CA and the ambit of the URA, there is a large corpus of guidelines known as ‘development 
control’ guidelines which has evolved separately from the urban design plans and guidelines, 
and is administered by the governmental body in charge of the function of development 
control.  The function of development control, and the guidelines and codes that are attached 
to it, are largely inherited from colonial institutions, when development control was 
undertaken by the PWD, and subsequently, the Singapore Improvement Trust. In 1960, with 
the coming into force of the Planning Ordinance and the repeal of the Singapore 
Improvement Ordinance, it was passed to the Planning Department within the Ministry of 
Law and National Development (PD, 1960) until 1966, when it was placed under the charge 
of the Chief Building Surveyor’s Department under the same ministry (PD, 1966). Then on 1 
April 1974, development control moved back to the PWD. Development control was parked 
under the PWD as the “Building and Development Control Division” (BDCD) until 1988, 
when it was transferred back to the Planning Department within MND (MND, 1988/89). A 
year after that, in 1989, the Planning Department and the Research & Statistics Unit were 
both amalgamated with the URA which thus became the national planning and conservation 
authority, no longer confined strictly to the Central Area. With that, all aspects of planning, 
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In contrast, ‘urban design guidelines’ are classed as an extra layer, a special class of 
considerations, overlaid on the ‘technical’ parameters of development control guidelines, and 
produced ‘in situ’ by the URA after 1974. Given such an institutional history, urban design 
considerations are often separated from development control considerations, since the latter 
only came under its fold in 1989. An immediate effect of this divide is seen in the division of 
labour within the URA. One of the everyday primary task of an officer in the Development 
Control Division of the URA is to process development applications and ensure that various 
guidelines and conditions are met before the issuance of a planning permission. The officer 
evaluates the applications based on development control guidelines which largely evolved 
under the administration of the BDCD in the PWD. Projects that fall within the Central Area 
or in designated areas identified for urban design controls are then internally forwarded to the 
Conservation and Urban Design Division for evaluation by architects based on guidelines that 
are usually more ‘design’ or aesthetic based, and which are largely based on urban design 
plans drawn up by the URA. Therefore, in the process of submitting for planning permission 
and depending on the location of the proposed development, all designs are subject to an 
internal form of design review based on both the urban design guidelines applicable for the 
area and the prevalent development control guidelines. Table 1 compares what are listed as 




Table 1  
List of ‘development control parameters’ and ‘urban design items’ 
 
DEVELOPMENT CONTROL PARAMETERS URBAN DESIGN ITEMS  
1. Land use  
2. Plot ratio   
3. Building height 
4. Setback and buffer requirements including the 
allowable structures  
5. Ancillary structures within physical buffer 
(prescriptive and objective based guidelines)  
6. Minor structural projections into setback (eg rc 
ledges, bay window)  
7. Floor-to-floor height  
8. Attic  
1. Pedestrian Network  
a Covered walkway width 
b Covered walkway soffit height 
c Covered walkway and open walkway 
levels 
d Location of ramps and steps 
e Screening of M&E and service areas 
f Provision of open walkway / underpass / 
overhead / free standing link to bus stop 
/ MRT entrance / adjacent development 
i location / alignment 
ii width and height 
Through block links / View corridor 
i location / alignment 
ii width and height 
9. Roof-top gardens / roof terraces / parapet wall 
height  
10. Balconies (including enclosure of balconies for 
landed housing) 
11. Site coverage  
2. Vehicular Access  
a Vehicular ingress / egress points 
b Location of lay-bys 
12. Communal open space (cluster housing)  
13. Private enclosed space (PES)  
14. Basement (protrusions and openings)  
15. Earthworks and retaining/boundary walls  
16. Landed housing plot size & width requirement  
17. Access points for landed housing  
18. Covered walkway (outside Central Area)  
3. Streetscape 
a Building Edge 
i Provision of building edge 
ii % of Articulation of building edge 
iii Height and depth of building edge 
b Requirement for party wall 
c Allowable height of party wall 
                                                 
9 This table is adapted from URA circular to professional institutes - “Changes to Waiver Application Process and the 
New Development Facilitation Committee”, dated 6 March 2006.  
19. Use quantum (incl shopping quantum in 
residential devt)  
20 Redevelopment of existing flats within 
designated landed housing areas  
d Setback of façade above party wall 
e Screening of elevated car parks 
21. Breakaway of landed housing for 
redevelopment  








b Screening (M&E equipment / Carparks) 
 
6. OPEN SPACE / PROMENADE / PEDESTRIAN 
MALLS 
 







c Frontage along covered walkways  
d Height / Height of opaque panel 





3. Civic District Guidelines, eg lighting plan, 
paving materials, tree planting. 
4. Singapore River Promenade  
5. Public Space 
ORCHARD PLANNING AREA GUIDELINES 
a. Urban Verandah 
b. 1st storey link 
c. 2nd storey links 
d. Underpass 
e. Façade articulation 
a OTHERS 
Ancillary Structures(bollards, low walls, bus, 
stops, canopies) 
 
The interrelation between the two sets up an interesting comparison. By comparing the 
lists, it is not immediately possible to draw a clean distinction between the two. While a large 
portion of urban design guidelines clearly have aesthetics as a basis – the reference to 
‘streetscape’, ‘roofscape’, lighting and façade articulations being the obvious few – there are 
also many which deal with the provision of basic pedestrian amenity and comfort. Urban 
design guidelines also are categorized according to individual precincts - such as Singapore 
River, Orchard Road and the Civic District which all have their specific set of controls - and 
are reserved for the Central Area and other parts of the island designated for special urban 
design controls. On the other hand, development control guidelines seem largely to be based 
on ‘technical’ concerns such as safety, GFA calculations and the provision of basic amenities 
such as covered walkways, which are couched as non-design related, straightforward 
requirements that can be applied and assessed in a more or less standardized fashion, and 
ultimately related to the calculation of development charge. They are also the de facto set of 
control for all developments in Singapore based on typology and use, and usually not 





DC guidelines –  
1. Applicable inside and outside Central Area (unless overridden by UD guidelines). 
2. Primarily created for the purposes of GFA calculation, safety and provision of basic 
amenities.  
3. Inherited from colonial institutions of building and development control.  
 
UD Guidelines –  
1. Applicable inside Central Area and other areas designated for urban design control. 
2. Primarily created for the aesthetic purposes and the provision of basic amenities.  
3. Created ‘insitu’ after independence.  
 
While this paper is essentially concerned with guidelines created for aesthetic purposes 
(and thus urban design guidelines in general), it should be noted that the bases of many 
development control guidelines are lost in the transfer of histories such that they are often 
taken to be pure figures of computation and irrefutable ‘standards’. The history of 
development control being undertaken by PWD helps to wash them clean of such 
associations, and the continued separation between UD and DC guidelines within the URA 
perhaps perpetuates this distinction as a history that seems to have too much at stake to be 
effectively shed off. Furthermore, design reviews often concern both DC guidelines and UD 
guidelines, on particular issues and in specific locales which makes it difficult to see them as 
separate. For example, guidelines were released on Sep 2004 to encourage more ‘innovative 
and better design of rooftops’ (URA, 6 Sept 2004). While clearly aesthetic in objective, it is 
neither restricted to CA or special urban design districts and is applicable, like other DC 
guidelines, to all areas unaffected by overriding UD or conservation concerns. Guidelines on 
public spaces also slide between DC and UD domains, since they are inextricably tied with 
GFA calculations, and yet their site-specific considerations make it necessary to evaluate 
them under UD parameters (see the three URA circulars establishing the criteria for public 





Another obvious cross-over is that of advertisement sign control. The control of 
advertising has always been placed under the control of the BDCD in the PWD, and the 
rationale for its control is almost entirely aesthetic. For example, it was reported that one of 
the roles of the division was to ‘maintain a pleasant and safe living environment and 
streetscape through the regulation of authorized structures and licensing and regulation of 
advertisement signs’ (PWD Annual Report 93/94 : 18).  In 11 April 1991, ‘free-standing 
advertisement billboards, advertisement signs on gable walls of shophouses and commercial 
skysigns’ were phased out ‘to achieve a more pleasant streetscape’. This creates overlapping 
concerns which are now being smoothened by the URA in order to deal with, on the one hand, 
this blanket island-wide prohibition of such advertisement signs as a form of development 
control guideline, and yet encourage more of such signs in specific commercial and 
entertainment zones in the CA as a form of urban design guideline. Thus, exemptions are 
made to this advertisement ban in areas such as Bugis and Orchard, where neon lights and 
advertisement signs are seen to be desirable (URA, 3 Dec 2001). The centralisation of the 
urban design function and the development control function into the URA in 1989 thus can be 
seen to work towards the resolution of such overlapping and sometimes conflicting controls 





In many ways, the Central/Outside Central Area divide continues to operate in practice. 
Within the URA, the development control division is staffed mainly by generalists (such as 
geographers and planners, though there are a handful of architects in the division due largely 
to internal movement of staff). On the other hand, the conservation and urban design division 
is staffed mainly by architects, which reflect the more aesthetically sensitive nature of the 
work in the division. To a certain extent, architecturally trained individuals occupy a special 
prescribed space which allows them some leeway in blending aesthetic taste and judgment in 
an otherwise largely technical, bureaucratic and pragmatic regulatory environment. Thus, 
within internal reviews, architecturally trained officers are often called upon to assess 
qualities such contextual ‘harmony’, place character and visual quality. Terms like 
‘harmonious’ and ‘compatible’ are also found frequently in design guidelines issued by the 
authority to the professionals, showing that the practice of aesthetic judgment in design 
reviews has been going on for some time, and that the imprecision of such words means that 
aesthetic judgment is often based on some educated sense of discernment (see Chapter Five – 
Development Guide Plans and the rhetoric of urban design).  
 
 The internal division between architects/non-architects within the URA is mapped onto 
the geographical distinction between ‘Central Area’ and ‘Outside Central Area’ – the latter 
being the ‘poorer’ cousin that requires less aesthetic attention and manicuring. As much as it 
is a matter of managing human resources and a legacy of institutional reshuffling, it also 
reflects the distinction given to an aesthetic space that can only be accessed by professional 
training. Compared with the rest of the island, the Central Area is subject to tighter and more 
comprehensive aesthetic control. Special urban design guidelines apply to every part of the 
Central Area, with different sets of guidelines for different districts based on the urban 
character and planning visions (Map 4). Until 2002, selected routes in the Central Area were 
designated as ‘ceremonial paths’ and any development along these routes had to be referred 























District Boundaries of the Central Area, 2006 
 
By 2006, the Central Area is conceived of a cluster of “distinctive districts”, each characterised by its predominant activity and 
physical urban character. Different sets of urban design guidelines are thus applied for each of these districts.  
 
source : URA 
 
administrators. This distinction between Central Area and aesthetics is however not hermetic. 
With URA becoming the national planning authority in 1989, it should not be surprising that 
its traditional attention to urban design within the CA now becomes applied on a national 
scale. Increasingly, pockets of spaces outside the Central Area have come under closer 
scrutiny and become designated as precincts with customized urban design controls. As of 
2006, about 50 clusters of designated areas outside the Central Area are covered under 
“special urban design guidelines”, which stipulate stricter controls on built form, massing and 
other architectural issues over and above the standard development control guidelines. These 
areas are often identified for their ‘unique’ characters – such as clusters of low-rise 
shophouses in Thomson, Joo Chiat and Holland Village or prestigious ‘good class bungalow 
areas’ – and the guidelines are created on the basis of ensuring that existing place character is 
not compromised by urban redevelopment or growth. (Singapore Masterplan 2003, Special 






In tracing the various plans prepared by the various relevant authorities, one can see that the 
initial project of urban renewal gradually grew into a project of urban design for the CA, and 
subsequently, with the centralization of all planning functions in the URA, for the entire 
island. The gradual growth of this project reflects both the increasing importance of the CA, 
as a space that needs to project a certain image that coheres with certain planning objectives 
or official visions, as well as the increasing propensity to extend ‘urban design’ 
considerations to many more parts of the island. If the spaces in the CA which needed 
‘greater design attention’ were initially identified by the foreign consultants in the 60s, then 
the state has clearly taken over the project with much energy and initiative. Indeed, it is seen 
that the state was able to conjoin, at a very early stage, planning objectives with aesthetic 
goals, moving in at a more and more microscopic level - from the first instance of urban 






The extension of urban design sensibilities nationwide, while at the same time, a continued 
effort to distinguish DC from UD guidelines, suggests that the cleavage separating CA from 
‘outside CA’ is both eroding and deepening. The CA will continue to represent an aesthetic 
focus for the state, though it will need to operate in a more complex field of differences. 
Clearly no longer that of ‘town’ and ‘country’, the CA/outside CA generates other sets of 
distinctions, such as ‘cosmopolitan/heartland’, ‘centre/periphery’, ‘national/international’ and 
so on. The CA, projected as commercial, financial and cultural hub of not just the nation, but 
the region or the world, will always be aestheticised with this outward momentum in mind. 
Even as it does so, this momentum tugs along representations of spaces outside the CA  - the 
town centres, regional neighbourhood hubs and housing estates – such that they must refer to 
each other to construct a more or less coherent image that manages the intense contradictions 
and cleavages across them.  
 
It has always been the case that transformations in the physical-spatial environment 
have the greatest visual impact and thus most crucial symbol of success of planning 
objectives (McLoughlin, 1973), and it is certainly one that is employed strenuously by a 
developmental state such as Singapore whose political legitimacy rests heavily on the 
deliverance of material benefits and economic progress. Design schemes are fundamentally 
constructions of faith. They project a future that is always described as better than what is 
now. In the case of Singapore, where the ruling political party has not changed since 
independence, such improvements, however, cannot reflect too badly on what is the current 
situation, since there are no predecessors on which to lay the blame. Thus the operation in 
official jargon is almost always a project of ‘enhancement’ – the task of making something 
that was good better. It has been noted by academics that the political style of Singapore’s 
ruling party is to generate a perpetual sense of crisis. Design schemes are thus also political 
statements, as they represent a promise to the masses that is expected to be delivered within a 
certain timeframe. They are statements of confidence – such that by its very presence, all 
forms of anxiety can be assuaged, because one has planned for it. This becomes more crucial 
when planning began to take on a more consultative approach with the public, as we shall 





Thus, aesthetics of the urban realm and politics implicate each other in very complex 
ways, no matter whether it is in the design of public spaces, national monuments, or in this 
case, any private development, since they all add up to the aesthetics of the city, which has an 
inexorably public nature about it. If Singapore has often been singled out for its rapid 
physical transformation into a modern metropolis, one of its agencies must be this 
determination towards an aesthetic goal, a planning vision, an image, which under a 
centralized planning system, an efficient and uncorrupt administration, enjoys a high rate of 
actualization. In this aspect, the practice of ‘review by administration’, and the twin facilities 
of urban design and development control, served as that vital filter through which the visions 




Design review in its political milieu 
 
Having sketched the institutional milieu of design review in post independence Singapore, 
this chapter now traces the ideologies of the government and public service which have 
impact on its evolution and operation. Thus, design schemes and review mechanisms are 
placed within a larger discursive framework, such that they are seen as events supported by a 
mass media and a political entity, influencing how they are presented to and engage with the 





Paradigm Shift in the Public Service – Participation and Entrepreneurialism 
The creation of urban design plans till the 80s is largely an exercise carried out in isolation by 
the planners. Chua (1996) notes that the centralized planning system is headed by a network 
of long serving civil servants, who work together at a personal level, thus bridging the 
sectoral division of the various state agencies and ministries. Within this culture of elitism, 
‘what has emerged is a planning system with almost no public participation…[and] this 
insulated autonomy was symptomatic of the general conditions of government in Singapore 
until the mid 1980s.’ Indeed, the technical and professional language favoured by the 
planning elite tends to distance the lay public from either engaging or contesting the entire 
project of planning Singapore’s future. Koh’s (1997) discussion of the ‘machine bureaucracy’ 
of the civil service from the 70s to 80s also reflects a system which emphasizes efficiency, 
technocratic rationality and a sense of mission to translate the ruling party’s (PAP) plans into 
reality. The blurred distinction between the politician and the civil servant has a profound 
impact in the area of planning – one of the arenas where national identity is most acutely 
created and national agendas served.  
 
According to Chua(1996), this link between politics and planning became obvious when 
the autonomous environment of the planners quickly opened up after the serious decline in 
the ruling party’s popular support base in the 1984 elections. The introduction of opposition 
MPs into the office signaled the people’s desire for a change in leadership style. The first 
time in which planning incorporated a consultation with the public was in 1988 when the 
Draft Masterplan to revitalize the Civic and Cultural District was unveiled in March that year 
and a public exhibition was held. The Civic and Cultural District is a charged space imbued 
with national significance – it includes monumental spaces such as the Padang, both colonial 
and new government buildings such as City Hall, Supreme Court and the Parliament House, 
as well as various museums, libraries and theatres. Public feedback was solicited on various 
proposals to develop the district into ‘a major historical, cultural and retail centre, as well as 
the venue for national ceremonies and functions’ (URA, Skyline, Nov/Dec 1988 : 4). 
Towards the end of the exhibition, a dialogue session was also held which was attended by 
about 180 people (Skyline, Jul/Aug 1988 : 2-5). One of the recurring rhetoric in both the 
dialogue as well as the subsequent reporting was that the district had declined despite its 





In its heyday, the area used to throb with life and activities, especially Stamford Road 
with its retail outlets and Bras Basah Road with its bookshops and sports shops which 
were well patronized by students from the many schools in the vicinity. But over the 
years, rapid deterioration of the older buildings, relocation of the schools and the 
absence of crowd-drawing activities have all but caused the district to sink into 
oblivion.  
Skyline, Mar/Apr 1988, v.33: 3 
 
The strategy of bringing back ‘life’ to the district was essentially two fold - to rehabilitate 
various old colonial buildings into museums and schools so as to bring back the crowds, and 
‘strengthen the character’ of the place by breaking it up into six ‘identity zones’ which would 
then be linked by a hierarchy of routes that make symbolic connections between various 
buildings and spaces. During the consultation, URA proposed several possible improvement 





1. Replacing bus stop and car park at Empress Place with greenery and footpaths; 
2. Nicoll Highway extension to link Marina Centre to future downtown and relieve 
traffic from the CBD; 
3. Removal of National Library to create a ‘vista relationship’ between Fort Canning 
Hill and Bras Basah Park; 
4. Redesigning of Dhoby Ghaut road junction to free up space and create strong urban 
edge by allowing buildings to line the junction; 
5. Creating a grander design to the entrance of Istana to accommodate ceremonial 
events; and 
6. Ensuring that new developments be built in styles compatible with the existing 
historic/older buildings.  
 
As can be seen immediately, the proposals opened for public feedback were very specific, 
focused on prescribed well-defined issues, and almost microscopic in scale, compared to the 
frame of reference that planners are used to. Strictly speaking, this is not a public consultation 
on planning issues, but on specific interventions and improvement projects at various 
locations within the district. The specificity of these proposals and the concreteness of its 
presentation (through models and large graphic panels showing the simulated results of such 
proposals) created a tight locus within which public opinion was focused. The authorities 
clearly were not trying to encourage any general discussion about larger social, cultural or 
political issues which might reasonably arise for a site of such importance, or open the 
ground for all sorts of alternative proposals that might look at issues on a larger scale and 
across administrative boundaries (which would be problematic given the sectoral nature of 
the civil service). Rather, these proposals represented projects that could be carried out, or 
were intended to be carried out, by the authorities – more specifically, URA - and public 
consultation was undertaken to both gauge and solicit support, and meld suggestions into the 
proposals where possible. Lastly, it is important to add that the geographical boundary of the 
district under study was uncontested, and possibly uncontestable. The boundary was a given, 
though it could clearly be open to all forms of questioning. Does, for example, the fact that 
this line runs here means that buildings on this side of the road are subject to ‘civic and 
cultural’ controls while the other side not? Also, the vision of the space was given as the basis 
of its transformation, and this framed the discussion rather tightly towards the achievement of 
that prescribed vision. The consultation did not, for example, ask the question of what the 
peoples’ visions of this space were (though evocations of that came through in the discussion). 
In all, these reflect the pragmatic style of the civil service and the government – one that is 
result-focused, and whose legitimacy lies on the deliverance of tangible benefits and 
improvements. It also reflects the tightly prescribed space within which public consultation is 
framed, in order that the discussion not lapse into ‘meaningless’ (or worse, controversial) 





As the first public consultation exercise, it also represented a first attempt to introduce the 
public to urban design concepts and the aesthetics of the built environment. While it is strictly 
speaking not ‘design review’ as defined in this essay, the results of such a consultation 
percolate into urban design guidelines that have impact on the design of private developments 
in the district. The official report mentioned that there was general public support for some 
form of aesthetic control to ensure that the architectural style of the area was maintained. The 
official view was the new developments had to be built in styles ‘compatible’ with the older 
buildings. The creation of the various routes, especially the ‘Ceremonial Route’, attributed 
such aesthetic importance to these spaces that the architectural design of any new 
development henceforth needed to be subject to the expert opinion of the Architectural 
Design Panel. Other suggestions, such as the improvement of Empress Place, the construction 
of the Esplanade bridge (extension of Nicoll Highway), pavement and sidewalk upgrading, as 
well as the introduction of various cultural institutions and schools into the area through the 
sale of sites and rehabilitations of old buildings, were carried out by the authorities gradually. 
A final touch of beautification was the creation of a ‘lighting plan’, which guided the building 





Despite such criticisms, it is important to note that this exercise was a pioneering effort, 
as it preceded much of the rhetoric on public participation issued from the top political 
leadership by almost a decade. It was only in the early 90s that political and economic events 
accelerated a paradigmatic shift in the way the Government saw itself in relation to the people 
and the private sector. The reign of Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong after the stepping down 
of now Minister Mentor Lee Kwan Yew in 1990 witnessed a softer approach in statecraft. In 
1997, PM Goh tasked that a report be made which gathered “views and built a consensus on 
how to make Singapore our best home - the place of choice to live a fulfilling life, to make a 
good living and raise a happy family”, one which reflected “a change of mindset, from one of 
reliance on government to one of obligations to the country.” (Goh C T. 1999) The report – 
called ‘Singapore 21’  as it painted the vision for a 21st Century Singapore – was produced 
after about one and the half years of public consultation with around 6000 Singaporeans from 
a wide range of professional and socio-economic classes. Five committees were set up and 
the eventual findings were summarized into five goals for the next century. Of these five 
goals, two in particular played a large role in the way the civil service began to reconsider 
seriously the way they engage with both the private sector and the general public.    
   





2. ‘Active Citizens who Make the Difference’ – increasing opportunities for public 
consultation and encourage the growth of active citizenry 
 
Besides being the clearest clarion call ever for greater civic participation in public 
policies and issues, it also placed the problem of the ‘Singaporean identity’ squarely into the 
spotlight and tied it together with a collective approach towards the urgent project of nation-
building. The overall sentiment was that of a foreboding sense of uncertainty and change; one 
brought about by various events such as the economic crisis which also happened in 1997, 
geopolitical tensions such as the ethnic violence at Kosovo, threats posed by the new 
globalised knowledge-based economy, as well as technological forces, notably the internet, 
which was seen as a potential threat to the social and political integrity of the nation-state. An 
enhanced sense of belonging and identification with the Singapore project, as well as the 
sense of ownership which could be cultivated by greater participation in national and public 
policy issues, was thus seen to be a ballast against the certainty of change –  
 
In such a world, political stability, social cohesion, and the values and commitment 
of our people will be of paramount importance. Together, they make up the 
"heartware" which will determine if we can meet the challenges ahead - whether we 
can muster our people to defend the country, whether we can mobilise our 
businessmen and workers to meet economic challenges, whether we can encourage 
our people to take care of one another. Heartware will determine our national 
resilience in a changing world. It will also determine the tone of our communities and 
the quality of every Singaporean's life. 
Teo C H, 4 May 1999 
The immediate impact of this S21 vision on the public service is found in a speech 
delivered by Mr Eddie Teo, Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister’s Office, to the elite 
Administrative Service officers in 1999. In his speech, he reiterated the culture of change – 
that the mindset of the public service must embrace change as the only certainty – and added 
that an increasingly educated citizenry exposed to the global situation would be less tolerant 
of ambiguous answers and expect to have their opinions heard. He proposed generally three 
ways in which the civil service could incorporate the S21 report as its operational paradigm. 
Firstly, the government had to begin to involve the public more in its decision-making 
process. Secondly, the public service had to become more communicative, open and 
responsive – the practice of simply following instructions and executing policies must now 
extend to the explanation and communication of such policies to the public. Lastly, the public 
service had to see itself almost as a service industry with a customer-centric mindset, one that 
required the officer to give “clear and sensible answers and useful information to the public 





Through the Public Service 21 office – a unit set up to change the culture of the public 
service - several initiatives were embarked. In 1995, service standards were published and 
‘Quality Service Managers’ were appointed in various civil service bodies. Customer service 
hotlines were also set up, and various alternative forms of service delivery, such as through 
electronic means, were quickly established. In 2004, a ‘No Wrong Door’ policy started which 
was aimed at addressing one of the problems of a sectoral public service structure. Its mission 
is to ensure that members of the public do not get referred from agency to agency when they 
approach the Government with an issue. And lastly, various feedback channels were created 
where the opinions of the public could be heard. One of such channels was the Pro-Enterprise 
Panel, set up in 2000, to “actively solicit feedback on rules and regulations that hinder 
businesses and stifle entrepreneurship … to ensure that government rules and regulations 
remain relevant and supportive of a pro-business environment” (Official website of Pro-





It is necessary to delve further into the economic crisis which erupted in the same year in 
which the PS 21 exercise as it continues to exert immense influence on operational paradigm 
of the public service. The economic crisis in a sense brought about a renewed sense of 
fragility in the government, understandably since the deliverance of material goods and 
economic success are key to political legitimacy. With the changing regional and global 
environment, particularly the shift in economic and political power brought about by the rise 
of two Asian giants – China and India, and a globalised market dominated by transnational 
forces and technologies, it was felt that Singapore, with a mature economy that can no longer 
compete on low costs and incomes, needed a different development strategy. The Economic 
Review Committee (ERC) was thus set up in 2001 and the results of its deliberations 
published in 2003. The recommendations of this report are far-ranging, and will not be 
discussed here. What is important is that the government started to embrace and promote 
‘entrepreneurship’ as one of the key attributes in order to participate and survive in the new 
knowledge economy –  
 
To upgrade Singapore into a knowledge economy, we need to nurture a spirit of 
entrepreneurship and creativity. Singaporeans need to venture beyond their comfort 
zones, accept risks and carve niches for themselves. Encouraging this mindset, 
however, confronts deep issues of culture and social values, and is a long-term 
exercise.  
ERC Report. 2003 
 
Much has been said about the lack of entrepreneurial culture in Singapore which has 
largely depended on the state enterprise and foreign companies to run its businesses. After the 
ERC report, however, innovation, change, dynamism, flexibility, and being ‘pro-business’ 
become immediate hot buttons in the public sector. This pro-business stance combined with 
the drive for more public consultation and customer-focus services represent the twin engines 
driving the paradigm shift of the public service, which in turn influences the ways in which 
planning and design review are evolving within the URA. First and foremost, it means that 
development control – that function which brings the authority in touch with the private 
sector constantly - has to shed its image as an institution of control and enforcement, but 
become more facilitative, customer-focused and open. Review by administration goes under 
similar pressure, and public officers are to welcome informal consultations to hear the 
opposing parties’ views, facilitate correspondence with other governmental agencies where 
necessary under the ‘No wrong door” policy, and meet more stringent deadlines in reviewing 
development applications (DA). In an environment that emphasizes being customer-oriented 
and pro-business, design issues have to be dealt with carefully since they are often the hardest 
to communicate rationally to the lay client, or potentially derogatory when they appear to be 
‘teaching’ a professional architect how to design, and often pale in comparison to the 
potential loss of delaying a multi-million development project. There has been, for example, 
at least a case in which the PEP was called in due to what was deemed by the applicant as 
unnecessary hindrance to the business as a result of the design review process. Design review 
by administration has to be flexible (every case deserves its hearing and support) and fast all 
at once. It is thus not a surprise that speed of processing DAs is one of the criteria in 
assessing the performance of the URA vis-à-vis its role as a planning authority – one can see 
it being reported in the annual reports as a ‘key performance indicator’ of service quality. The 
mechanisms of submitting a DA has been continually modified with the prime objective of 




– “fast, friendly, reliable” being the motto of the division as reported in the 1991/2 Annual 
Report. The target of clearing 90% of DAs within 8 weeks in the early 90s was reduced to 7 
weeks since 2000, and with the introduction of electronic submissions in November 2001, 
further trimmed down to 4 weeks. 2006 saw the setting up of a Development Facilitation 
Committee (DFC). The Committee is set up to arrest a common complaint that during 
informal review meetings, officers are not able to make decisions on the spot, thus leaving 
applicants hanging till an official reply is sent to them. Also, because such review meetings 
often happen after a formal planning submission is made, an unsuccessful appeal for waiver 
will often mean that the applicant has to resubmit, resulting in a loss of time and money. The 
committee offers an alternative review process whereby applicants could make face-to-face 
representation of their case for certain classes of waivers to the prevailing guidelines, before 
making a formal planning submission. As the Committee is chaired by the Director of DCD, 
this would deal effectively with the complaint of the ineffectual and faceless public officer, 





Development  Guide Plans (DGP) and the rhetoric of urban design 
With the momentum set in motion, subsequent planning efforts have tried to engage the 
public in various ways and at different levels. While some exhibitions were largely similar in 
nature to the Civic and Cultural District Masterplan in that a finalized plan was exhibited and 
only specific proposals opened for public feedback (such as public consultations held for the 
Master Plan for Urban Waterfront and the conservation guidelines in 1988 and 1989 
respectively), other exercises tried to incorporate public and professional opinions at an 
earlier stage. One of the most ambitious public consultation exercises was carried out to 
review the Master Plan in 1993, which lasted for almost 5 years until the Master Plan was 
finally gazetted in 1998. The entire island of Singapore was carved into 55 DGP areas, and 
each DGP illustrated the planning vision for its area and set out both planning parameters 
such as land use, plot ratio building height as well as more detailed urban design guidelines, 
such as provision of public amenities, pedestrian links and building typologies. The 
schematic of how a DGP was produced was reported in a newspaper article in The Straits 





1. Stage 1 - Surveying and collecting data  
2. Stage 2 - Analysing Data 
3. Stage 3 - Developing an Outline and involving other agencies 
4. Stage 4 - Exhibiting proposals 
5. Stage 5 - Refining the plan 
6. Stage 6 - The Master Plan 
 
Professional bodies, such as the SIA, SIP and REDAS were consulted at Stage 3 of the 
process, and the plans were exhibited for public feedback at Stage 4 of the process. The DGP 
exercise was accompanied by extensive reporting over The Straits Times – at least 17 articles 
were published about or related to the DGP exercise between Nov 94 and Jun 95 (this is in 
addition to reporting every time there was a DGP exhibition). The blitz of articles, appearing 
in the more relaxed lifestyle and entertainment section of the newspaper, “Life!”, was 
initiated by the URA and largely featured completed DGPs grouped according to certain 
themes such as ‘decentralization’, ‘waterfront housing’ and ‘waterbodies’. The articles were 
clearly intended to educate the public on the strengths of the planning system, the value of the 
DGP exercise and the role of the government and the URA. Furthermore, the exercise of 
‘designing’ the city and consulting the public for their views was described by then Minister 
for National Development as a slight indulgence, “a little bit of day-dreaming”,  that was 
possible only after economic growth of 6 to 8 per cent every year (Lim, Hng Kiang, 1994).  
What is public is largely publicity. While the exercise was clearly a mammoth 
undertaking which brought the issue of planning and urban design to every part of the island, 
it is debatable whether the depth, rather than scale, of engagement was equally expanded. In a 
sense, using this opportunity of a Master Plan review, URA had expanded its project of urban 
design from the Central Area to the whole of Singapore. The project of urban design also 
allowed a different type of discourse which related much more effectively and readily with 
the lay public. Instead of plans with blotches of colours, perspectival simulations of the future 
were used. Instead of just numbers and statistics, common physical objects such as pavements, 
trees and buildings all could be highlighted as subjects of urban design studies. If planning 
could only talk about densities and uses and relate that generally to ‘quality of life’ and 
‘diversity of housing types’, urban design was then able to articulate more emotive and 
aesthetic issues such as ‘architectural heritage’, ‘character of a place’ and ‘modern cityscape’. 
What the DGP publicity shows is that ‘urban design’ has become an effective communicative 
tool to relate to masses, one which can be presented in graphics, models and affective 
language through exhibitions and the press. This should not be surprising, since urban design 
as a discipline developed precisely to bridge that gap between planning and architecture, 
planner and public. In the case of Singapore, it seems that the application of urban design 
sensibilities at a national scale was facilitated by moving the Planning Department into the 
URA, thus bringing both functions under an administration led largely by architects, rather 
than planners, and which originated from a concern with designing the CA, rather than 





Yet, with this prominence of urban design as something which affects everyone, the 
actual practice of urban design has not changed much. Similar to the Civic and Cultural 
District Master plan, the results of the consultation exercise, and the eventual translation of 
that into either guidelines or real projects did not enjoy the same type of publicity blitz that 
the consultation exercise itself went through. The public feedback sessions ( Step 4 of the 
DGP process) were briefly mentioned in one article - largely to demonstrate that URA took 
into serious consideration feedback by the local communities – but there were no 
comprehensive reporting of what feedback were given, and which were taken on board or 
rejected. Lastly, despite such a massive project to engage and educate the public, design 
review by administration remains largely a private affair between the authority and the 
professionals. Decisions reached during design review meetings between the public officers 
and the applicants at the point of submitting a development application, formal or informal, 
are confidential, though that is likely the moment, as seen from overseas experience, which 
reveals the inherently messy and controversial nature of any form of development or design 
control. Public discourse on planning so far revolves around themes of ‘achievements’ and 
‘challenges’. Indeed, it is difficult to find any incidents of contestations, all such publicity 
wrapped in a gloss of impermeable harmony, short of private accounts with professionals ‘in 
the know’. For example, Chua (1996 : 215 – 216) who performed as an in-house sociologist 





In the mid-1980s, private architects were invited to participate in the development 
of DGPs for designated areas, in competition with the government architects and 
planners. There were a couple of rounds of competition in which each party 
presented its concept plans independently of each other. The plans were then 
exhibited for a brief period in public places. Individuals were invited to submit 
their comments and state their preferences for the competing proposals. An open 
forum was then conducted among relevant professionals to debate the merits of 
each proposal. The URA was to make the final decision after taking into 
consideration the inputs from professional bodies and laymen. Unfortunately, this 
was to be a short-lived exercise. Not accustomed to competing ideas and public 
opinions, the bureaucracy found the process ‘clumsy’. The competitive process was 
then replaced by ‘collaboration’, in which private architects were invited to work 
with those from the URA as part of a team to produce only one plan rather than two 
competing ones. Even this process of joint production ceased in 1994 and all DGPs 





If this moment of a open forum where public officers and architects were able to freely 
express their visions and argue for their proposal is similar to a kind of design review that is 
open to the public, then its termination in the DGP exercise is indicative of a reluctance to 
alter what has been established as the accepted practice – one that is conducted in a controlled 
and confidential environment, where contestation is minimized and administration, simplified.  
 
When the DGP exercise was finalized in 1998 and incorporated into the Master Plan, the 
populist and aesthetic rhetoric of urban design once again had to be translated into the 
technocratic and professional language of guidelines and planning parameters, and this 
translation was never fully reported. A scan of a range of urban design guidelines produced 
subsequently after about 1998 is conducted to determine how such rhetoric finds its way into 
a text that is traditionally written in rather technocratic and precise language. While it cannot 
be conclusive of how such rhetoric is changing the operation of such guidelines, the scan 
does suggest that a substantial portion of UD guidelines require a certain aesthetic judgment 
on the part of the administrators. ‘Quality of design’ becomes used more frequently as a 
criterion for various development incentives, most notably in specific districts in the CA. One 
is then reminded by the cautious approach of the American Planners Association which, 
mainly due to a long history of legal battles over aesthetic control issues, advocates the 
dropping of problematic words which are ambiguous and cannot be defended in court. In 
Hinshaw’s (1995) report published in an APA journal, he advised to drop criteria with 





1. Buildings should be to appropriate scale and be in harmony with permanent 
neighbouring development. 
2. The height and scale of each building should be compatible with its site and 
adjoining buildings 
3. The site should be planned to accomplish a desirable transition with the streetscape, 
and to provide for adequate planting, and pedestrian movement.  
4. Attractive landscape transition to adjoining properties should be provided 
5. Landscape treatment should be provided to enhance architectural features, strengthen 
vistas and important axes, and provide shade.  
 
Clearly, the lack of legal contestation has not instilled in the public, professionals and the 
authorities in Singapore that fear of litigation and this shows in the operation of design 
reviews and the scope of their jurisdiction. This is not a value judgement in itself, but it does 
show that the lack of open contestation perpetuates a particular system and model of design 
review, and that it is registered in the language used in these guidelines. To illustrate this 
contrast with Hinshaw’s advice, the range of criteria as used currently in UD guidelines in 











                                                 
 




List of urban design guidelines with built-in ambiguity and discretion  
 
Title of Circular to Professional Institutes Specific design-related clauses with built-in ambiguity and 
discretion  
Lighting Incentive scheme for developments in the 
Central Business District (CBD) and Marina Centre, 
24 Mar 2006 
“The lighting proposal must be of good quality and 
contribute positively to the city skyline” 
 
Art Incentive Scheme for New Developments in 
Central Area, 5 Sept 2005 
 
“The art work must be of aesthetic or heritage significance, 
artistically articulated and sensitive to the physical and 
cultural context of the locality” 
Orchard Road – Façade Articulation Guidelines, 8 Mar 
2005 
 
“To encourage attractive displays and greater visibility of 
activities within the buildings, the design and use of 
materials should ensure a high degree of transparency” 
 
“Attractive lighting of the facades is encouraged” 
Orchard Road – Party wall development guidelines, 8 
Mar 2005 
 
“For existing developments, extensions at the podium 
levels must be designed such that they are properly 
integrated with the existing podium block” 
Guidelines to encourage more innovative and better 
design of rooftops – Screening of mechanical and 
electrical services and car parks, on roofs and building 
facades within the Central Area, 6 Sept 2004 
 
 
“The façade design of all proposed car parking levels 
above grade shall be considered as part of the overall 
architectural treatment of the development” 
 
Revised Guidelines on Gross Floor Area Exemptions 
for Covered Public Spaces, 2 Aug 2004 
 
“Must be easily-accessible and be well-linked to adjacent 
development and pedestrian network” 
“Must have a high volume ceiling height” 
“Must have appropriate public amenities” 
 
 
Design Panels for Design Excellence 
Throughout this chapter, mention has been made of an ‘Architectural Design Panel’ (ADP). 
The setting up of specialised design panels to attend to either special projects or districts has a 
long history in independent Singapore, and represents quite an anomaly to the usual evolution 
of design panels in other western countries. According to Punter and Hinshaw, the creation of 
such professional panels can be traced to the rise of the conservation movement in both UK 
and the US. In Singapore however, the first such panel – the Architectural Design Panel – 
was set up very early in 1979 to ‘advise and make suggestions towards the improvement of 
plans submitted’, as part of several policies to ‘ensure that buildings constructed were of 
superior design and high quality’ (MND. Annual Report 1979). Created within the Building 
Control Division (BCD) of the Public Works Department, the ADP reviewed selected 
projects as part of the development control process administered by the division. With 
representation from both the public and private sectors, the ADP performed as an advisory 
body whose suggestions were incorporated into the formal process of applying for planning 
permission. According to official documents, ‘generally, large and prestigious projects were 
referred to the Panel for advice’ (ibid). Thus, not only is it unrelated to the conservation 
movement in Singapore, which can be seen to achieve momentum only towards the late 80s, 
the creation of professional panels is tied inextricably with the urban transformation of 
Singapore into the image of a modern city – one that demands buildings of ‘superior design 
and quality’. As stated in a professional circular, the ADP was seen to be ‘important in the 
70's and 80's when urban renewal was moving at a rapid pace and the character of the main 
streets within the Central Area was yet to be established’ (URA. ‘Design Guidelines Waiver 



















Review Route of the Architectural Design Panel, 1995 (shown darkened) 
This shows the route extended into High Street, Hill Street, River Valley Road and Clemenceau Avenue leading to the Istana 
Park. 
Source : URA, 12 Jun 1995 
Beyond this initial introduction in the Annual Report, there is no publicity about the 
projects reviewed by the ADP, the parameters of their jurisdiction, or even the persons 
nominated to be in the panel. Various circulars from 1995 – 1998 show that a review by the 
ADP is a two stage process (URA, 18 Jun 1998 and 19 Mar 1999), and kept to certain 
designated routes in the CA (Map 5). Submission to the panel involved a 1:200 architectural 
model, a set of plans, sections and elevations of each façade, and a “material sample board(s) 
to show the materials used for the roof, various facades, covered walkways and open 
walkways” (URA, 18 Jun 1998). It seems that the amount of time spent to review a project 
was an issue with the authorities and the practitioners, as the 18 Jun circular also reduced the 
number of plans to be submitted from 8 to 3, in order to ‘expedite the processing of 
development applications along the ADP route’ (ibid). Its general operation remained 
somewhat in obscurity until mention was made of it during the Civic and Cultural District 
Masterplan exercise, where the ADP became further tasked to review all development 
projects along designated ‘ceremonial routes’, thus extending the jurisdiction of the panel 





The ADP served its role for over 20 years with little public knowledge until its 
disbandment in 2002. While much more research is needed to uncover the workings of the 
ADP, the author was able to study a particular development which was reviewed by the ADP. 
Some of the significant recommendations given by the ADP for this development were:  
 
1. To abut with the common boundary line so as not to leave a strip of remnant land 
between the frontage and the building line; 
2.  To extend the covered walkway to connect with adjacent developments, and ensure 
that the soffit height is 3.6m; 
3. The building should have pitched unglazed terracotta coloured clay tiled roof; 
4. All roof top services are to be screened according to design requirements for the 




5. To retain the front of the existing warehouse buildings 
 
These recommendations were given at the first review meeting by the ADP, and it is clear 
that they were concerned mainly with fine-tuning aspects of the design in order to ensure 
some level of compliance with established design standards (height of soffits and continuous 
covered walkways) or urban visions (the use of a particular roof form) for the area. At least 
for this project, the panel did not support any major deviations from the guidelines for the 
area. In fact, the scale and concerns of these recommendations are not very different or 
drastic compared to the type of urban design conditions one might get from a normal review 
process by the planning authority. While this might conceivably be one of the grievances 
about the nature of this panel, and led to its replacement by another panel established 
specifically to allow the waiver of guidelines (discussed below), this remains a speculation 
until more such information can be studied in relation to the ADP.    
 
In the history of design panels, the reading of the 1998 Planning Bill marked a significant 
milestone, as once again, design regulations were again brought up as a point of contention. 
The Planning Bill was read a second time in 1998 to update the Act based on significant 
changes in the planning system and the current state of the physical development of 
Singapore. Besides updating the Act, Grant (1999 : 10) summarized the major new measures 
introduced, which included: 
1. new provisions for the enforcement of planning control; 
2. the introduction of a greater element of discretion in handling planning applications. 
The competent authority is now empowered to depart from the Master Plan when 
determining planning applications, under certain conditions; 
3. new measures for the conservation of historic buildings and areas in Singapore, to a 




4. a recasting of the provisions relating to the development charge. 
 
By 1998, it seemed that speakers on the Planning Bill were largely supportive of the 
planning system as practiced in Singapore, and dissenters, except for one, summarily still 
supported the Bill. By then, the success of the planning system was built in stone and visible 
to all. What the amendments allowed was to give the government more levity in deviating 
from the Master Plan and more power to enforce planning control. It is, on the whole, an Act 
that favoured greater centralized control of the urban development and planning of Singapore.    
 
The issue of design regulations was raised again in the reading of the Bill. Mr Chuang 
Shaw Peng (nominated Member of Parliament) pointed out the word ‘form’ in the clause 
18(2) which maintains that the competent authority is to grant outline permission only after 
having considered matters related to the land use, intensity, type, form and height of the 
proposed development: 
  
Essentially the competent authority has the subjective power to decide whether 
he likes the design put up by the architect. Would it not be better that the design 
aspect of the development, such as form, be left in the good hands of the design 
architects? In a free market economy, I doubt that the developer or design 
architects would be likely to put up a design which is economically unattractive. 
By not restricting the form, we can then make headway in encouraging our 
designers to be more creative and innovative. I believe this is something most of 
us would like to look forward to in the future of our nation.            




This time, the debate was much more sedate and brief. Mr Lim Hng Kiang, then 
Minister of National Development, echoed the reply almost 40 years ago that design control 
will be practiced cautiously, when he made the same assurance that “it is not the intention of 
the competent authority to look at individual designs, except in critical areas” (Singapore 
Parliamentary Debates, 1998 : 70). These ‘critical areas’ are restricted routes in the city 
centre which have ceremonial significance, such as the route that leads to the Istana, and 
developments there will have to go before the Architectural Design Panel. He reassured that 
“beyond these very restricted routes, it is not in our interest and we do not intend to regulate 
design.” 
The vagueness of the parliamentary debate on design regulation in 1998 does not lend to fine 
analysis. Referring specifically to Mr Chuang’s use of the word ‘form’, Singapore has by 
1998 almost a comprehensive set of urban design guidelines island-wide which in many cases 
regulate form, massing, typology and architectural elements, and so his comment seems to be 
missing the point. Mr Lim was however more likely referring to “architectural design” in his 
reply, more than just architectural ‘form’. As such, he assured that the finer aspects of design 
will not be controlled except for specific buildings in specific areas, by the ADP, and that 
such control will be done cautiously. However, a scan of URA circulars suggest that ADP 
jurisdiction has been expanding both before and after the reading of this Bill - a circular in 
1993 already stated that sale sites outside these routes may also be subject to the ADP review 
as well, and two circulars in 1995 (Map 5 & 6) further extended the designated routes which 
fall under the purview of the ADP. Also, other specialised panels have been set up on an ad 














Further extension to the ADP review route, 1995 
The Sept 1995 URA circular extended the ADP routes to both banks of the 
Singapore River up to Kim Seng Road and the open space at Raffles Place.  
Source : URA, 6 Sept 1995 
without reference to these designated routes. In Oct 2002, the ADP was disbanded, as 
officials felt that ‘with the maturing of the local architectural profession and a better 
appreciation of the value of good design, it was no longer necessary for an official 
authority/panel to advise Qualified Persons on the design and layout of their developments’ 
(URA. 20 Oct 2000). In its place and reacting to consultations with the architectural 
communities, the Design Guidelines Waiver Committee (DGWC), staffed totally by members 
of the private sector, was formed to ‘evaluate special cases of high quality and innovative 
urban/waterbodies designs that may merit deviation from the design guidelines and standard 
development control requirements stipulated by URA’ (ibid). In announcing these changes, 
Mr Mah Bow Tan, Minister of National Development, declared that the objectives are to 
foster architectural excellence and creativity (Mah B T. 22 Apr 2000). The current stage of 
design control and regulations with such agendas in mind can be reflected in the evolution of 





The 1998 debate on design regulation and review, despite its brevity, highlights once 
again its potentially controversial nature. The attitude towards regulating design remains 
cautious. However, this caution is also tussling with the desire to foster “architectural 
excellence and creativity”. While good design cannot be put in code, other avenues are being 
explored, and the setting up of specialised advisory panels represents one such well-trodden 
path. The official reason for the disbanding of the ADP is to respond to the “maturing of the 
architectural profession”, but it is always dubious to imagine that the practice of architecture 
progressed linearly from childlike petulance to skilful virtuosity, especially if we consider 
many of the good works done by Singaporean architects in the 60s and 70s. Furthermore, the 
circulars released by the URA shows that the areas of jurisdiction by ADP consistently 
increased, which seems to contradict with the need to withdraw supervision due to a 
‘maturing profession’. Rather, it might be more likely that the practice of setting out 
designated routes became inflexible and cumbersome, and the boundaries of ADP’s 
jurisdiction needed to be tweaked endlessly to account for areas of new significance which 
were proliferating with the quest for more ‘well-designed’ buildings. Therefore, the new 
system solved the administrative problem by allowing for an advisory panel to be set up as 
and when necessary for which ever site the authority deemed significant enough to be put 
before a design review, and met the national drive for more contextual/iconic and high-
quality buildings in the CA. This drive had to however contend with a change in mood which 
pressured the government to relax control and allow ‘greater and freer expression’ (Lee, 
Pamelia. 2004 : 8), and it seems that the DGWC is the result of these intertwining forces.  
 
The formation of DGWC – a set-up created after URA’s consultation with the Singapore 
Institute of Architects – supports the unsurprising opinion shared by most architects that good 
design can come about by reducing by-laws and guideline control. As of now, no official 
information has been released about the number of projects reviewed by the DGWC, and 
none was given upon request by the author. It is estimated, however, by the author that not 
more than 8 proposals have been submitted to the DGWC in its 4 years of operation. Two 
projects reviewed by the DGWC are reported in the corporate magazine - Skyline – ‘SOHO’, 
a mixed use commercial-residential development at Clarke Quay and the first project to go 
through DGWC, and ‘Rivergate’, a condominium development at Robertson Quay. Details of 
the review processes and what guidelines have been waived are sketchy in the case of SOHO.  
In the case of ‘Rivergate’, the following standard guidelines are waived (Skyline. May/June 





1. building height (from the maximum of ten stories in the area to 43 stories);  
2. building edge and covered walkway requirements (unspecified in report);  
3. roof form ( from the required ‘pitched roof’ in the area to ‘trellis fins’) 
4. activity generating uses on the ground floor (from the requirement of entire ground 
level to have activity generating uses to one corner of the development) 
 
According to the report, in return for these waivers, the development would contribute to 
the ‘public realm’ through its lush sky gardens and ground landscaping which relates well to 
the character of its surroundings, as well as its iconic presence, which would mark a 
termination to the Robertson Quay precinct (Plate 1). Clearly employed as the ‘poster boy’ of 
the DGWC, the authorities tried to demonstrate in a positive light how such a review process 
had benefited all parties – the architect who gets his vision built, the place which gets its icon, 
and the public who gets ‘generous meandering promenade along the riverfront’ and the 
‘benefits of city-living convenience’. Unfortunately, attempts by the author to interview the 
architects were rejected on grounds that the detailed information of the design review process 










Simulated perspectives of ‘Rivergate’ development 
 
Graphics of the ‘Rivergate’ development used in the article in ‘Skyline’. These simulations were amongst 
the materials submitted to the DGWC for review.  
 
(Source : Skyline, May/June 2005) 
 
 
The DGWC is unique in that it is chaired and staffed entirely by private sector 
architects and/or academics, with no public sector representation or chairmanship as is 
commonly the case for all other design panels. In fact, the carefully prescribed terms of 
reference of the committee reveal both the type of power the officials is willing to divest to a 
committee of private individuals, as well as what is officially seen to be within or outside an 
architect’s professional abilities. The issues which the committee is empowered to handle are 







Table 3  
List of items which can and cannot be considered by the Design Guidelines Waiver 
Committee  
(reproduced from URA circular, 2 Jun 2003) 
 
Issues that can be considered by the DGWC 
 
1. Building Edge/Buffer and setback requirements 
2. Building form 
3. Streetblock height control (for accentuation and articulation) 
4. Design and location of infrastructure and public amenities 
5. Roof form and materials 
6. Special Signage/Special lighting 
7. Design of rooftop and carpark screening 
8. Safeguarded view corridors provided intrusions would not compromise key objectives 
9. Foreshore setback requirements 
10. Waterbodies design requirements 
11. Any other development control requirements not specified below 
 
Issues which cannot be considered by DGWC 
 
1. Gross plot ratio/gross floor area 
2. Land use and use quantum 
3. Technical building heights 
4. Conservation guidelines 
5. Provision of infrastructure and amenities such as rear vehicular access, open space 
and vantage points (unless the applicant is able to provide excellent alternatives) 
6. Technical requirements imposed by other public or Government agencies  
 
The powers of the DGWC are restricted to an ‘aesthetic’ assessment of a 
development. Thus, issues with implications on land use and plot ratio, or what is seen to be 
‘technical’ considerations, are outside the committee’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, the 
breakdown of the items which can be scrutinized by the committee reveal that the control can 
be exercised on a very superficial (that is, strictly aesthetic) and elementary (for example, 
focusing on ‘roof tops’) level. Clearly, this level of design control has traditionally being 
avoided by the authorities, whose adherence to written guidelines at least provides much 
clearer boundaries on what is assessable in a review, and as revealed in the parliamentary 
debates, control of design on such a level is largely frowned upon by politicians. Thus, the act 
of moving such powers to a body of private practitioners, such that it becomes a form of 
‘self-regulation’ by industry and peers instead of the government, makes it much more 
politically correct and defensible. Lastly, there is ground for worry when the architectural 
profession is cast as ‘arbiters of aesthetic taste’, suggesting that design can be bracketed 
outside other environmental, social or cultural concerns and judged as forms, colours or styles. 
It seems at this moment, the authorities are only willing to divest that portion of urban design 
and planning concerns to the profession, and the profession has agreed to, and perhaps more 
than happy to, play that role. In fact, this role has gained a particular significance in the quest 
for iconic buildings and global city-status, and there is an increasing tendency to set up ad 
hoc design evaluation panels for important projects, especially through the sale of sites 
(which will be discussed in the next chapter), in order to procure better architectural design. 
The rhetoric for ‘design excellence’, whether it has become necessary for survival in a 
globalised environment (evoking again a sense of crisis), or a ‘little bit of daydreaming’ we 
can finally afford because of a ‘economic growth of 6 to 8 per cent every year’, as put by 
Minister Lim Hng Kiang, will profoundly affect both the practice and institution of design 





Specialized panels, whether it is the ADP, DGWC, or the ad hoc Design Advisory 
Panels set up for selected projects, have consistently being applied when ‘good’ design is 
seen to be necessary. Thus, in the multi-layered system of design reviews, specialized panels 
occupy the top rank, reserved usually for the most important prestigious projects or sensitive 
sites, where standard development control guidelines, or even the more aesthetically sensitive 
urban design guidelines, are not sufficient. While they are mainly advisory in nature, their 
recommendations are often incorporated into the formal development application process, 
such that they become binding conditions for the grant of planning permission. As such, the 
operation of these panels, much like how design reviews are conducted within the mechanism 
of development control, are held in confidentiality. While not much information is readily 
available about these panels in Singapore, similar lessons from overseas might serve as points 
of inquiry. Firstly, review by a panel of experts represent an additional hurdle for the 
applicant, and has often being criticized for being time-consuming and expensive10. Secondly, 
as this system relies on personal expert opinions, and not written guidelines, there will always 
be claims of personal prejudice and subjective taste, where rhetoric, persuasion and ‘personal 
beliefs’ seem to come too much into play. Lastly, within a small professional community like 
Singapore, and the strong centralized planning control of the government, no one really wants 
to ‘offend’ openly those in positions of power. In effect, due to the very small pool of experts 
to choose from, those who are reviewed today might be sitting as judges tomorrow, and vice 
versa, creating situations whereby personal relationships and vested interest might influence 
the objectivity of the review members. None of these, however, can be methodically analyzed, 
as the operation of design review by these panels are strictly confidential, and perhaps it is the 
recognition that such moments are extremely sensitive, that the established practice is to 






This chapter started by showing how the project of urban design began in the Central Area 
under the jurisdiction of the URA by tracing the planning schemes produced since its 
founding. Then, the paradigmatic shift in the mindset of the public service - a push for 
                                                 
10 For example, the entire process of the DGWC review takes up to 8 weeks, which is in addition to the 4 weeks 
needed to obtain planning permission after the lodgment of a development application. At least two reviews, and 
sometimes more depending on the complexity of the case, are usually necessary for a decision to be reached by the 
panel.   
 
openness and more public consultations as well as to become more pro-business rather than 
managerial – is discussed which resulted in the operational shifts in review by administration. 
Through a few important public consultation projects, a question is raised as to whether the 
definition of a ‘public body’ tasked with reviewing design of private developments now 
needs to be rearticulated. On the one hand, the everyday task of design review still happens 
within the institution of development control and thus the URA – there is, for example, no 
layperson or local community representation in the review process, and all decisions are 
confidential. Yet, the exercise of public consultations means that aspects of design which are 
going to be assessed and controlled go through a politically sensitive process whereby 
members of the public and the professional sectors are involved. The evolving nature of 
‘plan-production’ requires us to look at plans not just as texts in and of themselves, but as an 
event saturated with media visibility and representational qualities. In that sense, the medium 
of communication of a plan lies beyond itself. The plan is communicated via a range of 
supporting institutions and casts, notably the mass media through its reporting in newspapers 
and television, but also through the staging of public exhibitions in highly visible and 
strategic spaces. The public communications of the contents of a plan is a richly mediated 
space and one that offers much investigative potential. Such mediations do more than 
overcome the communicative constraints of the plan, which cannot be read or understood 
without some degree of professional expertise, but transform quite radically its foundational 
meaning. The plan is no longer a manifesto of the government, but a social contract between 
the government and the governed. It is no longer backed just by the force of law, but it is now 
also legitimised by the consensus of the people. To not fulfill the plan is thus to renege on the 





This event of plan-production is highly sensitive, and public officers, unless called upon in 
special occasions, refrain from making direct reference to aesthetic preferences, styles or 
tastes, or to engage in controversial discourse in public. In the case of the DGP, this was done 
through a simultaneous strategy of a publicity blitz in the press, the employment of populist 
and affective rhetoric and the specific temporal/spatial arrangement of public participation in 
the entire process. As discussed, the combination of ‘competition’, media exposure and 
having to judge in public ultimately caused the public authority to alter the DGP process to be 
more in tune with the traditional mode of civil service operation. If the public debates in 
which competing schemes were pitched against one another can be seen as representative of a 
design review so far kept hidden, then perhaps we can understand why design review as 
practiced in Singapore continues to be a private affair. Thus, while urban design serves well 
as a generator of popular and affective rhetoric and its potential as a way of shoring 
legitimacy for government-led visions is increasingly being tapped, the practice of reviewing 
it still remains confined within the professional realm and its discourse largely whispered in 
professional circles. Clearly it is a moment in which language becomes largely uncontrollable 
and cannot be reactively modified to defuse controversial points, one in which contestations 
are much more obvious and strenuous, and one where the innately subjective nature of 
aesthetics becomes all too obvious. The lack of open contestation, in turn, creates ambiguous 
spaces within UD guidelines, whose interpretation rests largely on the discretion and 
professional judgment of the administrators. For cases when the state wishes to impose more 
control than is appropriate for a public servant or body, design panels are set up with private 
practitioners to provide a form of consensus-based legitimacy. The DGWC, however, 
represents a moment of reversal in this evolution, as it reacts against established guidelines. 
Yet, it can be seen to continue to play into the larger state-led agenda of achieving ‘design 
excellence’, one which the state is willing to share the limelight with the architectural 







Chapter Five  
Design review by the  
Government Land Sales programme  
 
The Government Land Sales (GLS) programme is one of the avenues through which the 
Singapore Government is able to influence and control design aspects of private development 
by imposing certain design-related conditions in the tender process. While all government 
own and sell land from time to time to spur urban redevelopment, the instrumentality of the 
GLS programme in influencing and regulating design in order to achieve larger urban-scale 
aesthetic objectives in Singapore cannot be underestimated. The Programme was started 
almost immediately after independence as a form of collaboration between the Government 
and the private sector for the purpose of urban redevelopment. It was administered by the 
Urban Renewal Department (URD) within the Housing Development Board, and 
subsequently by the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) when it was formed in 1974. 
The role of the government is to acquire and amalgamate land and sell it to the private sector 
through a tender process who then lend their financial resources and expertise in its 
redevelopment. Over the years, it has evolved into a powerful mechanism through which the 
Government tracks and releases land into the market based on projected demand, thus 
influencing land pricing and market stability. As a mechanism, it also allows the Government 
to lay out certain design-related conditions as part of the sales/lease agreement so as to meet 





It is the latter aspect of the GLS that is primarily the focus of this chapter. Compared 
to the study of the GLS from perspectives of planning, urban development or land economics, 
the aesthetic dimension of this mechanism is much less explicated. It should not be the case, 
since design review is becoming an increasingly legitimised tool in shaping and imaging 
cities. Governments at every level assume a certain level of responsibility in seeking good 
design, and the quest for global finance, prestige and talent is fuelling an increased sense of 
agency amongst the governments to “do something” about ensuring good design. This is 
especially apparent in projects with national significance - heritage preservation, large scale 
urban regeneration, new industries and public institutions, and anything that plays a part in 





In Singapore, the state is the dominant land owner throughout the island, owning 
directly, or indirectly close to 80% of the land (Dale, O J, 1999 : 107 and Grant M, 1998 : 6). 
This permits mobilization of land resources on the large scale to carry out urban renewal 
programmes efficiently and speedily, especially during the 60s and 70s. The dominant state 
ownership of land, coupled with a strong centralized planning system, contributed to the 
immense impact of the GLS programme. By 1994, about 671 individual parcels of land 
totalling about 409 hectares, plus another 548 conserved shophouses, had been sold by the 
authorities for private sector development (URA, 1994 : 5). In certain districts made up 
largely of sites sold through the GLS, it is not surprising to see how official urban visions can 
be accomplished efficiently and with little deviation. 
  
The structure of this chapter follows a chronological survey of the GLS from its 
inception in 1967, giving an overview of how comprehensive planning visions and finer 
aesthetic-driven goals are achieved under varying circumstances. The tender mechanisms and 
sales conditions are analysed as textual records of a power structure that negotiates aesthetic 
interests and objectives between the various parties involved. As such, particular attention is 
paid to both the language used in these documents pertaining to design and aesthetics, and the 
weightage given to aesthetics in the awarding of these tenders. Official reports of the GLS, 
especially the earlier ones, in architectural journals and corporate magazines supply critical 
information which might not be apparent in the tender documents themselves. At regular 
intervals, the GLS is also placed in larger political and historical contexts to understand its 
evolution. While it is largely chronological, it also has a certain geographical focus - broadly 
within the CA, and more specifically, sites such as Golden Shoe, Golden Mile, Orchard Road 
and most recently, Marina Bay which were affected or are being affected by comprehensive 





Kick Starting the GLS, 1967 - 1970 
The first phases of the GLS were carried out by the URD, a small department formed in the 
Housing Redevelopment Board in 1966 to roll out and administer the programme. In the first 
three sales programme in 1967, 1969 and 1970, which resulted in developments such as 
People’s Park Complex, Woh Hup Complex (now Golden Mile Complex) and Pearl Bank 
Apartments, the URD prepared nearly-fully resolved simulations of proposed developments 
on these sites. Complete with plans, sections and models showing interior layout of shops, 
plazas, carparking facilities and ramps and human circulation paths, these were architectural 
schemes which developers could accept and build as proposed by the URD. As a result, the 
developments of some of the earlier sale sites were more accurately ‘designed’ by URD, and 
built by the private developers. A comparison of the models and sketch plans prepared by the 
URD, and what was eventually built effectively reveals that this is the case for Oasis Floating 
Restaurant (first sale of sites) and the overhead shopping bridge complex across Collyer Quay 
(third sale of sites) - Plates 2a/b and 3a/b. 
Plate 2a 
 
Model of ‘Oasis Floating 
Restaurant’ as proposed by 
URD in 1st Sale of Sites.  
 










Model of ‘Overhead shopping 
complex bridge’ as proposed by 
URD in 3rd Sale of Sites 
 
Source : SIAJ, 1970, n(38)  
Source : author, 2007 
Plate 3b 
 
Overhead shopping complex 
bridge as built. The bridge is 
similar to URD’s proposal, 

















Developers could also propose alternative schemes, and for these, planning and 
building controls were stipulated. However, these planning and design controls were loose 
and rudimentary, allowing much discretion to be exercised by the authority, and giving them 
room to react to developers’ proposals. General language on aesthetics such as “a similar 
purpose building or buildings of comparable size, design and standard” and “take due 
cognizance of the adjacent areas” were used. In fact, almost any condition of the site, even 
negotiations on land-use and density, could be re-proposed by the developers, and “although 
there will be no limitations on the massing, composition and treatment of the buildings, such 
designs shall be to the approval of the Board”. The result is that many alternative schemes 
were proposed and accepted, which were vastly different from the sketch plans and models 







Model of ‘Golden Mile’ luxury residential 
apartments as proposed by URD in 1st Sale 
of Sites 
 


















‘Golden Mile’ as built 
 











Model of ‘Pearl Bank’ residential apartments as 
proposed by URD in 3rd  Sale of Sites 
 







‘Pearl Bank’ residential apartments as built 
 









Given the experimental nature of the first few sales programmes, and a young 
planning system, negotiation was the order of the day.  Some of the sites in the first and 
second GLS were released and sold by negotiations, in which site, GPR, use and other 
planning parameters could be suggested by the interested developer. Even for schemes where 
the developer simply followed what was prepared by URD, negotiations as to the scale and 
intensity of the development were common. This was the case for the Oasis Floating 
Restaurant, which grew from small floating pods for “makan kechil” as envisaged by URD, 
to fully functional floating restaurants (SIAJ, Sept/Oct 1973 : 4-7).  
 
The architectural community was understandably excited by the sale of sites exercise, 
but generally felt that the simulated proposals were lacking in sufficient analytical and factual 
data. Thus, they made recommendations to the Government, requiring additional information 
such as floor areas and levels, car parking standards, fire and health regulations, nature of 
adjacent developments and so on. As such, tender packages in subsequent sale of sites 
programmes began to contain more such technical information. Design control, however, 
remained scant. The authorities made it clear that though the sketch plans and models could 
be taken wholesale, they were intended to only serve the function of assisting “the public in 
visualizing the site potential and to give guidance on the environmental requirements”(SIAJ, 
1969 : 22), especially since urban renewal was such a strange but momentous event 
happening in the midst of everyone’s living environment. It is also important to note that the 
tender process was not strictly price-based or design-based, but “judged on the overall 
economic return and design merits offered” (SIAJ, 1967 : 4) – design had a certain tangible 
weight in the evaluation of the tenders, which fitted into a system that was generally flexible 





As Mr Alan Choe, then the Head of the Urban Renewal Department, explained in his 
1969 speech, the first sales programme was meant to be a “pilot scheme to test public 
reaction, demand, type of development real estate value in Singapore” (Choe A. 1969). The 
inbuilt flexibility of the tender conditions reflected the experimental stage of the GLS. In 
addition, the lack of explicit design guidelines or extensive controls was in part due to limited 
manpower and professional expertise within the URD (Choe A. 1975 : 101). Alan Choe’s 
cautious approach towards prescribing an architectural style for newly independent Singapore 
may also have counted towards a rather laissez faire approach to design regulation through 
the early GLS: 
 
It is most important from the design point of view that there is no aping of styles and 
scales of architecture completely unsuitable to the local context. Unless care is taken 
the result may be a poor imitation of New York. Hence countries in Asia must ensure 
that styles and scales of architecture are designed for the local people, to meet local 
conditions and needs are within the financial capabilities of the country. It is also 
important that in urban renewal one does not destroy the colourful scenes and 
character of many Asian cities. In renewal, we must also constantly think of the 




Choe A. 1969 
 
Golden Shoe and the Selling of a Vision 
The development of the Golden Shoe, however, began to see more stringent and explicit rules 
pertaining to aesthetics and design. The Golden Shoe was one of the first major urban 
renewal projects to be launched, encompassing Shenton Way, Cecil Street and Robinson 
Road. The task of developing “Golden Shoe” was entrusted to the Urban Renewal 
Department. The combination of land sales, resettlement projects (which were designed and 
built by the authorities, such as the Public Works Department, or the Urban Renewal 
Department) and other government-built projects meant that entire stretches of urban 





































Central Area Plan, 1975/76 
 
A plan of the Central Area showing the concentration of government led or built projects in the mid 70s. 
Note the concentration of such projects in the Golden Shoe area.  
 
Source : Urban Redevelopment Authority. 1975-76.  Annual Report. Singapore : Urban Redevelopment 
Authority 
It is clear that from the beginning, the authorities and the government had a rather vivid 
visual image of what the future Golden Shoe will look like, and it did not represent the 
“colourful scenes and character of many Asian cities”. An architectural scheme was drawn up 
by the Planning Department for the “establishment of conditions of development on 
alienation and for the guidance of developers”. The Golden Shoe shall be the financial hub of 
a new Singapore, and it had to talk to the other global centres of finance from whence she 
drew her investments. The financial and business districts of Singapore must work, and 
therefore look and feel, like the modern cities from which these multinationals and high-
flyers were enticed. Such urban visions served as clear goals for the government, and 
assuring images for potential foreign investors, in 
marketing brochures, tender packages and other 
official documents. The visual image was 
correspondingly that of a modern metropolis with 
large skyscrapers, wide roads, densely packed 





the scheme takes the form of a podium to a 
height of 3 storeys which will extend throughout 
the development. Super-structures will be 
erected on the podium in the form of towers or 
slab blocks. The objectives of the scheme are 
the creation of a harmonious streetscape which 
will give an impressive skyline when seen from 
the sea or from other parts of the City. 
Plate 6 
Artist’s impression of ‘Golden Shoe’, 1964 
 
An artists’ impression included in the Annual Report of the 
Planning Department, showing the authorities’ vision for 
Shenton Way/Robinson Road – a row of majestic modern 
skyscrapers arising out of the swathe of urban slums.  
Source : Annual Report, 1964, Planning Department, 
PD, 1964 : 4 
 
This vision had specific requirements for an architectural typology (tower-podium 
superstructures), a strong urban edge, defined by the three-storey podium that “extends 
throughout the development”, rather than individual towers sitting on open spaces, and a 
triumphal sculpting of the skyline created by tall towers clustered together, not unlike the 
CBD of other modern, and mainly western, cities.   The amalgamation of land to create larger 
parcels, the repealing of the Rent Control Act for Golden Shoe and generous tax incentives 
given to private developers were aimed to not only achieve the speed and type of 
development, but also to achieve that desired image of the Golden Shoe. When many of the 
sites along Shenton Way, Cecil Street and Robinson Road were launched in the 2nd GLS 
programme11, almost all the sites offered were snapped by developers. Many of the early sale 
sites were located in the Golden Shoe area through acquisition and assembly of land parcels 
by the state. As mentioned earlier, the authorities were also building their own developments 
within the Golden Shoe, such as resettlement centres, which housed displaced businesses 
from other urban renewal areas. The sale sites and resettlement centres taken together, the 
comprehensive vision of uniform building lines and architectural typologies could be 
accomplished in a relatively short period of time.  Between 1967 and 1972, 12 sites covering 
2.19 hectares were released there. The URD’s planning and design guidelines, according to 
official publications from the planning authority, “resulted in an orderly skyline and 
streetscape in the high intensity built-up areas. These features include consistent podium 
heights, wide covered walkways and tree planting along Shenton Way”(Skyline, Sept/Oct 
1985). In addition, the control of development intensity and building height was used to 
create high points in the toe  (the junction of Maxwell Road and Shenton Way) and the heel 





                                                 
11 Sites launched in the Golden Shoe in the 2nd GLS includes current developments such as UIC building, OCBC 























Urban Design Guide Plan, circa 
1983 
 
Urban Design Guide Plan prepared by the 
Authority for Cecil Street. The dark masses 
show the new developments, in the context of 
the existing fabric. Note the ‘stepping down’ 
effect of new developments in order to create 
more ‘harmonious’ streetscapes. A model of 
the Golden Shoe (below)  by the URA serves 
as a 3D urban design tool with which to 
visualise the effects of existing and proposed 
urban design guidelines. The ‘toe’ and ‘heel’ of 
the district can be clearly seen in the model. 
 




The land sales programme was thus driven to achieve a predetermined urban vision 
and aesthetic. Modern superstructures, neatly lined facades, tight street edge, high-quality 
“modern” materials and ‘termination’ points - under these umbrella parameters which set the 
tone, structure and image of the entire precinct, developers and architects were free to lay on 
the cosmetics of their individual building. Chua discussed in the book “The Golden Shoe: 
Building Singapore’s Financial District” that varied urban design control were exercised to 
“achieve a more harmonious physical environment” in four distinct clusters of the Golden 
Shoe. For Shenton Way, the virgin state of the site meant that the authority had a heavy hand 
in organizing and shaping the architectural and street character. The design objectives were 
uniformity, visual continuity and human scale. For Robinson Road and Cecil Street, the 
existence of old buildings, smaller plots (amalgamated by private players rather than the 
Government) set a more varied context. Visual continuity in this case therefore meant relating 
new developments with old developments so as to avoid jarring differences in scale or form. 
The result is that the building designs were stipulated to be “lower and squat in order to 





Based on these urban design visions for the Golden Shoe, the various sale sites in the 
area were sold with specific design-related conditions, which combined together would 
achieve the desired image of uniformity, visual continuity and scale. For example, in the case 
of Cecil Court, covered walkways were required around the perimeter of the development – 
3m on the Stanley Street side, and 3.7m on the Cecil Street side. To achieve uniformity in the 
streetscape, it was also stipulated that “the podium height and soffit level over the ground 
floor covered walkway of the proposed building shall be of similar height and level as those 
of the adjacent 17 storey office building” (URA, Developer’s Package, 1980a : 27). Within 
the same streetblock, Dapenso Building was also setback to the same line, with 3m wide 
covered walkway facing Stanley Road, and 3.7m wide facing Cecil Street. The podium height 
and soffit level of Dapenso Building was also required to match that of its neighbour, LKN 
building. In addition, “the top of the tower shall be of similar height as the adjacent approved 
building” (ibid).  
 
The precise format of urban design controls for Cecil Court and Dapenso Building 
(9th Sale of Sites) is typical of what has evolved from the rudimentary and loose verbiage in 
the first to third sale of sites. In fact, by the 5th sale of sites, architecturally resolved sketch 
plans had more or less disappeared, replaced by skeletal guide plans, whose purpose is to 
illustrate basic urban design requirements, and there was thus no longer any ‘design’ for 
developers to take off and go. The text-component in the tender documents spell out in 
precise language what is required, what is encouraged and what is not allowed, while the 
guide plan illustrates these diagrammatically. As language became more precise, flexibility in 
planning parameters diminished. This relation between precise requirements, which are laid 
out in text, and the guide plans, which play the supporting role, has become the modus 





The evolution of design control in the GLS programme, 80 – 90s 
Various criteria can be emphasised – land price, design, returns to the national 
economy, time required to complete the project, amount of employment generated by 
the project. On a given set of criteria, different weightage can be given to each to 
reflect the policy objectives. This was the method used by the URA in 1977 to propel 
Singapore into a phase of quality architecture and urban environment. Then the 
emphasis was on good or outstanding designs and this coupled with the publicity of 
sale sites overseas, resulted in some of the world’s best architects coming here on 
behalf of their clients, both local and foreign.  
Skyline, 1982 : 5 
 
Depending on the urban design vision, design-related requirements such as the position of 
tower blocks, terraced facades, uniform elevations and provision of plazas and landscaping 
elements have been subsequently imposed on various sale sites. Most of these requirements 
are justified from larger urban design perspectives, such as the protection of view corridors, 
maintaining the scale of the streetscape, articulation of corners and the provision of public 
spaces. Harmony of the streetscape is an often quoted rationale, and this means preventing 
any single development from overshadowing or disrupting the overall scale and massing of 
the streetblock. While it is still academic debate as to what constitutes public good, or 
whether ‘contextualism’ is a sufficient reason for the stipulation of certain form or scale, the 
government has taken upon themselves to craft urban form based on such aesthetic rules. The 
degree of interference in the design of individual developments arising from these larger 
goals is however variable and debatable, and some of these conditions can be seen to be too 
prescriptive. The stipulation for a terraced façade for Riverwalk Apartments veers too close 
to architectural design, as is the stipulation for a stepped profile for Paradiz Centre. Urban 
grain is also sometimes manipulated via elevation control. This occurred, for example in 
Midlink Plaza development, when 2 adjoining sites were sold as separate sites. Design 
requirements then stipulated uniformity in elevation, thus creating a development that looks 
like a single urban block, although it is in all other senses two separate developments. A 
collection of such controls is quoted from the sales documents from 70s to the 80s and 
presented in Table 4: 
 
Table 4  
Selected list of urban design conditions in various GLS tender documents 
 
 Name of 
Development  





Residential with 1st 
floor commercial 
Human scale -  
Stepping of scale 
from pedestrian 
promenade along the 
Singapore River 
“The podium shall not exceed 4 
storeys and its façade facing 
Singapore River shall be of 
terraced design as shown on the 
simulated plans” 
2 Midlink Plaza 
(1979) & Guan 
Commercial Consistency in urban 
grain 
“The façade design and external 






buildings shall be identical so 
that the buildings architecturally 
form an integrated project. 
Details of the façade design and 
finishes shall be determined and 
approved by the URA before the 
successful Tenderer submits the 
plans for consideration by the 
relevant Competent Authorities” 
 




Provision of Public 
space and 
connectivity 
“The successful Tenderers of 
Land Parcels (8) and (9) shall set 
back their proposed buildings for 
provision of a plaza as shown on 
the simulated plans…” 
 
“The design of the landscaped 
plaza and materials to be used 
for the paving thereon within the 
respective Land Parcels shall 
match and blend with each 
other”  
 
4 The Gate Way 
(1980) 




Urban Vista and 
Axes 
 
“The proposed development 
shall incorporate a central 
landscaped plaza of not less than 
3,000 sqm. The said plaza shall 
be located between the podium 
and the tower and be opened 
towards Beach Road as shown 
on the simulated plans. The 
minimum dimension of the 
opening of the plaza fronting 
Beach Road shall be 30m. “ 
 
“It is preferable that the ground 
floor of the tower be open and 
111 
112 
unenclosed so as to relate 




5 Paradiz Centre 
(1982) 
Commercial Expression of corner/ 
node in the urban 
streetscape 
“The facades fronting Kirk 
Terrace and Selegie Road shall 
be of terraced design, and the 
front and rear facades shall also 
be in alignment with the adjacent 




The quest for higher design standards through the sale of sites was pursued early by 
the authorities. The 7th Sale of Sites programme launched in 1978 which included the sites at 
Marina Centre and Orchard Road, marks a threshold in the way design is being courted. For 
the first time, the GLS was advertised overseas for tenders, and received “unprecedented 
capacity crowd of local and international pressmen at the URA’s Press Conference Hall” 
(URA, Annual Report, 1978/79 : 43). Information on the GLS was given to diplomatic 
missions in regional Asian countries as well as to further countries such as Taiwan, Bahrain 
and Kuwait. Foreign architects thus started to make inroads into the architectural scene of 
Singapore through these early GLS programmes. The practice of advertising overseas, 
especially for large important sites, continues today where a globalised architectural practice, 
the internet and international conferences offer plenty of opportunities to attract foreign 
investors. As a result of this premium placed on design, it was not uncommon for tenders to 
be awarded to a lower price. In the 8th sale of sites, for example, out of 23 sites which were 
awarded, 5 sites were awarded to tenderers who did not submit the highest price, but 
submitted “very good or outstanding designs” (URA, Annual Report, 1979/80 : 33). For this 
to be announced in the annual report of URA, it suggests that the authorities were openly 
supportive of such a practice. Given that design was a tangible criterion in the evaluation of 
these tenders, submission requirements were comprehensive. Tenders had to submit complete 
sets of plans, sections and elevations, as well as an architectural model. In addition, the 7th 
Sale of Sites also started the practice of requiring developers to submit details on materials 
and finishes to ensure “higher quality building standards”. However, a survey of sale sites 
showed that the use of design as an award criterion became the exception rather than the 
norm sometime after 1989, and tenders after that were largely based on the tender unit price. 
For most sites after 1989, tenderers only need to submit a unit price in an envelope, without 
plans, elevations or models12. The reasons for this change were not reported, though it clearly 
continued the evolution of the sales mechanism towards one of transparency, objectivity and 
efficiency, in place of flexibility and subjectivity. Though it is not in the scope of this paper, 
this must have had a fundamental impact on the GLS as a tool in engendering a vibrant 





In the late 1980s, conservation picked up momentum in Singapore, and the first conservation 
projects were kick started by the URA through the sale of sites. The 13th Sale of Site included 
the restoration and conversion of several shophouses in Tanjong Pagar into Commercial 
/Residential /Institutional developments. By then, the powers to enforce conservation were 
already written into the Act, including the ‘designation of conservation areas, control over 
works in conservation areas, power for the conservation authority to issue conservation 
guidelines, and the extension of various planning powers to conservation’ (Grant, M. 1999 : 
9). Given the extensive controls exercised by the authority, and the conservative ideology of 
conservation in these early years, the maxim of the ‘3R’s - maximum Retention, sensitive 
                                                 
12 Developments within designated routes under the purview of the Architectural Design Panel still had to submit full 
drawings and architectural models to assist in the evaluation of finer aesthetic considerations. 
Restoration and careful Repair (URA, ‘Conservation Guidelines’, 2006) - was adhered to in 
code and in practice. Aesthetic regulation for conserved buildings was largely strict, purist, 





From 1987, a series of small conservation sites – mainly the restoration and conversion of 
shophouses ranging from 1000sqm to 4000sqm - have been released steadily over the years. 
In 1989, the ambitious project of Bugis Junction with a total site area of over 23,000sqm, was 
launched through the sale of sites. It was a pilot project involving a large scale commercial 
development in the midst of heritage shophouses. A new compromise had to be negotiated 
between the business viability of the new, and the conservation of the old. This compromise 
was spelt out in the numerous sales conditions and control plans for Bugis Junction (URA, 
Developer’s Package – Bugis Junction, 1989). Which portions of the old shophouses were to 
be kept and completely restored, what were allowed to be removed, where the new would be 
located, and how it was to relate to the old were comprehensively covered in the documents. 
The nature of design control is a collage of standard clauses developed so far for sale sites 
(stipulating massing, height and siting) and the clauses developed for conserved buildings 
(full restoration or semi restoration, keeping of certain elements etc). In terms of aesthetic 
control, the conditions reflected a reactive and flexible approach – a strategic choice as it was 
the first of its kind. There are no mandatory micro-control clauses controlling aesthetic 
aspects of the new buildings, except for a specific clause that requires the part of the 
development to have “pitched roof with unglazed clay tiles”. However, the general preference 
for “harmony” over “contrast” is clearly articulated in the tender documents:  
 
The objective of the design of all new buildings must be to blend with the 
surroundings and to fit in the urban fabric rather than to make a strong contrasting 
statement. The buildings and their details must be designed to relate to the form, 
proportion, solid-void relationship, directional expression, texture, colours and roof 
form of the retained existing buildings… Attempts must be made to capture regional 
flavour in terms of architectural forms and motifs. The use of an indigenous pitched 
roof form suitable for our climatic conditions will help to achieve picturesque 
environment. The sensitive use of traditional motifs adapted to contemporary 
construction would contribute to a richness in the façade treatment which ultimately 





Subsequent changes were made to the controls as the development proceeded, but the 
vision and general framework of the development was very much in keeping with what was 
painted in the sales package. One of the critical changes is in the construction of a glass 
canopy that covers the entire pedestrian mall of Hylam Street within the development. The 
control plans are silent about whether or not the pedestrian mall can be roofed over, and if it 
can be roofed over, whether the canopy structure would be subject to certain design control. 
However, a clause in the tender conditions does stipulate that the pedestrian mall shall be 
kept open for public use at all times. The result as built today shows Hylam Street roofed 
over with a glazed structure and serving as an interiorised air-conditioned shopping street. 
The intention to keep it public “at all times” was traded away, as it now behaves and operates 
as part of the shopping mall of Bugis Junction. 
 
The Bugis Junction project, its commercial success and the architectural solution of a air-
conditioned interiorised street, was significant as it symbolically signalled a new phase in 
conservation practice and ideology. Thus began subsequent projects involving ‘old and new’ 
architectures. A similar project, ‘China Square’, followed in 1994. Aesthetic regulations 
involving conservation became increasingly complex and nuanced. In areas such as 
Chinatown, the ‘strictest’ control is exercised, while in areas such as Joo Chiat, where 
heritage sits next to new developments, rear extensions and other small additions are allowed 
(URA, ‘Conservation Guidelines’, 2006). Differences in regulations are also implemented in 
order to be more specific and responsive to the type of use in the restored conservation 
buildings. In exercising aesthetic control for conservation projects, the direction has been to 
offer more incentives and options and thus release development potential, a shifting ground 
that reflects competing interests between business, heritage and power. The recent upgrading 
of Clarke Quay in 2006, featuring giant umbrella canopies, brightly coloured pontoons, and 
fanciful bluebell structures – none of which would have passed the sales conditions when the 
site was first released in 1989 -  attests to the general relaxation of aesthetic control when it 
comes to ‘old and new’ projects.  It also reflects what then Minister of National Development, 
Mr Dhanabalan, said to reassure the Parliament of the balance between conservation and 
economic development, in the reading of the Planning (Amendment No 2) Bill to introduce 





We will be monitoring very carefully to ensure that we conserve only those areas that 
are really worth conserving. On conservation, of course, once you have dealt with 
very clear cases, there is a large grey area where it can be quite subjective. And we 
are very mindful that the economic imperatives should prevail in many cases. So we 
will make sure that we will not stifle development or unnecessarily devalue people’s 
properties because we have swung to the other extreme of wanting to conserve 
everything.  









With the exception of New Downtown at Marina South, the potential of using GLS to create 
entire urban visions has diminished over the years as the city becomes more and more 
developed. Instead, GLS has become one of the potential avenues of pursuing landmark 
buildings. The rhetoric of the icon began in Singapore towards the end of the 21st century, and 
can be bundled together with the general awakening to the importance of the creative 
industries in the creation of global cities. In the competition of global cities, buildings are 
seen as trophies that propel the image of the city to the world, while capturing the 
imagination, and the hearts, of the locals. This rhetoric was first employed by the URA when 
they launched a public exhibition in 2000 on the “Landmark and Gateway Plan” (Map 8) to 
obtain feedback from the public and professionals on ways to make the city “more exciting 
and distinctive”. The plan “identified landmark sites and focal points of activity for 
safeguarding, as well as gateways into the city and significant vistas within the city to be 
protected”, as well as ways to “break new ground to create buildings and spaces of 
outstanding architecture”(URA, http://www.ura.gov.sg/landmarks/final.html, read on 21 Jun 2006).  
 
Map 8   
Landmark and Gateway Plan, 
2000 
Major routes    Gateway Sites   














One of the outcomes of the exhibition which has direct implication to the practice of 
design regulation and the GLS is the official impetus to take the extra step to achieve an 
iconic product. The notion of the “harmonious” is fading in preference for the “iconic”. For 
such landmark sites, stepped profiles – the condition for Paradiz Centre - are no longer 
enough to declare a corner – it now needs to be taller, bolder and more eye-catching. There 
were indications of using design competitions to generate interest and better designs for sites 
designated as landmarks, and to relax design guidelines for these sites. Nevertheless, Mr Mah, 
Minister of National Development, remarked that while guidelines can be relaxed, that alone 
cannot guarantee iconic buildings, and reiterated the official position that still frowns at 
buildings that are iconic without exhibiting “good taste and manners”. He also attempted to 
set the frame broader so that iconic buildings are not monuments in and of themselves, or 




While reducing guidelines is useful, it will not guarantee that landmark buildings will 
be built. URA’s vision will not materialise without proper execution, especially from 
the private sector. At the end of the day, the works of the architects and designers 
will determine whether a building is truly a landmark of significant stature. But most 
important of all, we need sponsors and like-minded patrons who share the same 
vision to commission such high-quality works. For developers, this will be your 
opportunity to leave a permanent mark on Singapore’s architectural heritage. Not 
only should the landmark buildings be unique on their own, they should also be good  
 
 
"neighbours", enhancing our city instead of detracting from it. Good taste and good 
manners are needed to achieve such a delicate balance. Ultimately, the objective is 
not just about designing spectacular buildings. More importantly, it is about making a 




Mah B T, 2000, Opening Speech at the launch  
of exhibition “Unique City in the Making” 
 
The ERC set up in 2001 and mentioned in the previous chapter made several 
references to the task of achieving ‘design excellence’. Firstly, the Land Working Group, a 
sub-committee of the ERC 13 , made recommendations on new ways of selling land. The 
objective is to “enhance the land’s ability to create value” (MTI, ERC – Land Working Group, 
2002 : 2). In its conclusion, the report made the important recommendation that the 
Government should minimize its participation in markets where there are “no developmental, 
strategic or sociopolitical considerations, as this minimizes “the crowding out of the private 
sector, and increases the available competitive space.” In at least two other subcommittees’ 
reports was design and the ‘icon’ mentioned which can be seen to put design back firmly 
back in the realm which has “developmental, strategic or sociopolitical considerations”, thus 
justifying government intervention. The sub-committee on service industries released a report 
on the creative industries development strategy. The creative industry was lauded as one of 
the movers of the new economy. Architectural design and services was included as part of 
this industry but was scantly mentioned in the report overall. Nevertheless, with this report, 
URA’s thrust for promoting architectural design found a convenient vehicle into the larger 
national agenda. The Tourism Working Group recommended the total revamp of Orchard 
Road as a “world class shopping street” and proposed that renowned architects should be 
                                                 
13 This is one of the 7 other subcommittees, each dealing with specific issues such as tourism, manpower, business 
and so on. See Ministry of Trade and Industry. 2002. Economic Review Committee - Executive Summary. 
Singapore : Ministry of Trade and Industry, pp 2 
invited to propose an integrated scheme for Orchard Road encompassing improvements in 
connectivity and landscaping as well as the creation of iconic structures”. By then, design has 
been legitimized as a economic value-add, deserving a place in the national agenda, so much 
so that during the National Day Rally speech in 2005, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
talked about Singapore being remade into a “vibrant, global city”, and used power point 
slides to project vibrant images of housing estates, Orchard Road, Marina Bay and Bugis – a 
definitive nod to the power, and necessity, of images in the projection of an global city (Lee 





For the GLS, while it is clearly impossible to stipulate an ‘icon’ as a requirement in 
the sales condition, the sales documents starting from 1990s had began to emphasis the 
planning vision and intention for the sale site, thus selling the message and influencing the 
developers to take the official vision into account in developing the sale site. The material 
implications of the iconic become apparent by comparing the urban design conditions for 
Orchard Turn Sale site (OTS), a designated landmark site, when it was launched in 2005 with 
the conditions when it was launched in 199114. During both sales launches, it was couched as 
the “gem” of Orchard Road, one of the last prime sites to be offered in the heart of the 
shopping street. However, under the impetus of the iconic, the urban design requirements in 
2005 is clearly much more ambitious and exacting than that of 1991. The 2005 sales 
condition contained far more evocations of its iconic status, calling it a ‘landmark location’, 
envisaged to a ‘next generation retail development that will set new trends and standards in 
terms of its retail offering and shopping experience…’, and “mark the gateway to Orchard 
Road” (URA, Developer’s Package – Orchard Turn Site, 2005). Further more, it will be an 
‘epicentre’ of Orchard Road, a “central venue for major festive events and celebrations’. 
                                                 
14The sale site above the Orchard MRT station was launched earlier in 1991, but it was not sold. It was relaunched 
again in 2005, amidst a booming real estate market. The tender was eventually won by a joint consortium made up 
of Capitaland (Singapore) and Sung Hung Kai Properties (Hong Kong).   
None of these are evoked in such ambitious terms in the 1991 sales documents. However, 
even though it was designated as a landmark site in the Landmark and Gateway Plan, there 





Compared to the 1991 design conditions, the 2005 design conditions are both more 
stringent and permissive. For example, to create a landmark building, the development is 
allowed to go beyond the 30 storey height limit for buildings in the area, up to 218 AMSL 
(Above Mean Sea Level), or about 40 storeys in height – a momentous first for a building in 
the Orchard area. However, an additional requirement is imposed – in order to capitalize on 
its landmark location and height, a public observation deck is required to be provided on the 
top floors of the development. This is clearly aimed at cementing the role of the development 
as a public and touristic attraction in the Orchard area. A carefully-worded set of urban 
requirements stipulate the provision of a ground level public space of not less than 3000 sqm 
that is “seamlessly integrated with the pedestrian mall, such that activities in the Public Event 
Space can spill into the mall” (ibid). By not specifying the form and shape of the public space, 
the requirement becomes performative rather than prescriptive, as it attempts to balance 
between balancing the goals of street-level vibrancy with precious ground level retail space. 
In addition, a public concourse is required that integrates the ground level public space with 
the entry/exit level of the MRT station in the basement, creating a more public-oriented 
building that embraces, rather than keeps out, the crowd. Compared to the 1991 conditions on 
provision of open space, which did not specify a minimum area or require direct linkage to 
the MRT basement entrance, the 2005 conditions clearly demands more from the design of 
the development in order to contribute to the urban experience of Orchard Road as a whole 































Plans 1a and 1b 
Control Plans for 1991 Orchard Turn Sale Site  
 
Two of the control plans of the Orchard Turn Sale Site in the tender package when it was launched in 1991, 
showing urban design requirements for the development. 
 
Compared with the requirements and guidelines  imposed when it was relaunched in 2004, the 1991 requirements 
were not as stringent and demanding on issues such as public space, design standards and other public amenities.    
 
 


































Plans 2a and 2b 
 
Control Plans for 2006 Orchard Turn Sale Site 
Two of the control plans of the Orchard Turn Sale Site, showing urban design requirements for public space on the 
pedestrian mall level that is “seamlessly integrated with the pedestrian mall, such that activities in the Public Event Space 
can spill into the mall” and a public concourse that is “contiguous” with the MRT entrance/exit level in the basement and 
connects to the public space on the pedestrian mall. Other urban design requirements in the plans include pedestrian 
connections to the adjacent developments where knockout panels had been provided for when they were developed many 
years ago. The control plans encapsulates forward-planning, where the provisions are made years in advance in order to 
complete the vision for a precinct. It also shows the comprehensiveness and thoroughness of the pre-sales process, where 
design conditions and possibilities are exhaustively researched so as to make all planning parameters and technical 
r quirements clear upfront – characteristic of a process that trades clarity and objectivity for flexibility. Indeed, for a tender 
t at is awarded based on the highest bid-price and does not consider design as a valid criteria, it has become necessary to 
make sure that all such design conditions are clear so that they are binding if necessary. There will be difficult to return 
design into the equation once the tender has been issued. To articulate such design requirements, language here is 
sometimes employed carefully to suggest more than concrete prescriptive requirements – “contiguous with” and 































































While these requirements might make the building more prominent and public-
oriented, they do not guarantee architectural iconicity. Try as the sales document might to 
both stipulate and persuade an icon out of the tenderers, the tender awarding process is still 
based on the highest premium, and architectural merit has no place in the awarding decision. 
The call for architectural excellence has no real teeth - the developer is merely “encouraged 
to explore innovative building forms and architectural expressions for the development” (ibid) 
(italics mine). Instead, the development proposal shall be subject to review by a Design 
Advisory Panel (DAP), comprising of members from both the public and private sectors, to 
provide inputs on “overall building layout and architectural design”. The DAP process is 
integrated into the formal planning permission procedures, which means that it happens after 
the site has been awarded to the highest price, not before, and becomes part of the procedure 
of obtaining planning permission. As discussed in Chapter Four, while the DAP has often 
been formed regularly on an ad hoc basis to guide important projects, it is debatable, from 
both Singapore’s experience and overseas experience, whether it really can make something 
architecturally mediocre to start with anything more than slightly less mediocre. At the very 
least, the advisory powers can make sure no major problems are created, but it has never, nor 





A complex series of requirements and persuasion operates in the OTS tender 
documents. The quest for the icon transforms the sales documents into a marketing brochure, 
instructional booklet and legal document rolled in one. However, as it is functionally a legal 
document, there is no confusion as to what is merely encouraged and what is required. At the 
end of the day, objectivity and precision is still the modus operandi, in place of discretion and 
subjectivity, and the site will be awarded to the highest price submitted, icon or no icon.  
 
 




The confluence of rhetoric on the iconic and the global is most obvious at Marina 
Bay, a large piece of reclaimed land to the south of Singapore that is gearing up to be 
developed into a new global city of the future. While not truly a mega urban project in the 
scale of Dubai’s Palm Island or the numerous townships sprouting in China, Marina Bay has 
an international presence simply by force of marketing and the potential development value 
embedded in the land. Two recent projects launched after 2000 – the Business Financial 
District and the Integrated Resort - will be discussed here as case studies of how the sales 
mechanisms as well as the detailed design conditions have changed due to perceived global 
competition and the quest for icons. Before that, however, it is important to recall the genesis 
of Marina Bay and what forces gave rise to its physical profile.  
 
Marina Bay’s orientation towards the global is already present from the very day a 
decision was made to reclaim land and create it. Its genesis began when the State and City 
Planning Project (State and City Planning Project Report, 1967) made recommendations to 
“alleviate the traffic bottle necks caused by the narrow bridges across the Singapore River”. 
They proposed to direct traffic away from the Golden Shoe area which was undergoing 
intensive redevelopment by reclaiming land to the south of Singapore River. It was 
rationalized that the additional land, collectively known at that time as Marina City, would 
also offer ample opportunity for the future growth of the city. The reclaimed land consisted of 
3 large parcels of land – Marina South (243 ha), Marina Centre (106 ha) and Marina East 
(318 ha) (Map 9).  Reclamation works started in 1971. The first articulation of the planning 
vision for these three plots of reclaimed land can be found in the early corporate reports of 
URD and URA in the mid 70s. Then, the planning intention for Marina Centre was to serve 
as a “terminating node” for the Orchard Road shopping belt. Marina East was to be reserved 




Early Reclamation profile of Marina City, 1980s.  
 
Note the three parcels of land labeled Marina South, Marina East and Marina Centre, coloured in 
yellow. Marina Bay is the body of water bound between Marina Centre and Marina South. 
 
Source : Urban Redevelopment Authority. 1981/2 Annual Report  
Place/Shenton Way and thus the new business and financial district of Singapore – proposals 
that generally still are in effect today :  
 
The development of a Marina Centre off Telok Ayer Basin will be by means of a 
bold and ambitious reclamation scheme which will not only enable construction of a 
new coastal expressway to skirt the intensive developments in Shenton Way and 
Collyer Quay, but also provide sufficient land for the development of parks and 
recreational, entertainment and commercial facilities as well as housing. The scheme 
also provides for an impressive and beautiful Marina Bay for Yachting and other 




Housing Development Board, Annual Report 1973/4 : 102 
 
By 1982, most of the reclamation for Marina South had already completed, and the URA 
was able to embark on a large-scale planning project for the 243H Marina South. To achieve 
the best possible design solutions for Marina South commensurate with its destiny to become 
an international financial centre, international consultants were appointed to recommend 
design guidelines (Urban Redevelopment Authority, 1982/3:12). It was thus in 1986 that two 
international architects, Mr I M Pei and Mr Kenzo Tange, were appointed by the URA to 
prepare a masterplan for Marina South (Plate 8). According to an URA annual report, both 
consultants “independently conceived the same broad visions” for the city and proposed a 
“futuristic vision for the city of Singapore as the new downtown for Singapore with 
impressive skylines, promenades, open spaces and plazas, and landmarks to frame the bay”. 
 
In both proposals, the locations for urban markers were embedded in the plan – the 
Fullerton Hotel and the Merlion which served as the “sculpture at the mouth of Singapore 
River”, the Central Promontory, and the Bayfront Promontory together describe a triangular 
geometry so as to provide a form of visual anchorage and definition to the bay15. For the I M 
Pei scheme, the gridiron geometry of the old downtown was extended into Marina South, 
thus creating an extension of the historic urban grid drawn by Sir Stamford Raffles. In Kenzo 
Tange’s scheme, the reference point was the mouth of the Singapore river – the historic 
beginning of the city and its entreport trade – which is used as a centre to inscribe a arc that 
                                                 
15 Informal Interview with Mr Goh Hup Chor, ex-Chief Planner of Urban Redevelopment Authority, 19 Jul 2006 
determines the profile of the bay. The connection to history was thus on a rather abstract level, 
and starts with colonial modern Singapore. Also, something can be said about the choice of 
these two architects since they were specifically invited by the authorities to propose the 
visions – both are highly respected international architects, educated in the West but 
avowedly Asian in temperament and culture. Both had had many projects in Singapore, and 
thus offered some measure of comfort to the authorities in terms of the quality of their work 
and the character of their architectural aesthetics. In directly appointing them, the authorities 
knew, more or less, that they will get a specific type of urban waterfront, with modern 
















The 1989 Draft Master Plan for Urban Waterfronts at Marina Bay and Kallang Basin 
provides additional clues as to what influenced the final profile of Marina Bay. The report 
compared the bird’s eye view of Marina Bay in its 1989 profile, and the images of what were 
held to be examples of successful waterfronts of a similar scale – Sydney Cove and Baltimore 
Inner Harbour. Pictures were used to support the argument that “Marina Bay is too large 
Plate 8  
Proposed Visions by I M Pei (left) and Kenzo Tange (right) for Marina Bay, circa 1994 
  
Source : Urban Redevelopment Authority. 1994/5 Annual Report 
resulting in loss of scale and spatial definition”. The curved profile of the land circumscribed 
a body of water that was 1050m wide and 780m long. In comparison, Sydney cove was 275m 
wide and 600m long, while Baltimore Inner Harbour was 460m wide and 280m long. Other 
weaknesses identified from this comparison included “inadequate land for development”, 
“poor access to the bay” and “promenade continuity”. Therefore, the new profile of the land 





The appropriate scale of the basin after reclamation and the strong definition of future 
developments along the waterfront will give this bay a distinct urban character. Key 
vistas will be strengthened with carefully-designed open spaces, boulevards and 
buildings that relate visually to each other16  
Urban Redevelopment Authority, Annual Report, 1989  
 
The bold planning strategies and urban transformation of Marina Bay as envisaged in the 
1996 exhibition was put on freeze due to the Asian financial crisis. It was only in 2004, when 
the real estate market started to boom again, that a major move was undertaken by the 
Government to launch the development of Marina South. $300 million was dedicated to 
develop the waterfront promenade around Marina Bay and new pedestrian cum vehicular 
bridge, and to extend the Common Services Tunnel and the road and sewer network to serve 
the projected new developments. The URA was appointed as the place manager, or 
development agent, whose role is to:  
a. spearhead and coordinate development efforts in Downtown at Marina Bay;  
                                                 
16  This was further corroborated in an informal interview with Mr Goh Hup Chor, ex-deputy Chief Planner of the URA. 
He explained that the shape and size of the basin was generated by benchmarking it with other waterfronts of a 
similar scale. One of the major consideration for the enlarged area of reclamation was that the financial gain from the 
sale of such prime land far outstrips the decreasing cost of reclamation, making it economically attractive to create a 
large land-bank to cater to future demand.   
 




c. carry out active promotion and marketing, and place management for the 
area. (italics mine) 
Urban Redevelopment Authority, Professional Circular, 13 Mar 2004 
 
In justifying URA’s expanded role, Mr Mah, Minister of National Development, 
appealed once again to increasing global competition, and thus the need for a more pro-active 
coordinated comprehensive approach that encompasses not just the infrastructural and policy 
aspects that are traditionally part of URA’s portfolio, but also the software aspects such as 
events management, marketing and branding (Mah B T, 12 Ap 2004). Generating a ‘sense of 
place’ is thus an objective, though it is explained loosely, and in politically correct terms, as 
being both relevant to foreigners and locals alike, without, or more probably, carefully 
avoiding, the reality that such a Marina Bay caters specifically to certain classes of people 
most of the time. Nevertheless, the spectre of urgency makes notions of an organic 
emergence of place-identity a foregone issue, and one of URA’s first project as development 
agent was to embark on a corporate branding exercise. Mah (21 Jul 2005) says, in announcing 
the brand of Marina Bay, “Place branding, like product branding, is one of the means to 
create a differentiation that will appeal to the buyers’ emotions, and interest them to invest 
and to visit. … It has to define a compelling central idea and vision that will set the place 
apart from its competitors, while staying relevant and inspirational to the audience” – a 
classic iteration of a consumerist ideology applied to the art of place-making. 
Rhetorics of urgency and global competition are by now a common echo within official 
press releases.  More than “an impressive and beautiful Marina Bay for yachting and other 
aquatic activities” and an opportunity for a “spacious and attractive Central Area “, as 
portrayed in the reports of the 80s, Marina Bay is now to be Singapore’s competitive 
advantage, its hope for the future, and a necessary investment in order that in the long term, 
the material needs of the local populace can be sustained. This justifies the planning intention 
for Marina Bay which is naturalized as prime real estate with the attendant ornamentation of 
cultural and entertainment institutions. It also justifies the necessity for branding in order to 
attract global investment, the thrust for international architecture competitions to generate 
media attention, excitement and the best designs that the world can offer, and the expanded 
role of the URA to determine not just the hardware, but also manage the software aspects of 




Cities all over the world are competing aggressively for investments, jobs and tourists. 
Singapore needs to plan for and invest in our city so as to safeguard our position as a 
premier place for business and talent. With its waterfront location and availability of 
unencumbered land, the Downtown at Marina Bay can be Singapore’s competitive 
advantage, providing the opportunity to develop a unique business and financial hub as a 
seamless extension to the existing CBD.  
Mah, B T, 21 Jul 2005 
 
International Design Consultancy and the Business Financial District 
Immediately after the $30 million budget was announced for Marina Bay, an international 
design consultancy was carried out specifically for the design of 1.5km stretch of the public 
waterfront promenade and a pedestrian bridge connecting Marina South to Marina Centre 
(Plan 3). Launched on 16th April, the purpose was “to get ideas and design proposals that 
                                                 
17 Such administrative arrangements are not peculiar to Singapore – see Sydney Foreshore Authority for example, 
where city councils also act as place-managers. Nevertheless, the reasons for the formation of such administrative 
powers are different, and in the case of Singapore, ‘pressures of globalisation’ are the main justifications for the 
expanded role of the government. Since its inception, the Marina Bay Development Agency, the division formed 
within URA in 2006 to plan and manage Marina Bay, has organized several events such as the F1 Powerboat World 
Championships and New Year countdown celebrations. 
will not only create beautiful public places and spaces, but move us closer to building a 




The design brief reinforces the planning intention for the site, highlighting its ambitions to 
become a “unique business and financial hub in a city-in-a-garden setting’. As the first stage 
of an ideas consultancy, the scope is quite open-ended. The site information plan particularly 
reinforces the placement of landmarks and focal points at specific locations which the 
reclamation profile catered for. Much of the images and text in the appendices evoke Marina 
Bay as a face presented to the outside world, demanding aesthetic detailing from specific 
vantage points. The physical profile of the bay allows views of the entire urban scenery, 
heightened at certain designated ‘lookout’ points, such as the proposed pedestrian bridge, 
vistas and promontories, and framed by landmarks at the corners of the bay. This face is, as 
an urban entity, a highly crafted artifice. The body of water serves as both a focus of activities, 
and also a generator of aesthetic distance (a distance that was carefully thought through in 
relation to Sydney and Baltimore). The promenade constitutes the first layer of the façade, 
where a conspicuous culture of leisure and consumption is to be cultivated. This then steps up 
gradually to the skyline, aestheticised by deliberate variegations through plot ratio control and 
design conditions. Night lighting to accentuate the skyline is also a design requirement in all 
new or existing developments along the waterfront, in order to project an image of a 24/7 city 
full of energy and vitality. Thus, in March 2006, the ‘Lighting Incentive Scheme’ was 
launched which only applies for developments in the Central Business District and Marina 
Centre – clearly areas where the buildings can contribute to the visual spectacle of the city 
when viewed from the water. The circular states that ‘not only will lighting make the city 
more appealing for activities after dark, it is also an attractive promotional asset that has 
tangible economic benefits, such as supporting the tourism sector and attracting investment’. 















































































































































































































































by defraying the capital cost of external lighting installation to buildings in the designated 
areas through cash grants or additional gross floor areas. In addition, building owners are 
encouraged to ‘switch on the lights on weekends (Fri-Sun) evenings from 7pm to 11pm’, and 
during national celebrations and festive occasions, ‘the building owners may be required to 
switch on the building lighting’ (italics mine) (URA, Mar 2006). Within this space which is 
constantly projected as global, there is seamless all-weather pedestrian-friendliness with 
extensive open spaces, sheltered or underground connections, parks and water edges. Here, 
the ideal user is a privileged global body who will be in constant comfort and his senses 
endlessly stimulated, a utopia where seemingly all is public, leisurely space. In the now 
clichéd mantra of a intensely mixed use ‘live-work-play urban environment’, the global body 
is always situated in this made-for self-sufficient world, never having to step out of it, even as 
he/she travels from one to the other thousands of miles away. Marina Bay, in trying to fit into 
this circuit of global spaces, must therefore afford all the expected luxuries that the global 





Perhaps one of the most concrete examples of how such aesthetic preferences are 
being translated into built form is found in the tender documents of the Business Financial 
District (BFC). Launched around the same time in 2004, the tender document is as usual 
replete with evocations of its prominent location and its promise as a landmark of 
‘international standard’. For an architectural brief, this has the added effect of suggesting a 
certain aesthetic that will be appropriate for this site. There are two parcels of land included 
in the tender documents. Parcel A is the site proper for the BFC, while site B – the arrowhead 
shaped promontory which faces directly the waterfront - is optional for the developer to 
purchase to develop into a ‘distinctive public attraction and signature waterfront development 
of international standard’(URA, Developer’s package – BFC, 2004 : 10-11). The submission 
requirements for Land Parcel A includes the overall masterplan showing landuse, 
development intensity, parcellation and phasing strategy for the entire site, detailed plans and 
sections showing pedestrian connections and open spaces, models and a statement describing 
the overall design concept and how it relates to the larger context of the city and Marina Bay 
(ibid : 8-9). For Parcel B, where architectural quality is clearly more a concern given its 
public nature and prominent frontal location at the Marina Bay, a Concept Evaluation 
Committee is set up to review the development and design concept at the point of tender 
submission ( not after the tender has been awarded, as is the case for the ADP process). The 
committee looks at essentially two clusters of issues involving design quality and business 
model. As such, the submission requirements for Parcel B include both a report on the 
development concept, use and operators (business aspects), as well as the design concept and 





The BFC tender conditions also stipulates extremely sophisticated envelope control 
guidelines to create towers of different heights and frontages, in order to sculpt a variegated 
skyline which is seen to be an important aspect of a memorable urban image of Singapore 
(Plans 4). For example, clause 6.7.3 requires that ‘for the portion of the development with 
Parcel A2 fronting Marina Boulevard, a maximum of 50% of the total site frontage shall not 
exceed 150.0m AMSL in height up to a depth of approximately 50.0m from the building 
setback line fronting Marina Boulevard … this is to ensure that there is a variation in the 
skyline profile front Marina Bay” (ibid: 28). Another interesting addition in the brief is the 
‘sky-decks’ and ‘elevated and/or low-level waterfront pavilions within Marina Bay’ (ibid: 61). 
The sky-deck is defined as a floating single-storey platform elevated six to eight stories above 
the ground, extending out to the waterfront. It is meant to support activities such as “cafes, 
restaurants, wine bars or recreation clubs and is encouraged to include facilities such as 
viewing decks and landscaped roof-gardens that are accessible to the public”. The water 













































































































































































































































































































































generating uses such as “cafes, restaurants or wine bars”(ibid: 62). Both options are clearly 
intended to thicken that layer of visual attraction and activities to the face of Marina Bay, a 
spatial buffer, screen and façade all at once, which must be appropriate in terms of how ‘well-





Despite such sophisticated urban design guidelines for both parcels, the acceptance of 
tender is finally still based on the highest bid price, and the awarded design would be subject, 
once again, to review by the DAP. There is clearly a struggle to introduce design into an 
extremely refined sales system without compromising its objectives of transparency, fair 
competition and extracting the highest premium for the sale of the land. As with the OTS, 
although design can be seen to have a place in the national economic agenda, it seems that the 
authorities are still cautious about admitting design as a criterion in the awarding of large and 
important sites – architectural design proves to be simply too difficult to be measured and 
quantified in economic terms to justify accepting any bid but the highest.   
 
The Integrated Resort and the Disappearance of the Casino 
More so than the BFC, the most prominent development at Marina Bay is that of the high-
profile ‘Integrated Resort’. The ‘Integrated Resort’ here describes a large scale mixed use 
development with a casino component. Besides the MICE (Meetings, Incentives, 
Conventions and Exhibitions) facilities, hotel, retail and entertainment centres,  the crux of 
this development is that it will contain this casino component – one which the government 
has vigorously rejected for a long time on grounds of a casino’s potentially negative social 
and moral impact on the people. Thus, when the ERC recommended to build a casino in 
Singapore to invigorate the tourism industry, PM Lee Hsien Loong replied :  
 
There may be economic merits to setting up a casino in Singapore. But the social impact 
is not negligible. By making gaming more accessible and even glamorous, it could 
encourage more gambling and increase the risk of gaming addiction. A casino could also 
lead to undesirable activities like money laundering, illegal lending and organized crime. 
Although one can try to mitigate these effects, the long term impact on social mores and 




Lee H S, 2001, quoted in Lee H S, 18 Apr 2005 
 
However, in April 2005, the Government reversed this long-held antagonistic stance 
towards gambling and decided to allow, not one, but two Integrated Resorts with casino 
components in Singapore, one within Marina Bay, and the other in Sentosa. The magnitude of 
debate, along with a scale of public involvement and interest quite uncommon in Singapore, 
must be understood within such a political climate and attitude towards gambling. Between 
March 2004 and December 2005, public feedback was gathered through phone interviews, 
face-to-face surveys, dialogue sessions and website forums, and the summary of feedback 
was posted on the website of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The summary was silent about 
the proportion of respondents who were for or against various aspects of the casino, or the 
demographic breakdown of the respondents, though it neatly categorized the major concerns 
of the protestors, and those of the supporters :  
For Casino  
a)  Will create significant economic benefits and jobs.  
b)  Will boost the tourism industry / attract more tourists.  
c)  Will provide a wider range of entertainment options.  
d)  Will divert local gamblers back to our own shores.  
e) Singaporeans are socially responsible and mature enough.  
f) Adults should exercise personal responsibility  




a)  Will potentially result in an increase in social ills, such as higher incidence of 
problem gambling, increase in crime, etc. Social safeguards will not work as 
there will always be loopholes. 
b)  Against Singapore's pro-family policy.  
c)  Has a cannibalising effect on other industries.  
d)  Erodes our moral and religious values.  
e) Tarnishes Singapore's good reputation and image. 
 
Source : Feedback Unit  
 
 
The various ministerial statements about the government’s decision to allow casinos 
reveal that many of the ministers, despite personal reservations, had accepted the decision to 
proceed with the casinos. In his round-up speech in parliament, Prime Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong reiterated much of the rationale for the decision – economic benefits and jobs, 
boosting tourism, and perceived competition amongst regional cities. It was estimated that the 
two Integrated Resorts will increase annual GDP by S$1.5 billion and create about 35,000 
jobs throughout the economy (Singapore Tourism Board, 4 Nov 2005). Although the worries 
about social problems and erosion of work ethic still existed, the rationale was that the 
globalised environment had made gambling so accessible and competition so rife that 
denying the casino was no longer a reasonable option. The task was therefore to ameliorate 
and control the potential ills of a casino. By then, due largely to the public nature of the 
debate, the casino had achieved a status not just as an economic solution, but as a measure of 
Singapore’s willingness to change, take risk and become more attractive to foreign 
investment. In this measure, the assessors were not just Singaporeans, or the government, but 
the world’s investors and players who would otherwise ‘mentally scratch us off from the list 
of countries that will go for business, for leisure and entertainment.’ (Lee K Y, 19 Apr 2006) 
This ‘list of countries’ constituted an imaginary class of super league global cities, and the 
desire for this membership, in this case, legitimized the presence of two casinos. In fact, well 
aware of the visibility of such an important decision to other competing cities, Singaporeans, 
by engaging in a year-long highly publicised debate on the casino, seemed to have placed 





To say no after worldwide publicity for a year, Singapore will be sending out the wrong 
signal, that we want to stay put, to remain the same old Singapore, a neat and tidy place 
with no chewing gum, no smoking in air conditioned places, no this no that – not a fun 
place. The old model on which I worked was to create a first world city in a third world 
region – clean green, efficient, a pleasant , healthy and wholesome society, safe and 
secure for everyone. These virtues are no longer sufficient. Now we have also to be an 
economically vibrant and an exciting city to visit, with top class symphony orchestras, 
concerts, drama, plays, artists and singers and popular entertainment. These are the 
lifestyles international professionals and executives seek. We want the companies who 
manage these entertainment troupes to include Singapore on the tour of cities around the 
world.   
Lee K Y, 19 Apr 2005 
 
The arising concerns of a correct or desired representation of such an Integrated Resort, 
so that it does not “tarnish Singapore’s good reputation and image’ as the feedback puts it, 
became a nucleus around which the mechanism of procuring and guiding the project was 
created. As the official discourse had been eager to stress, the Integrated Resort is not just a 
casino similar to that in Las Vegas, or worse, Macau. Rather it is a ‘large-scale development 
offering multiple world class attractions . . . an entire complex of classy hotels, luxury shops, 
fancy restaurants, spectacular shows, convention centres all found in one single destination. 
The gaming component will occupy not more than 3-5% of the total area of the IR 
development . . . Casino gaming is an important part of the mix, but only a part’ (Lim H K, 






Simulation of the Integrated Resort 
screened during the National Day Rally 
speech, 2005 
 
A computer simulation of the Integrated Resort used in 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s National Day Rally 
Speech on 9 Aug 2005. This image was generated by 
the Urban Redevelopment Authority before the tender 
was launched for the Integrated Resort.  
 
Credit – Urban Redevelopment Authority 
In the 2005 National Day Rally speech, a 
computer simulated image of the IR (Plate 9) was 
created and broadcasted to the entire populace to 
rectify and preempt erroneous mental pictures of the 
Integrated Resort. In this image, the Integrated 
Resort is a modern avant-garde glass-clad edifice 
that will sit comfortably in any financial or cultural 
district, rather than a gaudy fire-spouting pyramid. 
Architecture is used to sanitise and camouflage the 
project so that its casino aspect (only 3-5% of the 
floor area) is largely invisible, firstly in the realm of 
discourse, and later in its physical form. As 
mentioned earlier, this is the first time in the history of National Rallies that images were 
used – clearly a milestone in the way ‘imageability’, a measure by which cities impresses 
upon its locals and visitors as a visual image and a often quoted property of ‘global cities’ – 
can be crafted, designed and finally built with intended results.  
 
Shortly after, in Nov 2005, a Request for Proposal exercise for the IR was launched by 
Singapore Tourism Board. In this exercise, the government laid out its parameters for the 
development vis-à-vis the vision of Marina Bay. Clearly expecting an iconic structure, but not 
iconic in the sense of pyramids and sphinxes, the press release took pains to articulate the 
government’s expectation for an IR that is ‘modern, architectural distinctive, urban and well-
integrated’, ‘contemporary in style, incorporating an external architectural treatment that is 
appropriate to its prime downtown location and complementary to the modern image of 
Singapore as a leading Asian city’. The Request for Proposal documents also stipulated that 
‘the IR Operator will be required to provide a landmark public attraction … at the Bayfront 
Promontory as well as public facilities such as the Waterfront Promenade around the Bay and 
Event Plaza…’. By public attraction, the document listed facilities such as ‘cultural centre, 
museum, art gallery, contemporary art centre, performance theatre, arena, science centre, 
maritime museum, planetarium or aquarium’ – all of which form the expected ‘cultural 
ensembles of art and culture’ that ‘spectacularise the urban and raise the value of the city in 
the commodified images of place that flood the world’ (Short, 2004). Just as the press release 
was silent about the casino, the civic nature of such cultural objects would serve to 
camouflage the central point of contention in the entire development. The physical location 
and visibility of the casino will be further controlled via powers permitted in the Casino 
Control Act, which includes the power to define the casino premises within the development 
and how it advertises itself to the public (Singapore Parliament, 2nd Reading of Casino 





In a bid to place emphasis on the design and business concept, the government departed 
from common sale of land practice in Singapore and fixed the land price. Instead, the 
evaluation criteria focused on tourism appeal and contribution (40%), level of development 
investment (20%), architectural and urban design excellence (30%) and strength of 
consortium and track records (10%). A high-leveled ministerial committee was formed to 
assess the tender submissions18. Four consortiums submitted for this RFP exercise19. The 
                                                 
18 The judging panel was chaired by Deputy Prime Minister S Jayakumar and comprised of ministers and permanent 
secretaries from Ministries of National Development, Trade and Industry, Finance and Law. A Technical evaluation 
committee was also formed and represented by various statutory boards, local and international architects, as well 
as a global consultancy firm to advise on the robustness of the business model. 
tender result was finally announced on 26th May 2006 and podcast via the Straits Times, 
Singapore’s mainstream newspaper. In the announcement, officials detailed the reasons why 
the chosen scheme won, according to the established evaluation criteria. One section focused 
on the architectural and urban design elements in the winning scheme. The officials described 





1. Overall composition of proposal fits very well with existing as well as the future 
developments on the bay. 
 
2. Unique architecture, exciting addition to the Bay. Eg. Hotel towers are set back from 
waterfront, it will open up expansive views to the city as well as to the entire Marina Bay. 
It will also make the skyline of the new downtown even more attractive and distinctive.  
 
3. All different components are well integrated and seamlessly connected with the MRT 
station, the proposed gardens at Marina South, and with the waterfront promenade. 
 
4. Many attractive external and internal spaces, spaces which can be enjoyed by the 
public, such as the waterfront promenade, which runs right across the development, an 




                                                                                                                                           
19 The four consortiums are Genting International/Star Cruises, Harrah's Entertainment/Keppel Land, Las Vegas 
Sands  and MGM Mirage/CapitaLand. Las Vegas Sands won the tender for the IR.   
 
5. Distinctive features including a Skypark, above the hotel towers, which will provide 
360 views over the city and garden and bay, and an Art and science museum, the design 





transcribed by author from podcast on announcement of tender results for  
Integrated Resort, Straits Times, 26 May 2006 
 
The appraisal clearly emphasized the public merits of the project- as an icon contributing 
to an established vision of the Marina Bay scenery, the public spaces and facilities where 
visitors “can actually sit along the waterfront to enjoy the watershow, lightshow and the 
performances, all with the city skyline as a backdrop”, and how it is a good fit with the 
existing infrastructural network. Even the distinctive architectural features, such as the 
skypark (is it really a public space?), was couched in public terms, where an imaginary 
person would be afforded expansive views of the city. Yet, the general architectural 
composition, provision of public facilities along the waterfront and connections to nearby 
transportation hubs and facilities were already stipulated as tender conditions, and they could 
not therefore be the reasons why the scheme was chosen. The appraisal also deftly avoided 
any kind of comparison with the other three entries that might suggest why this was better 
than the others, which made it even more difficult to understand the architectural merits of 
the scheme. When, for example, the reporters asked why the public was not engaged in the 
judging or reviewing of the competition entries, the officials replied that they were not at 
liberty to disclose the details of the other entries due to intellectual propriety issues. They also 
added that the design review process was a highly complex task which needed the 
discernment of both locally and internationally renowned professionals, thus affirming both 
the existing practice of keeping design review strictly within the realm of the professional, 
and the fact that Marina Bay needed an internationally acknowledged aesthetic:  
 
…I think I must also point out that it is a very complex process of evaluating 
architecture and then concept. It is not just a matter of looking at a picture, I mean, if 
that picture was shown by, for example, Las Vegas Sands but it is not just a matter of 
looking at a picture. You really have to go into the details, the layout, where the 
location of the public spaces are, how they interface with one another and so on. So it 
was a pretty technical process and that's the reason why we appointed a competent 





Mah B T, 26 May 2006 –  
Media Conference, Q&A, supplied by Ms Krist Boo 
 
Needless to say, the casino had all but completely disappeared from the physical 
manifestation of the project, and no mention was made of it whatsoever in the announcement. 
This sanitized and ultimately meaningless appraisal of the winning scheme reflects the 
strategy that permeates much of the publicity materials about the city. An opaque flatness 
prevents any substantive understanding of the process of selection and thus, how discourse is 
translated into its material form. 20  Particularly on matters as subjective and potentially 
controversial as aesthetics, the authorities assiduously avoid being seen as endorsing a certain 
style. It is therefore a type of rhetoric that attempts to preempt and neutralise controversy and 
dissent, of which architecture is complicit in perpetrating in material form. 
 
Conclusion 
The GLS is instrumental not only as a mechanism that spurs and manages urban development, 
but also in a more subtle way, influences the aesthetics of the urban environment. Aesthetics 
is never an easy issue to legislate or govern, especially for the authorities who assiduously try 
                                                 
20 Even though the tender has been awarded and closed, the tender documents of the Integrated Resort are so far 
not publicly available and efforts by the author to obtain the document through official channels have not been 
successful. For an important project with high-leveled ministerial involvement, perhaps, this layer of text is deemed 
too sensitive to be released into the public realm, reflecting further the culture of silence and non-controversy. 
to be objective and non-controversial. Indeed, this study of the tender documents reveals the 
changing nature of the text and the image, pointing to how the system evolved from one of 
flexibility and discretion in the early phases of the GLS, to one of precision and efficiency. 
While design had always been an evaluation criterion in the awarding of sites since the 
inception of the programme, it disappeared around 1998 such that most sites were tendered 
solely on price. The boundaries of acceptable control also fluctuate, and perhaps it is in the 
case studies of Orchard Road and Marina Bay that the desire of the state for a certain design 
pedigree, that we see a radical reconfiguration of this boundary. Thus, not only do these sales 
incorporate architectural design as one of their awarding criteria, in the case of the Integrated 
Resort, the state fixed the land price at $1.2 Billion, so as to remove price out of the equation 
and compel interested investors to focus on presenting the best business, development and 
architectural concepts for the site instead (STB, 4 Nov 2005).  The bundling of design 
together with business, whether in the case of the Integrated Resort or the various two 
envelope systems, suggests that the value of good architectural design will continue to have 





The GLS serves effectively as a vehicle through which various state agendas are 
layered onto the aesthetics of the urban realm. It is also flexible enough, as the different types 
of design conditions and sales mechanisms show, to manage the evolving relationships 
between the state, the market, the professionals and the public when it comes to regulating 
design. In addition, the case studies of recent and significant urban projects illustrate how 
popular discourses of globalisation and iconicity have legitimized a slew of urban strategies 
from financing international consultancies, to shaping reclaimed land, to incentivising the 
night-lighting of private developments. While this study progressed primarily through the 
study of official circulars and sales tender documents, this layer of text is but one snapshot of 
the multiple agencies that ultimately give material form to all the desires, impulses and 
rationales that make up the urban environment. A whole realm of negotiations and 
transactions happen during and after the tender processes, within design advisory panel 
meetings or daily meetings with developers, most of which, at least in Singapore, are not in 
the public realm. Nevertheless, as one aspect of design review practised in Singapore, the 
GLS is clearly a crucial one, simply due to its pervasive role in Singapore’s urban 












At the end of this dissertation, one cannot help but wonder whether its purpose is to propose a 
better model for the way design reviews are conducted in Singapore. Given the limited scope 
of this research, the lack of precedent or empirical data (such as a body of prior research or 
surveys with professionals and government officers), and without a strong basis of 
comparison with other existing models, it will be presumptuous to do so. Rather, it is to 
remind ourselves that the way buildings and the urban looks is sufficiently important for 
professionals, authorities and governments to step in and legislate or control, often in rather 
invisible ways. Re-piecing the ‘idealised look’ – often suggested in design guidelines and 
official documents which state how things should be - is therefore an avenue into 
understanding the ideology and strategies of the planning elites. More importantly, by 
describing how design reviews are conducted and the institutions which support its practice, I 
hope to have surfaced the range of agendas which urban aesthetics can serve as a vehicle for. 
By this conclusion, I both summarise and speculate on the research findings with the 
objectives of distilling a series of logics permeating the rationale and practice of regulating 
design in Singapore, and point to a direction for further research in the meaning-construction 






While Singapore’s planning system is adopted from the colonial forebears, its subsequent 
evolution in the practice of design review and control achieved a distinct momentum. Most of 
the unique characteristics of Singapore’s planning and urban development system have been 
noted by earlier researchers, and of these, those which have the most obvious impact on the 
practice of design reviews are –  
 
1. strong state-led entrepreneurialism;  
2. centralized planning control;  
3. strong ties between the government and the civil service; and 






The powers to regulate design are incorporated in the various institutions inherited from the 
colonial era – the legal framework enshrined in the Planning Act, the professionalisation of 
town planning, and the various planning instruments such as development control and the 
Master Plan.  Upon independence, three main review mechanisms have been instrumental in 
the regulation of Singapore’s urban aesthetic: 
 
1. Review by administration represents the everyday operation whereby all 
development applications submitted for planning permission are subject to. 
Traditionally known as ‘development control’, this mechanism requires the creation 
of various urban design guidelines and plans, stipulating different design-related 
controls for different parts of the island.  
 
2.  Review by specialized panels of architectural experts and officials represents an 
extra layer of control reserved for sites or projects which are significant enough to 
warrant greater design attention.  
 
3. Review through the sale of sites, where land is sold with various design-related 
conditions, started in 1967 to launch the urban renewal of the Central Area. The 
dominant state ownership of land, coupled with a strong centralized planning system 
largely contributes to the immense impact of the GLS programme.  
 
For all these mechanisms, the established practice is to first paint an urban vision, which 
carries within it certain physical or aesthetic qualities. These are then codifed into design 
guidelines and other control parameters. The rapid percolation of national agendas into the 
planning and design review processes is only possible with the seamless relationship between 
the government and the planning authority/civil service, and the centralization of all forms of 
planning functions into one single administration. Nevertheless, while these points are salient 
characteristics of a well-honed system, we can also see that they are not completely stable or 
immutable. Recent economic, political and social changes propelled the state to restructure 
the economy into a high-end service-oriented knowledge-based economy, and embark on 
various initiatives and institutional changes in order to construct greater national or 
community identity in reaction to perceived threats from a borderless globalising world. 
These mean that the practice of design review will continue to be inflected to align with 
greater national or extra-national agendas. Already, once the creative industries are seen to be 
a viable area for the next prong of economic growth for Singapore, ‘design’ in all its 
dimensions, notably architecture and urban design, is able to climb up higher into the state 
agenda and appear more prominently in various government speeches and national events. 
Similarly, the tourism industry, both traditionally and increasingly an important cash cow for 
the economy, influences tremendously the way places are packaged, organized and 
represented, and plays a crucial role in privileging certain built forms and spaces which can 
be converted into tourism receipts. All these can be seen to work simultaneously with the 
‘global city’ rhetoric, where all forms of anxieties – economic, social, political and even 
philosophical (recalling the debate on ‘Asian values’, for example) – coalesce into an intense 
concentration on a preferred type of urban aesthetic, one of iconic structures, glitzy spectacles 
and ‘unique’ local flavours. Nowhere are these more pronounced than in Marina Bay – the 
global ‘face’ of Singapore. The Integrated Resort project, and the slowly exploding 
realisation of the entire Marina Bay attest to a widening array of mechanisms created to 
influence or stipulate such aesthetics. In this, it is clear that the government has decided to 
vest more powers in shaping and regulating the Bay to the URA. Beyond the traditional 





Development Agent, brands, promotes and organizes events for the Bay. Thence, the power 
to inscribe meaning into this charged space extends beyond the hardware into the software, 
from space into time. In a way, such heightened control can be seen not as a departure from 
normal practice, but a continuation of the type of logic which created the Architectural 






Although these macro-forces influence many more government policies than just urban 
aesthetics, there is something about ‘design’ which is different from other types of 
regulatable entities. The wickedness of ‘design’ has been highlighted in both parliamentary 
debates during the reading of the Planning Bill. Firstly, it is technically not possible to reduce 
architectural design into a few standard criteria which then can be applied to measure ‘good 
design’. Secondly, it is politically disastrous to demand certain aesthetics of private 
developments, beyond a certain level of detail. Lastly, it is administratively impracticable to 
review the design details of every project, being completely different, submitted for planning 
permission. Thus, even though the state is stepping up on its efforts to promote and secure a 
certain urban aesthetic, it is sensitive to the boundaries of acceptable practices. Yet, in this 
environment without a legacy of legal battles as in the States, and where a culture of silence 
drapes over how design can, is or should be regulated, these boundaries of acceptable 
practices will shift imperceptibly – and it is the momentum of the shift, that perhaps this 
broad survey can start to suggest.  
 
At the same time that the state plays a strong role in both the designing of Singapore’s 
urban landscape, it also participates in the project of disseminating and controlling the values 
and meanings attributed to such preferred forms. Thus, the uniform connected podiums and 
towers of Golden Shoe were translated to mean all the desired qualities of a “Wall Street of 
Asia” while the Orchard Turn sale site of 2006 illustrates that being taller and radically 
different are essential to signify an iconic status and a new heart of Orchard Road. More 
complex is the review process of the Integrated Resort, where the process and the 
architectural result had to translate to mean a willingness to change and compete globally (by 
reversing the long-established policy of saying ‘no’ to casinos) and yet distance itself from 
stereotypical images of casinos found in Las Vegas or Macau, with its associations with vice 
and moral decay. These case studies show that through the process of design reviews, the 
construction of such meanings and values undergo complex layers of screening and filtering, 
exclusion and dissemination. There is no single operation which can adequately encapsulate 
the processes by which certain aesthetics or design is embedded or qualified with certain 
meanings. However, all the mechanisms described thus far – review by administration, 
specialized panels or sale of sites – share certain similar operational strategies, which 
emerged largely from, though not entirely unique to, the exigencies of the political and 






1. Professionalisation of design language and aesthetic judgment, while at the same 
time, the trivialisation of design discourse in the public realm through selective 
disclosure and the art of mass communications; 
 
2. Avoidance of open contestations and potential conflict between lay and professional 
opinions on aesthetics in public domain; and 
 
3. Centralization of all functions of urban planning, development control and urban 
design within a single authority, resulting in a strong state control over the arbitration 
of aesthetic value and meaning, while at the same time, the employment of affective 
rhetoric and limited public/professional consultation to grease this centralization of 
power.  
It must be stressed that these strategies are pronounced in, but not unique to, Singapore. 
In effect, the use of design guidelines, the creation of design panels, and the general 
institutions of planning are found in many other cities, some of whom in fact copy such 
practices from one another. Thus, while the content and context might be different, the 
infrastructure is quite similar. In proposing a theoretical model for the further study of design 
reviews as a moment in the encoding of meanings into the urban landscape, this similarity in 
infrastructure is important. There exists a distinctly common operational unit that is employed 
across all review processes - codes. All manners of planning and design reviews depend on 
the production of codes. The inherent function of the code revolves around the logics of 
speed, immateriality and repeatability – that it essentialises knowledge or reality into sets of 
information so that it can be transmitted quickly and accurately, and that the same code can 
transmit or contain all types of information through a given set operation of encodings and 
decodings. Although clearly a form of technical mediation, it also enjoys the status of an 
‘origin’ through its claims of essentialisation, similar to the DNA structure, such that it 






The nature of the texts scutinised in this research can make similar claims. Design 
standards and guidelines essentialises what we know before and what we wish to see in the 
future into nuggets of instructions. Yet in this act of coding, also an act of ellipsis, the vast 
remainder of its rationale for being, becomes lost – sometimes inevitably, sometimes 
conveniently. Thus the complex colonial history of the shop-house five-foot way is 
deproblematised through erasure and reduction into a ‘standard’ clause, a technical 
requirement that is justified by the argument of weather protection and pedestrian circulation. 
Its moment of coding thus transforms on the one hand history into professional information 
and instruction, something ready-for-use, while dislocating it into an institutional matrix 
which can benefit from this dehistoricisation. Through this process, the message becomes 
encoded with a very restricted capacity for decoding. Indeed, it is because the decoding 
becomes possible only with recourse to professional language and expertise, that the entire 
enterprise is insulated from external critique. No one is able to effectively question the 
engineers on the requirements of sewerage piping, though Ben-Joseph (2006) has showed that 
not only do these requirements emerge at a specific moment in time when cities grew large 
enough for sanitation to become a problem, but also that this moment of crisis becomes 
perpetuated into codes for the placement and sizing of sewerage systems in American cities 
everywhere. While it is fair to say that many codes emerged during a point of crisis (that of 
fire-regulations being another classic example), the loss of their history through the process 
of encoding generate a problem of inertia, such that only a subsequent crisis can call for their 
review. But what constituted a crisis before might not be considered a crisis should it happen 
again, for the thickening of its practice over time and the institutional framework that grow to 
support or resist it shift the grounds of its legitimacy, such that any change, in the absence of 






For such technical texts, the moment of decoding, another determinate moment in the 
circulation and communication of design standards, is to a large extent circumscribed by the 
moment of coding. The task of decoding lies solely in the professions, who alone, due to 
training and the institutions set up to protect such professional turfs, are able to decipher them. 
Part of this is in the language employed in these texts, whether it is in the technical jargon, or 
the means of representation, such as the use of orthographic plans, models or other 
architectural graphic methods, which require a trained literacy in order to interpret. Part of it 
is largely also due to the restricted visibility of these texts – they are often official documents 
circulated strictly within professional institutions. Some are protected by confidentiality 
clauses, while most are simply protected from media view by its resolutely dry and technical 
nature, and thus will not make for ‘interesting’ reporting. Yet, as Hall (1977) reminds us, the 
circuit of communication cannot end here in this restricted space, and that, ‘at a certain point, 
however, the broadcasting structures must yield encoded messages in the form of a 
meaningful discourse”. By meaningful, he attributes to the power of the message to have an 
‘effect’, to ‘influence, entertain, instruct or persuade with very complex perceptual, cognitive, 
emotional, ideological or behavourial consequences’. While he was using the television as a 
point of study, the operation of this text can be seen to follow a similar logic. Ultimately, It 
has to be translated, usually by either the author or the user, to justify and highlight their 
active role in the shaping of the urban environment. What needs to be transmitted are values 
of good aesthetics (what is good and appropriate aesthetic for a global city image), or values 
of good urbanism (buildings should line up tightly so as to form a ‘tight street edge’), with a 
fair amount of entertainment (everyone can use and enjoy these spaces/buildings) thrown in 
for good measure. Such discourses in turn conceal the codes further, to make them seem 
benign, natural or just plain irrelevant to public discourse, and best left to the professionals to 






Another tendency of this translation into a ‘meaningful discourse’ is to lay claims of 
authorship. As mentioned earlier, the stunning transformation of the city has the immense 
capacity, through its spectacularity, to translate into political mileage for the government. In 
Singapore, all these coalesce together as the central planning system and the tight relationship 
between the government and the civil service ensures that such claims of linearity can be 
convincingly made, with very immediate results. The task of making meaningful discourse of 
the city thus is energetically pursued by the government, through its many evocations of 
accolades and identities. Garden City, Global City, Tropical City of Excellence, Biopolis, 
Mall of Singapore, City to Live, Work and Play in – all of these share the similar effect of 
turning policies, regulations and governmental action into ‘meaningful’ identities to mobilise 
mass imagination. Thus, as the design review process, in the case of Singapore, is confined 
more or less strictly within the state planning apparatus21, it would be reasonable to expect 
that much of what is regulated has the potential to be translated into meaningful discourse, 
thus leaving out another vast remainder of what is deemed to be either uncontrollable 
(politically and technically), or lacking in such potential. This makes the moment of the 
design review an even more crucial moment of study, as much for the parameters which 
come under its jurisdiction, as well as all that is deleted from it. The negotiation and 
construction of meaning during this moment thus sets the stage for the decoding process 
much like carving authorial territories, such that each party owns the right to decode in his or 
her interests those territories bequeathed. Architects can talk about the concept and 
innovation of their individual design, developers can recast it in marketing and promotional 
slogans, while the government can dwell on the employment benefits that such a 
development will bring or its role in the sculpting of the skyline, much like a script pre-
written in the moment of the design review. Conflict, though not always of the antagonistic 
kind, then arises when respective parties cross into each other’s territories, such as when 
architects argue for a deviation to the predetermined vision of the skyline for his/her design, 






In scrutinizing this moment of design review in order to foreground its role in the 
meaning-construction of buildings and the urban, we have thus looked at both its content, as 
well as its discursive structure, that is, the various media representations, professional and lay 
opinions and official press releases that surround the operation of the review process. 
Following Hall’s model of encoding and decoding as ‘determinate’ but not necessarily 
symmetrical moments (in fact it is his argument as well as mine that the relationship is highly 
asymmetrical in favour of the encoding-producer), a derivative model that might serve as an 
                                                 
21 This is in contrast to other planning systems where, for example, local community representation in design review 
meetings are more common, or where design control is carried out and policed by local communities rather than 
solely by the government.  
analytical structure for furthering this research is proposed (Fig. 3). On the encoder-producer 
end, the agents mainly include those who command the resources to patronize architecture, 
the architectural and design-related professionals as well as various interest groups (we 
include here intellectuals and popular critics) who are powerful or visible enough to influence 
important decisions related to the aesthetics of the urban environment. On the decoder-
receiver end, the agents include mainly those who take an active interest in such issues 
(usually, but not limited to, the architects and related professions), and the lay public, who 
again must be conceived of those who are passive or remote receivers, and those who 
physically use or occupy the spaces or buildings in question, and thus are affected materially 
by decisions made by the encoders. Furthermore, due to the nature of buildings and urban 
spaces, the encoding and decoding cycle continue endlessly and well beyond the ‘design 
review’ moment. Buildings are presented and re-presented continually in different ways 
during their long lifespan. Commercial buildings might be converted into hotels, while hotels 
might be conserved as national monuments. Furthermore, the effects of certain encodings will 
differ based on the level of familiarity and association a person has with a space or building. 
A projection of a shopping mall might excite the tourist, for example, while evoke anger in an 
ex-resident of the site who was evicted due to the mall development. Thus, the significance of 
design review as also a control over meaning fades in relation to the multitude of subsequent 






Thus, considering the range of agents at both ends, and the multiple levels of encoding-
decoding depending on nature of these agents, the trajectory of such research begins to 
expand. Furthermore, the model also suggests with a dashed arrow a shuttling to-and-fro of 
references, a recoding loop connecting decoder to encoder and back again, whereby meanings 
always seem to ‘degenerate’ or become ‘usurped’ after the design review process, and thus 














The corroboration of codes with various institutional practices and histories give rise 
to much of the primary texts this research has studied. Tender documents, design guidelines 
and legal ordinances are not produced for the purpose of mass communications or to sway 
popular imagination. Rather, they are highly specialized texts aimed at specific professional 
groups, such as lawyers, architects, developers and planners for specific ends. As such, they 
can be said to be confined largely within the ‘encoder-producer’ end of the matrix. Yet, this 
exclusion creates both a form of invisibility as well as a need to decode it into a desired form 
of visibility. As this research has shown, it is both the hidden nature of the design review 
process that also propels the need to publicise and popularize images and notions of urban 
aesthetics through more controlled mediums.  
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Theoretical Model for the study of design review within the matrix of encoding/decoding 
Despite its prescriptive and largely objective nature, it is simplistic to see these 
documents as the proto-forms of the physical realm, though they represent a crucial moment 
in the creation of urban form and meaning. It is the objective of this research to argue for 
their significance as another ‘text’ in the urban realm, one that is not as closely studied 
academically in the usual textual readings of the city. They are a written form of urban 
discourse that records the complex relationships between the authorities, the practitioners and 
the users. For a start, they are an indispensable step when we trace the material implications 
of a general rhetoric or discourse, since they translate them into physical requirements and 
legal boundaries. The seemingly technical, objective and neutral language of these documents 
also encode ideological and historical baggages, cultural biases, aesthetic preferences, 
economic imperatives and policing strategies. This hermetic and specialized text-form should 
be analysed with the same criticality as the forms of texts regularly used in urban discourse. 
Furthermore, as the proposed model highlights, the value of such documents is in what they 
record, what they hide, and how they are reinterpreted, reiterated or erased in the course of 
time. Thus, while the lack of information in the public realm already suggests something 
about the practice of certain aspects of design reviews in Singapore, much more sustained 
efforts is needed to gain better empirical understanding of these hidden practices so as to 
come to grips with the complexity of its entirety. Till then, this research is a prologue to a less 
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